Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

Oral Answers to Questions — SOCIAL SECURITY

Disability Surveys

Mr. Worthington: To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what progress has been made in assessing the financial implications of the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys' surveys on disability.

The Minister for Social Security (Mr. Nicholas Scott): We are using the extensive information provided by the surveys to help us consider how best to develop policies which serve the needs of disabled people even more effectively.

Mr. Worthington: Time is running out. Earlier this year the Minister of State promised that there would be a timetable for action after July, but there has still been no action on this issue. Is the Minister aware of the survey conducted by Strathclyde regional council social work department which showed that 80 per cent. of the disabled were worse off after the social security reforms of last year, by an average £9 a week, and that those who were most handicapped suffered most financially? We need action by the Minister and by the Secretary of State to put that right and to end the link in this country between disability and poverty. We cannot accept the Government's slothfulness on this.

Mr. Scott: The findings of the Strathclyde survey stretch my credulity and do not accord with much of the other evidence that is coming in. But that illustrates the point that although we are anxious to make rapid progress on disability benefits, we must carefully examine all the evidence and the representations that we are receiving before making up our minds on the way forward.

Mr. Hannam: Is my right hon. Friend aware that one of the major problems with the disability benefit system is that two people with the same disability can receive widely differing levels of benefit—depending for example, whether the disability was from birth, from an accident or from an industrial injury? Will my right hon. Friend take that into account in his review of disability benefits and in his present negotiations with the Treasury?

Mr. Scott: It is manifest that the cause of an injury can affect the level of benefit to which people are entitled. That is due to the fact that the pattern of disability benefits has

grown up rather incoherently. We shall look into that aspect to see whether it is possible to arrive at a more coherent pattern.

Mr. Alfred Morris: Is it not deplorable that, instead of responding to the challenge of these reports, the Government pile handicap upon handicap by inflicting on disabled people the poll tax, the NHS White Paper proposals and social security changes which their organisations say produced 1 million disabled losers? Where is the urgent and comprehensive review that they were promised? Was that a leak yesterday in the Sunday Telegraph about a change in the treatment of disabled people of working age?
Finally, will it be a nil-cost review of benefits? If so, how can that possibly be justified when the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys has shown that there are vastly more disabled people than the Government ever thought?

Mr. Scott: It is precisely because we have to balance the need for urgency against the need for a comprehensive look at all this that I cannot yet say exactly what timetable we shall follow. Since the Government came to office, expenditure on benefits for the disabled has risen by £390 million per year in real terms, compared with a figure of £220 million under the Labour Government, so we need no lessons from the Opposition about benefits for the disabled.

Pensioners

Mr. Charles Wardle: To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security whether those older and disabled pensioners who benefit from this autumn's special package will lose transitional protection when these increases are introduced.

The Secretary of State for Social Security (Mr. Tony Newton): No. The increased income support pensioner premiums which took effect in the week commencing 9 October were on top of any transitional addition then in payment.

Mr. Wardle: The increases that my right hon. Friend has introduced will be welcome, particularly because much of the extra money will go to pensioners who retired before the state earnings-related pension scheme began in 1978, but how have pensioners on the lowest incomes fared by comparison with the average increase in pensioners' incomes in the past decade?

Mr. Newton: My hon. Friend is right that the purpose of the changes which have just taken place was to help those who have had the least opportunity to benefit from the improvements in occupational pensions and in SERPS in recent years. The most relevant figure that I can give is that the proportion of pensioners on the lowest 20 per cent. of incomes fell from nearly two fifths in 1979 to less than a quarter in 1986.

Mr. Frank Field: If I have understood the Secretary of State correctly, I must congratulate him. Will he spell out to the House that by having no clawback of the increased pensions to the very poorest group, he has made nonsense of the Government's policy of transitional protection? If he is ensuring that this group benefits totally from the additional increase, why do not all pensioners and people on other benefits similarly benefit?

Mr. Newton: With all due respect to the hon. Gentleman, we have not made nonsense of anything. We have given up to £3·50 per week extra to more than 2·5 million of the disabled or oldest pensioners.

Mr. Favell: Is it not true that there are some very rich pensioners and that it is much more sensible to concentrate on the poorest group than to spread the jam thinly as the Labour party would have us do?

Mr. Newton: It is certainly the case that on the latest information available to us the average total net income of pensioners has been rising considerably faster—nearly twice as fast as for the population as a whole. That underlines the success of earlier policies, those aimed at improving especially the position of the newly retired in general. It also reinforces the need to focus our help on older retired people, which is exactly what we have been doing.

YTS

Mr. Nellist: To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security how many 16 and 17-year-olds are currently disqualified from benefit for not taking up the offer of a place on a youth training scheme; and if he will make a statement.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Social Security (Mrs. Gillian Shephard): None is disqualified, because the question of disqualification does not arise in the case of a 16 or 17-year-old.

Mr. Nellist: Is it not a fact that in the 12 months to September, 15,400 16 and 17-year-olds had to apply for income support on special grounds of severe hardship, because they had been disqualified by not having a YTS place, and that 5,230 were rejected and have no benefit at all? When will the Government end this period of economic conscription to YTS through denial of benefit? If the youth training scheme offered a guaranteed job at decent allowances and a genuine future for teenagers there would be no need for the legal theft of putting thousands of teenagers into penury.

Mrs. Shephard: The Government consider that it is the best possible start for young people to obtain a training place on YTS and to benefit from the allowances associated with it, and 400,000 young people throughout the country are currently doing just that. I remind the hon. Gentleman that there are many vacant places on training schemes which should make it possible for young people to find an appropriate training place. The hon. Gentleman's point about severe hardship proves the need for the scheme introduced by the Government to cope with young people who for one reason or another were obliged to wait for a training place or who fell into some kind of difficulty. The hon. Gentleman will also recall that some categories of young people receive income support because for one reason or another they cannot benefit from a YTS place.

Mr. Baldry: We all welcome our hon. Friend to the Dispatch Box. Does she agree that there can be no possible justification for 16 or 17-year-olds not being either in full-time education or in full-time training? At a time when jobs will increasingly go to those who are skilled and qualified, it is criminal to deny those between 16 and 17 and up to the age of 19 opportunities for the best possible

education and training. Is it not depressing that some people in the Labour party seem to want some kind of lumpenproletariat to continue?

Mrs. Shephard: My hon. Friend is absolutely right. I repeat that it is the Government's view that the best possible start for young people is to continue in education, to get a job, or to take advantage of the youth training scheme. As I have said, 400,000 young people are currently doing just that.

Mr. Flynn: We welcome the hon. Lady to her new post with warmth and sincerity. I recall that when she was a Back Bencher she spoke about this issue in Committee. It is disappointing that her reply does not reflect the concern that she expressed then. Has the Minister read the recent report by the citizens advice bureaux which makes it clear that the changes made in July are having no effect and tells a bleak story of growing numbers of young people at the most vulnerable time of their lives having the problems of poverty unnecessarily heaped on them? There are stories of young pregnant girls who have no chance of taking part in a YTS scheme because of their pregnancy but who can get no income support and are left without any money at a time when diet is so important. There are also stories of family break-ups because there is no income in the family.
The CAB confirms, as an independent body, that this is Government-sponsored poverty—it cannot be blamed on anybody else—because the Government have not only greatly increased the number of young people in hardship, but have intensified their suffering and destitution. The Salvation Army confesses that it cannot cope and the Church of England Children's Society says that there are 98,000 children without hope. Everyone else can see that this is a growing problem. When, in the name of pity, will the Government see it?

Mr. Speaker: Order. We shall make little progress if we have long questions.

Mrs. Shephard: I thank the hon. Gentleman for his kind words. The CAB report makes six recommendations, all of which can be fully answered by my Department. The hon. Gentleman mentioned the case of young pregnant girls. The view of the Department and of the Government is that 16 and 17-year-olds, including pregnant girls, are covered by the guarantee of a place. There is no evidence to suggest that pregnancy is an obstacle for young women who are genuinely keen to undertake training, and who are medically fit to do so. In that respect, the rule that they should work until 11 weeks before the expected confinement is in line with the rule applying to women over 18.

Anti-fraud Officers

Mr. David Evans: To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what was the amount recovered in 1988–89 as a result of the work of anti-fraud officers in his Department; what was the target set; and what were the comparable figures for five years ago.

Mr. Newton: The total savings achieved by action against social security fraud in 1988–89 were just over £340 million, taking the Department of Social Security and the Department of Employment together. This compares with just over £120 million in 1984–85. For the DSS alone, the


1988–89 savings were, in round figures, £260 million against a target of £240 million, which compares with £100 million in 1984–85.

Mr. Evans: I thank my hon. Friend for that reply. Although those figures are encouraging, are they not merely the tip of the iceberg? Will my hon. Friend assure the House that his Department will keep as a high priority the anti-fraud office which is doing such a splendid job, so that the taxpayer may save money? After all, the taxpayer is the paymaster, and we should bring more such fraudulent individuals to justice.

Mr. Newton: It is undisputed that some social security fraud still goes undetected, so there is scope for further action. We shall continue to ensure that our efforts, and those of the Department of Employment, are made as effective as possible.

Mr. Skinner: Will the Minister also examine those employers who are taking tax and national insurance contributions from their employees and not passing the money to the proper department? An estimate the other day suggested that more than £1 million per day is being taken by such employers and not passed on, which is fraud on a far bigger scale than that described by the Minister. As for talking about the tip of the iceberg, the Minister should turn the attention of his right hon. and hon. Friends in other Departments to City fraudsters such as those involved in Ferranti who go undetected because the Government will not attack their own friends.

Mr. Newton: I shall concentrate my reply on the hon. Gentleman's quite sensible point about tax and national insurance fraud by employers. He will know that the Inland Revenue vigorously pursues such matters. Its compliance officers save about £2 billion, as I recall the latest figure, and there have been a number of prosecutions. I accept that our concern with fraud should not be confined to social security beneficiaries who are getting benefit fraudulently but should be extended to anybody who is defrauding the taxpayer and thus other beneficiaries.

Mr. Brandon-Bravo: If, as my right hon. Friend said, the amount of social security fraud discovered was in excess of £250 million last year, in layman's terms would it not be true to say that that would be the equivalent of giving every old age pensioner in the United Kingdom an additional 50p per week? Does that not put social security fraud into its proper perspective?

Mr. Newton: It is for precisely that sort of reason that we take the drive against fraud so seriously. To put the point another way, the sum that I mentioned is significantly greater than the very large amount that we have just made available in additional pensioner premiums.

Income Support

Mr. Allen: To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security if he has any plans to increase the level of income support.

Mr. Newton: We have this month substantially improved the level of income support for older and

disabled pensioners. I expect to be making fairly soon a statement about the income support rates from next April, when they will of course be increased.

Mr. Allen: Is the Secretary of State aware that my constituents and many others are finding it increasingly difficult to manage on the current level of income support, especially in respect of a healthy diet? Did he read the recent Childright report which, using the Department's own figures, showed that if the amount of money required for a healthy diet were taken out of income support, only £1 would be left to meet all other needs? It is becoming a choice between heating and eating. Will the right hon. Gentleman do something about that?

Mr. Newton: I have already said that we shall take all those matters into account in setting the social security rates for the forthcoming year. There appears to have been a suggestion that attempts were made to suppress the report to which the hon. Gentleman referred. My understanding is that the author of the report has been entirely free to publish it, and I hope that it is well understood that that is the case.

Mr. Nicholas Bennett: Given that 85 per cent. of women whose partners have left them receive no support from those former partners and therefore rely on income support from the state, when will the Government take action to make those men responsible for the dependants whom they have left behind?

Mr. Newton: My hon. Friend is aware that the rules of the social security system provide for efforts to be made to ensure that those known in the jargon of the trade as "liable relatives" are found and required to make a contribution. Steps are taken to try to ensure that that contribution is paid and we shall be looking for ways to make those efforts even more effective.

Mrs. Beckett: Is the Secretary of State aware that the Childright report is just one of several recent reports that draw attention to the difficulty faced by many families in paying their bills? The right hon. Gentleman will recall that four years ago, when the Government were planning all their changes in social security, many independent groups warned that they would leave families unable to pay their bills. As the Government's plans for the poll tax, water charges and electricity charges can only make matters worse, what does the right hon. Gentleman plan to do about the situation?

Mr. Newton: As the hon. Lady referred to our previous exchanges in the House some three or four years ago, at the time of the reforms, she will not have forgotten that, among other things, the reforms in the income-related benefit system steered substantial additional sums of money towards low-income families and those out of work, both through income support and through family credit. In particular, family credit is bringing much greater sums to such families than family income supplement did. I hope that the hon. Lady will bear that in mind.

Mr. David Nicholson: Is my right hon. Friend aware that more than 50 per cent. of working people in the United Kingdom are making provision for their retirement, which is by far the largest proportion in the EEC, and that the number of retired people with income from private pensions and occupational pensions is increasing? Is he further aware, however, that in my


constituency and elsewhere there remain a number of people who have little income above the basic state pension? Does he therefore recognise that the increases implemented this month are very welcome as the first fruits of the Government's good intentions towards that group?

Mr. Newton: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for recognising our efforts. Obviously, we shall continue, as and when we feel able to do so, to build on that basic policy of seeking to steer additional help to those pensioners who most clearly have additional needs.

Disabled People

Mr. Wareing: To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what plans he has, in the light of the findings of the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys' surveys, to increase the allocation of resources to disabled people.

Mr. Scott: We have already provided for an increase in spending on the sick and disabled in real terms of £1·9 billion, at 1988–89 prices, over the three years to 1991–92. This is a real increase in expenditure of more than 20 per cent. We shall consider the need for further expenditure following our assessment of all the results of the OPCS surveys.

Mr. Wareing: Is not the Minister citing increases which are due to the greater take-up of benefits introduced by my right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Wythenshawe (Mr. Morris)? Is he not truly concerned about the abject poverty of many disabled people—the 4·6 million disabled adults who subsist on an average income of £65 a week? Is it not about time that, instead of posing as a Minister for the disabled, the right hon. Gentleman showed some real concern? Now that the OPCS surveys are out of the way and we have them before us, I hope that we shall not have to wait another 18 months—as we did for the Griffiths report—before the Government take action.

Mr. Scott: As I said in answer to an earlier question, the Government have no reason to be ashamed of their record in responding to the needs of disabled people. I hope that the hon. Gentleman himself will be glad that the take-up of attendance allowance and mobility allowance has increased so substantially under the present Government. The same number of people were there when Labour was in office, but fewer took up the benefit.

Mr. Cormack: Is my right hon. Friend aware that a small, tragic and diminishing group of disabled people desperately need help now? I refer to the haemophiliac AIDS victims. Will my right hon. Friend please do something specific for such people who really do constitute a special case and who are dying almost daily?

Mr. Scott: Obviously, we are considering the needs of all disabled people. Let me, however, point out to my hon. Friend—who, I know, takes the concerns of this group very seriously—that substantial sums are still available from the money that was provided for the Macfarlane Trust. In the short term, that money is available to help those people to meet their needs, and I hope that my hon. Friend and other hon. Members—including the hon. Member for Birkenhead (Mr. Field)—will encourage them to avail themselves of that opportunity.

Mr. Ashley: Although I agree that there is no reason to be ashamed of the increased number of claimants, does the Minister agree that there is reason to be ashamed of the fact that most disabled people have experienced no significant increase in their income, despite the Government's boasts about increased prosperity in Britain?

Mr. Scott: Of the £3·5 billion extra in real terms that the Government are spending on disability benefits, some £500 million is due to the increase in the value of benefits, and the rest to take-up. That take-up, however, is meeting real need. Of course we shall address all those points when we review and reach conclusions about the OPCS reports.

Mr. John Marshall: Will my right hon. Friend confirm that surveys have shown that in Scotland poorer people, such as those mentioned in this question, pay less under the community charge system than they did under the discredited rating system?

Mr. Scott: I am sure that the House will note the point that my hon. Friend has made.

Transitional Protection

Mr. Martyn Jones: To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security how many of those on transitional protection will not enjoy a full uprating of their benefits next April.

Mrs. Gillian Shephard: I cannot anticipate the uprating announcement, but more than half those on income support transitional protection are expected to receive an increase at next year's uprating.

Mr. Jones: Will the Minister confirm that the half to whom she refers have not received an increase since April 1987? Does she know of any other group who have received no increase in income for three years? In the time during which transitional payments have been frozen, the cost of living will have gone up by about 19 per cent. by next April. How would the Minister like a cut of one fifth in her income?

Mrs. Shephard: It is correct that after the uprating those still on transitional protection—which should by then be about 5·4 per cent. of the total number of claim—will not receive an increase in their benefit. It should, however, be remembered that those people will still be receiving more benefit than those who have started to receive benefit since April 1988. The hon. Gentleman should also remember that 88 per cent. of all claimants will receive the full uprating in April and that of the other 12 per cent., who are currently on transitional protection, about half will receive some increase.

Mr. Boswell: Does my hon. Friend, whose presence at the Dispatch Box I welcome, agree that it is in the nature of transitional arrangements that they should be transitional and eventually run out? That has nothing to do with the overall level of benefits, on which the Government have a commendable record—for example, in the recent extension of benefits affecting 2·5 million people this month.

Mrs. Shephard: I thank my hon. Friend for his kind remarks. I agree that when there is a massive change in the social security system, such as the one introduced in April


1988, there are bound to be some people who, at the point of change, are adversely affected. That is why the Government introduced transitional protection to ensure that those people are protected from too sudden a change until the benefit to which they are entitled under the new system catches up.

Mr. Robin Cook: Could I tempt the Minister to name the figure about which she is being rather coy? Will she confirm that 200,000 claimants are unlikely to receive any increase next April, and that, by definition, they are likely to be the most frail and disabled, as they were the ones who used to get the highest allowances? What does she say to a pensioner of 81 who has been told that he cannot expect an increase until 1992, and does not know whether he will live to claim it? Will she confirm that every single one of the 200,000 was included in the 88 per cent. of people who, the House were constantly assured, would not be losers as a result of last year's changes? Does not their desperate plight now expose how utterly bogus that claim always was?

Mrs. Shephard: After the uprating about 200,000 people will still be on transitional protection. As I pointed out in an earlier answer, it should be remembered that those people will still be receiving more benefit than those who have come onto benefit since April 1988. I remind the hon. Gentleman that a number of those vulnerable groups have been fully protected, for example for those who need a large amount of domestic help and for those who require respite care the cost of that has been fully updated year by year. In addition, there has been continuous targeting on the most vulnerable groups, in particular the elderly and disabled who have been mentioned so many times today.

Homeless People

Mrs. Gorman: To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security if he has any plans to use the housing benefit system to discourage people coming to London and claiming they are homeless.

Mrs. Gillian Shephard: We have no such plans. Housing benefit is available to anyone who has to pay rent for their home, without any residence qualification.

Mrs. Gorman: I thank my hon. Friend for her cogent reply. Is she aware that most people claiming housing benefit in central London insist on remaining in the most expensive central areas, as I know from my experience as a Westminster city councillor? Is my hon. Friend further aware that such people could easily find accommodation if they were prepared to travel to the outer areas, particularly across the river to Southwark, where there are thousands of empty units of accommodation? Do the Government have any plans to encourage those people to go where housing is available within easy travelling distance of central London?

Mrs. Shephard: I remind my hon. Friend, who I know is aware of this, that housing is the responsibility of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment. However, I am sure that she will also understand that local authorities are not expected to pay housing benefit on unreasonably high rents, and arrangements exist so that the rent officer can judge whether rents are unreasonably high.

Dr. Reid: May I congratulate the Minister on her first answer, rejecting the suggestion by the hon. Member for Billericay (Mrs. Gorman)? People throughout Britain, particularly in areas of high unemployment such as Scotland, would be horrified if the Government had any intention of imposing a residential qualification on those who do not have, and are never likely to have, a residence. May I remind the Minister that the specification that one must spend a specified time in a specified parish was the underlying principle of the poor law in Britain? May I express the hope that that is not the type of Victorian value that the Government or their supporters want us to return to?

Mrs. Shephard: I shall repeat the words with which I began: we have no such plans.

Mr. Robert G. Hughes: Is my hon. Friend happy that the system of assessing housing benefit does the utmost to help all vulnerable groups? Is she aware that housing benefit is assessed only after a private rented flat has been found, and that that may not achieve the housing changes that we want or do the utmost to help vulnerable groups find housing for themselves?

Mrs. Shephard: There are sometimes problems with assessment for housing benefit and with a delay in the local authority making an award. It is the responsibility of local authorities to make the award within 14 days and they have powers to make an interim payment. From time to time, they need reminding of this power.

Young People

Mr. Wallace: To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what further measures are planned to ensure the financial security of young people.

Mr. Scott: By developing the youth training scheme, which now offers over 500,000 places, we have provided the means for young people under 18 to ensure their own financial security. Income support remains available for those who are not able to take up a place on the sceme and" since July, 16 and 17-year-olds who have to live independently can get extra help through the income support and housing benefit scheme.

Mr. Wallace: Has the Minister of State, or his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, had an opportunity to read the letter sent to the Secretary of State last month by the Scottish Council for Single Homeless, which, although welcoming the July changes as a step in the right direction, found the sums inadequate to allow young people who are estranged from their parents to have a living? Regrettably, the reality is that some young people have to move away from home. Will the Minister consider two specific proposals—an estrangement premium, to bring income support levels for young people up to the level for those over 25, and a re-examination of social fund rules so that young people may claim deposits which many landlords and landladies require before they will give them accommodation?

Mr. Scott: Of course we continue to monitor the effects of these provisions. The level of income support for 18 to 25-year-olds is set to reflect the lower earnings expectations of people at the age compared with those over the age of 25. In those circumstances, social security


officers seek to provide evidence for the person concerned that they young person will be on income support and will therefore be in receipt of benefit in due course and, if necessary to liaise with landlords to reassure them of that fact.

Mr. Paice: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the best way to ensure the financial security of young people is for their parents to help them by advising them to do everything they can to secure a beneficial career? As there is now plenty of access to training and further and higher education, that is the way to long-term financial security.

Mr. Scott: I am sure of that, and that is the most desirable outcome. We have to recognise, however, that there will be some young people who, for one reason or another, are unable to be with their parents or who are suffering severe hardship for other reasons. That is why we have improved the situation for them.

Mr. Andrew F. Bennett: What is the Minister doing to help 19-year-olds in full-time education completing their A-level course, whose parents lose child benefit when they reach the age of 19, and who are not themselves eligible for any benefit? When such parents receive income support, they will also lose any allowance for their children from that source. Now these people will be faced with the poll tax. Is it not disgraceful that the Government give no encouragement to people to complete A-level courses and so benefit themselves and the community?

Mr. Scott: As we all know, local education authorities have the power to pay educational maintenance allowances to people in that situation. It is for the education system, rather than the social security system, to provide such money.

Pensioners

Mr. Watson: To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what plans he has for providing a universal new benefit for pensioners over 75 years of age.

Mr. Scott: On 9 October we introduced new and enhanced premiums for disabled pensioners and those aged 75 and over into the income support and housing benefit schemes. This extra help is quite properly targeted on those older pensioners who are most in need. I have no plans for a universal new benefit for this age group.

Mr. Watson: Is the Minister aware of a large number of people aged 75 and over who just fail to qualify for that premium although they have long since made a contribution to society and who deserve to live their retirement in dignity? Does the Minister agree that the fairest way to tackle this problem is to introduce a universal premium, or is his advice to such people simply that they must await the arrival of a Labour Government for one to be provided?

Mr. Scott: No, I do not agree, because total incomes of pensioners have risen very quickly under this Government —more than twice as fast as for the population as a whole, at a rate of some 3 per cent. a year, which is all that the last Labour Government could achieve throughout its time in office. Under those circumstances, it is right to try to use the resources that we have to help those most in need.

Disabled People

Mr. Turner: To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what further discussions he has had with organisations of and for disabled people on the survey findings of the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys.

Mr. Scott: I met separately representatives of the Disability Benefits Consortium and the Disablement Income Group in May to listen to their views on the first OPCS reports. Since then, we have continued to receive comments both from individuals and other interested organisations.

Mr. Turner: Did the Minister listen to those organisations when they told him that the majority of disabled people were living on or below the poverty level? Did he listen to those organisations when they told him that disabled people were living on incomes which, taking into account the cost of disability, are £39 a week less than those for non-disabled people? Will the Minister tell us when this Government are going to do something for the needs of disabled people?

Mr. Scott: When I met those organisations, we did not have all the OPCS reports in front of us. Now that we can look at them, we find that in terms of financial circumstances, about 70 per cent. are satisfied with their standard of living, few are in financial difficulties and the allowances paid for the extra cost of disability, such as attendance allowance and mobility allowance, more than cover the extra cost incurred.

Oral Answers to Questions — CHURCH COMMISSIONERS

Clergy Ordination Measure

Mr. Bowis: To ask the right hon. Member for Selby, as representing the Church Commissioners, what further discussions he has had with the Archbishop of Canterbury regarding the Clergy Ordination Measure 1989.

Mr. Michael Alison (Second Church Estates Commissioner, Representing the Church Commissioners): The Clergy Ordination Measure is a matter for the General Synod of the Church of England, although I have spoken informally to the Archbishop of Canterbury about the outcome of the debate on 17 July. The Synod will meet in November, which will be its first opportunity formally to consider the matter since the debate in the House in July.

Mr. Bowis: Will my right hon. Friend gently explain to the Archbishops and the others who may be participating in the decision on what to do next on this measure that there was no basic hostility in the House towards the Church in taking that decision, but that it was taken largely by members of the Church of England who were prepared to stay up through the night to correct a matter that they thought was going wrong? Will my right hon. Friend take to them our concerns about the carte blanche nature of that measure? Will he take to them the concern that the measure appears to give the clergy an advantage over the laity because the laity are not to be allowed to be remarried in church, but divorced and remarried clergy are to be allowed to advise them of that fact? Will he finally suggest to the Church that such special cases as there


undoubtedly are would be better addressed by the approach of annulment or nullity than by this form of treatment?

Mr. Alison: I certainly take note of my hon. Friend's comments, and his positive and helpful suggestion. He will remember that it was not only members of the Church of England who happened to be Members of this House who were prepared to stay up late at night, but a substantial number of Whips in the Whips' Office, who likewise felt that it was desirable to stay up late at night and who profoundly influenced the outcome of the debate.

Mr. Frank Field: When the commissioner is reporting back on this measure, will he make it plain to Synod that many people who waited up through the night for the debate were not happy that the Church should refuse remarriage in church to ordinary lay people, but wished to create a special class of citizenry—those who were divorced and remarried, but who wished to be made priests—and that there may be a similar rough passage for the measure if the Church continues to maintain those two tiers of citizenship?

Mr. Alison: I certainly take very careful note of the comments by the hon. Member for Birkenhead (Mr. Field). He will understand, as I do, that it is unlikely that the Clergy Ordination Measure will be further amended before representation to the House, if the General Synod decides to represent it. His point is one he can make further in debate, if we debate the matter again.

Sir John Stokes: Is my right hon. Friend aware that, supporting what has been said already, we represent many lay people and that they are not at all happy about the measure? I give solemn warning that the House will not pass the measure unless it is substantially amended.

Mr. Alison: I certainly concur with my hon. Friend's observation that the Church of England, in its active parochial life, is well represented by my hon. Friends on the Government Benches and also by Opposition Members. It is entirely proper that such measures should be considered by the Church of England laity in this place. However, I must tell my hon. Friend that the opinions on the merits of the measure are sharply divided. If there were another debate on the measure, I suspect that the outcome would not necessarily be the same as that which occurred on 17 July.

Church Buildings

Mr. Cran: To ask the right hon. Member for Selby, as representing the Church Commissioners, what is the latest figure he has for the number of churches that the Commission has given permission to be (a) demolished and (b) used for other purposes since 1979.

Mr. Alison: Since 1979, the Church Commissioners have made schemes under the Pastoral Measure authorising the demolition of 109 redundant churches and the appropriation to suitable alternative uses of 374 others. A further 115 have been placed in the care of the Redundant Churches Fund.

Mr. Cran: At some point, could my right hon. Friend provide information about the number of churches that have been disposed of, but are now used by rather more dynamic churches than the Church of England? In relation

to the Church of England, does my right hon. Friend agree that a 2·5 per cent. attendance rate on Sundays is a national disgrace and that it is partly attributable to a political clergy?

Mr. Alison: Since 1969, 1,215 churches have been made redundant and new uses, often for the benefit of the wider community, have been found for more than half of those. Very many of them still remain in constructive and positive use for suitable alternative employment—so to speak. The number of people attending Church of England Sunday worship services is mercifully not subjected to anything equivalent to the Whips' Office in this House. Nevertheless, the numbers—without whipping—are tending to increase Sunday by Sunday.

Mr. Tony Banks: What criteria are adopted by the commissioners when they consider alternative uses for redundant churches? Would using a church for bingo or as a McDonald's hamburger restaurant be acceptable to the commissioners? One or two churches in my area are so affected.

Mr. Alison: If the hon. Gentleman would like to make positive proposals, the Church Commissioners, who are always after making a reasonable profit on their assets to the benefit of the retired clergy, would consider sympathetically anything that the hon. Gentleman might propose. The hon. Gentleman would have to exercise his usual discretion and wisdom so as not to make any really untoward proposals for alternative use.

Ordination Trends

Mr. John Marshall: To ask the right hon. Member for Selby, as representing the Church Commissioners, what are the implications for the future expenditure of the Commissioners of the trend in ordinations during the past five years.

Mr. Alison: There is no clear trend in ordinations to suggest any significant change in the balance of the commissioners' expenditure in future years. The figure for 1988 male ordinations was the highest since 1971, while the relatively low figure anticipated for 1990 is likely to be partly balanced by the increased number of women entering the ministry.

Mr. Marshall: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the increasing number of women entering the ministry should be given full rights and that we should have women priests able to perform every function?

Mr. Alison: In the light of the difficulities encountered by the Clergy Ordination Measure in July, it would be tempting providence to take a position on a measure concerning the ordination of women as priests before that has even been determined in the General Synod.

Mr. Heffer: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that many of us believe that those are matters which should be settled only within the Church and should not be matters for discussion in the House of Commons, especially as hon. Members belong to many denominations and religions? They could take decisions on issues which are not really their concern, but the concern of people like me who are members of the Church. Is he also aware that many of us who hold very strong catholic opinions in the


Church do not go along with some of those people who say that all Anglo-Catholics are opposed to the ordination of women? We are not.

Mr. Alison: The hon. Gentleman is a well-known and loyal Anglican. He will agree that the reality probably is that a substantial number of the solemnisations of marriages, both Christian and secular, that take place in churches are subject to clergy who, because of the establishment of the Church of England, are authorised to register and solemise matrimony in a sacred environment. That makes it evident that public interest in Church of England matters should properly be considered not only in the General Synod but in this House where distinguished laymen such as the hon. Gentleman can express an opinion.

Research

Mr. Harry Greenway: To ask the Right hon. Member for Selby as representing the Church Commissioners, what is spent by the Church Commissioners for research undertaken by committees of the General Synod; where that money is spent; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Alison: The commissioners do not fund research for the General Synod, but I will willingly assist my hon. Friend in securing the relevant information from the General Synod, if he wishes.

Mr. Greenway: Is my right hon. Friend aware of the report of the Bishop of St. Albans' committee on the merits and shortcomings of the White Paper on broadcasting? Does he agree that the Broadcasting Bill should seek properly to secure and expand the place of Christian broadcasting in the same way as it does in respect of secular broadcasting?

Mr. Alison: Yes. I have seen the report of the Bishop of St. Albans, and while I do not agree with everything that it contains, I share my hon. Friend's hope that when the Broadcasting Bill comes before the House, at least as great an opportunity for the expansion of Christian broadcast-ing will be written into the Bill as that proposed for secular broadcasting.

Oral Answers to Questions — HOUSE OF COMMONS

Telephone Costs

Mr. John Marshall: To ask the Lord President of the Council what is the annual cost to public funds of the House of Commons telephone system.

The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Sir Geoffrey Howe): The figures for the Palace of Westminster for the past three years are given in appendix I of the first report of the Services Committee of this Session. These indicate an average charge for telephone services over that period of £1,434,125 per annum. Of that sum the average call charges for each year were £505,163. This House pays some 86 per cent. of the total bill, and, on that basis, the cost to public funds of those telephone services attributable to the House are £1,233,348 and £434,440, respectively.

Mr. Marshall: Will my right hon. and learned Friend confirm that a switch to Mercury could save the taxpayer between £50,000 and £75,000? Does my right hon. and learned Friend, whose policies of controlling Government expenditure and fostering competition formed the basis of our economic success in the early 1980s, agree that such a change would bring a worthwhile saving?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I am more than content to accept the tribute offered by my hon. Friend. I remind him that when considering the precise proposals for making economies in public expenditure, one must consider not only the short, medium and long-term effects but the effects of changes proposed or made on the economy that one has in mind. All those matters were considered by the Services Committee in its report published earlier this year. It had reservations about the effect of the change at this stage on the quality and reliability of the service, the ease and speed with which faults might be reported and rectified, and the effect on the traditional relationship with the supplier, British Telecom. The matter can be reconsidered but it was fully examined by the Committee and the Sub-Committee.

Mr. Winnick: When international conferences take place in which this country is actively involved, is there not a case for right hon. and hon. Members being able to telephone, in this case, the Prime Minister, to tell her that her action has been disgraceful and deceitful. As a former Foreign Secretary ——

Mr. Speaker: Order. That has little to do with this Question. Did I hear the hon. Member use the word "deceitful"? If so, will he withdraw it? I ask him to withdraw that allegation against the Prime Minister.

Mr. Winnick: I understood that it is a question for the Prime Minister and the House of Commons ——

Mr. Speaker: Order. I ask the hon. Member to withdraw the word "deceitful".

Mr. Winnick: Other Commonwealth Prime Ministers have echoed what I have said. [Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order. I am not concerned about the context. Will the hon. Member kindly withdraw that word? He knows that it is unparliamentary.

Mr. Winnick: The position—[Interruption.] If I am allowed to speak ——

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman knows that this is taking time out of Question Time. Will he kindly withdraw that word, please?

Mr. Winnick: I have said that I believe that the Prime Minister has been deceitful—[Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order. I give the hon. Gentleman one final chance. Withdraw the word, please.

Mr. Winnick: If you, Mr. Speaker, wish me to withdraw since I am not allowed to use that word in the House of Commons, obviously I will do so.

Mr. Thurnham: Does my right hon. and learned Friend have any information about the number of fax machines that are connected to the telephone system? Will he ensure that no list of their numbers is published so that we do not get any junk fax on our fax machines.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: My hon. friend is right to draw attention to the fact that fax machines are playing a growing part in the communications system of the House of Commons. There are apparently about 135 lines now installed expressly for that purpose. I cannot go beyond that information at this stage.

Procedure Committee

Mr. Allen: To ask the Lord President of the Council what representations he has received regarding the Procedure Committee's outstanding proposals.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: Apart from exchanges following the business statement on 27 July and informal meetings with the Chairman of the Select Committee on Procedure, I have received no specific representations on the Committee's outstanding proposals.

Mr. Allen: Will the Leader of the House take this first opportunity to condemn the outrage of Prime Minister's Question Time now taking place in Kuala Lumpur with real Prime Ministers? Does he accept that he has some distinguished predecessors, for example Norman St. John-Stevas, now in another place, who introduced departmental Select Committees and his other predecessor who introduced televising of the House of Commons? When it comes to the right hon. and learned Gentleman's time to move on to another job, what would he wish to be remembered for?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I shall be discharging my duties as Leader of the House as effectively as I can.

Mr. Latham: Will my right hon. and learned Friend ask the Procedure Committee to look at the motions on procedure which the hon. Member for Nottingham, North (Mr. Allen) lists on the Order Paper day after day? If we must continue to waste money printing those motions every day, perhaps we could debate them.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I find that a great deal of our time is taken up by trying to keep abreast of the hon. Gentleman's motions on that subject.

Mr. Skinner: Does the Leader of the House agree that he and the Government administrators will have more than a little difficulty if, in the next Session, an embryo research Bill is introduced and amendments relating to abortion are tabled? Does he have it in mind that the Government will use a guillotine to stop the debate?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: The Bill that the hon. Gentleman envisages will possibly come before the House will be handled by Parliament in accordance with the full range of procedures available to both Houses.

Theft

Mr. Harry Greenway: To ask the Lord President of the Council if he will detail the cost of losses and thefts of House of Commons china and cutlery since his answer of 18 July 1988, Official Report, columns 786–87; and if he will make a statement.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: Purchases of tableware for the financial period 1988–89 amounted to £52,289, which represents less than 2 per cent. of that year's turnover. The average cost per annum over the past five years is £38,066. The purchases were largely to cover general wear and tear. It is not possible to give any further breakdown.

Mr. Greenway: Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware of reports that House of Commons plates, cups, saucers and cutlery are to be found in all sorts of places? Will he consider arranging an amnesty for the return of those treasures, and will he keep the House informed of progress?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: My hon. Friend's pronouncement should encourage all hon. Members and others to ensure that such objects are returned as promptly as possible. I found no fewer than 17 cups in my own office this afternoon.

Mr. Allen: Was the amount lost in cutlery and other tableware equal to what has been gained by selling off the family silver? Is it also equivalent to the amount of money made by the Conservative party selling dinners in this place to its political friends?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: There appears to be no limit to the ingenuity of the hon. Gentleman's mind. His point has nothing to do with the question.

Oral Answers to Questions — CHURCH COMMISSIONERS

No. 1 Millbank

Mr. Thurnham: To ask the right hon. Member for Selby, as representing the Church Commissioners, what further progress there has been in the building alterations at No. 1 Millbank; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Michael Alison (Second Church Estates Commissioner, representing the Church Commissioners): Work is progressing well and the new accommodation for commercial letting is expected to be complete at the beginning of 1990. The Church of England Pensions Board took up its new accommodation in the Millbank complex in July—without any House of Commons cutlery, plates or cups.

Mr. Thurnham: As I pass that building every day on my way from my flat to the House, I continue to take great interest in the progress of the work. Will my right hon. Friend remind the House of the cost of the work to date and of the estimate of the final completion costs?

Mr. Alison: The conversion is costing several million pounds. I am afraid that I cannot give the exact figure without notice. The building development is well up to schedule and will certainly be completed on time.

Points of Order

Mr. Nigel Spearing: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I believe that you can confirm that, under Standing Orders relating to questions, it is within your discretion to permit a private notice or written question arising after the date of due notice for questions, which in your opinion is such that the Government should answer. If such a question arises and matters escalate after midday to a degree not apparent previously, is it possible for such a question to be tabled between midday and 3.30 pm or, as I expect, does the question have to be held over until 3.30 pm on the following day?

Mr. Speaker: If that occurs—when that occurs—I have no authority to grant a private notice question at short notice, but those facts would certainly be taken into account if a private notice question were submitted on the subsequent day.

Mr. Eric S. Heffer: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. It arises out of Question Time when you gave an answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) in which you said that he could not say that the Prime Minister had been deceitful, either in this country or abroad. I should like to ask whether that ruling is in "Erskine May" and whether we can say such things. If an hon. Member says that somebody is a liar, I accept that an hon. Member would then be brought to order. However, being deceitful is not quite the same thing as being a liar. People can lie without being deceitful and be deceitful without being liars. Many people in the House and elsewhere are deceitful, but are not necessarily liars.
I should therefore like to know the basis of the ruling that you have given, Mr. Speaker. Is it in "Erskine May"? What exactly is the position? If we continue along these lines, we shall end up not being able to say anything about anybody or about anything that they say or do, and that would be quite wrong in a parliamentary democracy. I understand that in a parliamentary democracy we can challenge Conservative Members in the same way that they can challenge us. I should like to know the precise basis for your ruling, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Gentleman has been here long enough to know that we in this House do not attribute dishonourable motives to each other—[Interruption.] Order. We are not televised yet, but I hope that we shall set a high standard in the words that we use about each other. "Deceitful" is an unparliamentary word.

Mr. Heffer: Is the basis of your ruling to be found in "Erskine May," Mr. Speaker? Does it say that in "Erskine May"?

Mr. Speaker: There is no longer a list of unparliamen-tary expressions in "Erskine May".

Mr. Tony Banks: There is a list——

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Gentleman had better have a look.

Several Hon. Member: rose——

Mr. Speaker: Order. I am not prepared to have an argument about it. We must keep high standards here and treat each other as right hon. and hon. Members of the House—on both sides.

Mr. Harry Cohen: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I believe that my hon. Friend the Member for Newham, South (Mr. Spearing) was alluding to the need for an emergency debate on the London ambulance dispute, which has been escalated by the management. After the deadline for making representations to you, I received information that the management had taken the keys away from the vehicles belonging to my local ambulance service and will not put——

Mr. Speaker: Order. That is as may be, but I have nothing to add to what I have already said to the hon. Member for Newham, South (Mr. Spearing).

Mr. David Winnick: rose——

Mr. Speaker: Order. I hope that we shall not pursue this matter as we have an enormous list of amendments on the Children Bill.

Mr. Winnick: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. You know that I and other hon. Members observe your rulings and that we are trying to do so. Will you reflect on the ruling you gave a moment ago to my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) and what you said to me? I mentioned to you—perhaps you did not hear me because of the noise—that Commonwealth leaders use the same words that I used. If that word simply cannot be used, so be it, but since there is no list in "Erskine May", and since many people believe that the Prime Minister has been—I cannot use the word, according to you—I believe that on future occasions we should be able to speak our minds in a free Parliament and in a parliamentary democracy.

Mr. Speaker: I hope that the House too will reflect on the matter of parliamentary language. That certain words may be used outside this place is irrelevant. What we are concerned with in this House is keeping up our standards, and I hope that we shall. do so.

Mr. Alan Williams: Further to the point of order raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Newham, South (Mr. Spearing) about private notice questions. As you have said, Mr. Speaker, we are coming towards the time when the House will be televised and, understandably, the public will expect the House of Commons to reflect the immediacy and urgency of situations as they are seen outside this place.
We have a myth, which we have all sustained over the years, that private notice questions are not asked unless they are granted. That leads people outside not to understand the extent to which hon. Members on both sides of the House try to pursue matters that are of great urgency, sometimes at a constituency level, but often at a national level. Might it not be time to question whether we need to sustain the illusion that unasked private notice questions have never been asked in the first place?

Mr. Speaker: If the right hon. Gentleman wants that to happen, he should take it to the Procedure Committee because it is the Procedure Committee that binds the Chair on this matter. I cannot go beyond what the Procedure Committee has recommended and the House has agreed.

Mr. Edward Leigh: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. Will you please make it quite clear that, once Parliament is televised, television will be the servant of Parliament and not Parliament the servant of television?

Mr. Speaker: I have used that phrase myself.

STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS, &c

Ordered,
That the draft Inter-American Development Bank (Seventh General Increase) Order 1989 be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &amp;c—[Mr. Greg Knight.]

Orders of the Day — Children Bill [Lords]

As amended (in the Standing Committee), considered.

Mr. Speaker: Before calling upon the Minister to move the order of consideration motion, I must draw the attention of the House to a printing error on the Amendment Paper. The amendments to new clause 34, which is printed on page 3173, will be found on page 3164.

Mr. Keith Vaz: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker: Leave it for the moment.

The Minister for Health (Mr. David Mellor): I beg to move,
That the Bill, as amended, be considered in the following order, namely: Amendments relating to Clauses 1 to 14, Schedule 1, Clause 47, Schedule 4, Clauses 48 to 53, Schedule 5, Clauses 54 to 56, Schedule 6, new Schedule 6A, Clauses 57 to 59, Schedule 7, Clauses 60 to 63, Schedules 9 to 13, new Clauses 1, 23 and 20, remaining new Clauses, new Schedule 9A, Amendments relating to Clauses 15 to 26, Schedule 2. Clauses 27 to 33, Schedule 3, Clauses 34 to 46, Clauses 64 to 71, Schedule 8, Clauses 72 to 91 and the Title.
I should like to pay warm tribute to the officials of the House, who had to work exceptionally hard to produce the order of consideration for today having regard to the large number of amendments that have been tabled. I know that that necessitated a number of officials of the House, as well as officials of my Department, working through the night on Friday. I should like to express my gratitude and, I suspect, the gratitude of the House for that.
The motion endeavours to arrange our consideration so that a significant number of uncontentious and formal amendments are taken first.

Mr. Vaz: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I tried to attract your attention earlier, but you did not call me. My point relates to what the Minister has just said and the order in which the House will take the amendments. As you, Mr. Speaker, have said, there is an enormous number of amendments to the Bill. I am concerned about new clauses 13 and 5, which involve the child assessment orders and the child production notice. They are important clauses and, if we follow the selection that you have determined, we shall reach them by about 7 o'clock this evening. In view of the importance of the clauses and the statements made by the Minister last Saturday to the social services correspondent of The Guardian will it be possible to take those clauses out of the schedule you suggested and put them back until tomorrow?

Mr. Speaker: The order in which amendments are taken is not for me. It is in the Government's motion which is on the Order Paper. If the hon. Gentleman does not like that motion, he must vote against it.

Mr. Mellor: I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not feel it necessary to do that.
I was about to say that the motion, which has obviously been discussed through the usual channels, is an endeavour to reflect the significance of making progress


with largely uncontentious amendments, followed by the opportunity, while the House is still fresh, to consider some issues, including the one raised by the hon. Member for Leicester, East (Mr. Vaz), which are more contentious and on which the House will no doubt want to spend some time.
In explaining to the House why there are so many amendments, I shall make three points. First, the Bill is a major consolidation and reform of both the private and public law relating to children. It is an important technical Bill on a matter which is unlikely to be the subject of further sustained parliamentary consideration for some time. Therefore, it is crucial that all the details are right, hence the large number of amendments, many of which, though I suspect purely formal and uncontentious, are vital. I apologise for the large number of amendments.
Secondly, the Bill has proceeded through both Houses of Parliament as a non-partisan measure and, therefore, the fact that when the Bill was considered in totality in Committee the Government offered a number of concessions to opinion among all parties means that a number of the amendments reflect agreements which were reached in Committee. While that has added to the work of the House, it is an ornament to Parliament rather than otherwise that the Committee stages have led to such a measure of consideration on Report.
Thirdly, one or two new issues have arisen, such as the follow-up to the Crookham Court school problems which have led to some amendments being tabled. It would have been remiss if we had not taken the opportunities offered to make changes in a part of the law which plainly gave rise to considerable public concern.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1

WELFARE OF THE CHILD

The Solicitor-General (Sir Nicholas Lyell): I beg to move amendment No. 37, in page 1, line 11, at end insert—
'(A) In any proceedings in which any question with respect to the upbringing of a child arises, the court shall have regard to the general principle that any delay in determining the question is likely to prejudice the welfare of the child.'.

Mr. Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 40, 41 and 74.

The Solicitor-General: Following what my hon. and learned Friend the Minister for Health has said, I can add that these amendments are not contentious and I shall deal with them comparatively briefly unless hon. Members wish to ask questions about them. The effect of the amendments is to state as a general principle that the court is to regard any delay in proceedings about children as likely to prejudice the child's welfare. That is something about which the House will agree and I commend the amendments.

Mr. Vaz: The Solicitor-General invited questions on these technical amendments. Does he believe that the amendment pre-empts the debates that we shall hold later on family courts? Does he agree that if we had a family

court, it would meet many of the criticisms of the delays that occur when the court system deals with cases affecting children?

The Solicitor-General: I am sure that the steps that we propose to take and which we shall have an opportunity —I hope not much later—this afternoon to discuss fully will meet the hon. Gentleman's point.

Mr. Ian McCartney: My point is not so much a question as a contribution about an issue that causes me great anxiety. During the past decade, much of my work has concerned the delays involved in court hearings of children's cases—delays between hearings and subsequently in the appeals procedure.
When considering provision for a child's future welfare, it is vital that circumstances dividing the child from the wider family and that access, when appropriate, to the child by the parent during proceedings be taken into account. Unfortunately, either because of duplicity, pressure of work or lack of communication between parents, the representatives of parents, the wider family, the local authority and the court, in the period leading up to court proceedings there is often a vital breakdown in communications and in the link between the family and the child. When a final decision has been made by the courts that break often leads to an irreversible breakdown in relationships which can cause unnecessary anxiety for children and for the family, the parents, the wider family and especially grandparents.
I do not want to pre-empt future debates on clauses dealing with maintaining family links during proceedings, but will the Minister assure us that statutory instruments will be brought to the House laying down the responsibilities of the court and the local authority to maintain the link between the child and the wider family during proceedings? Such advice should set out the basic tasks that must be undertaken to ensure that the relationship continues for all practical purposes.
When proceedings are pending, parents and the wider family are often wholly excluded from communication with the child—they cannot celebrate birthdays, Christmas or other special events together; they cannot gain access for usual family activities, either. It is vital to lay down in legislative form certain other practical steps that the courts must take. Local authorities and courts must not be given options: we must set down clear duties for them to undertake in respect of maintaining the important link between the child in care and the authorities who are responsible for determining its future welfare.
In many instances, courts and local authorities should be empowered to expedite the following matters: facilities should be provided for preparing meals for children and giving babies a feed. Families should be able to take a child to and from school or nursery if the child is still attending during care proceedings. They should be able to go out on social outings to shops and cinemas and clinics and doctors. Families should be able to clean a child's room, make its bed, wash and iron its clothes, read to it and tell it stories. They should be able to help the child with reading or writing and with shopping for shoes and clothes, with or without the foster parents if the latter are involved in care proceedings. All these are vital in cases in which the courts have yet to decide whether long-term


separation from the family is in the interests of the child. In that preceding period the link must be maintained and carefully nurtured, along with the support of professional social workers under the guidance of the court.
It is also important when there is some measure of access to the child during proceedings, that prior to access facilities are provided to choose clothing and the other things that a child needs and which can be provided by a grandparent, another member of the family or a family friend. Those are minimum standards that require to be set down, and without them the situation will remain as it is now.
Efforts have been made to amend the clause. When delays take place—sometimes for legitimate and at other times for not so legitimate reasons—the break-up of the family begins and gathers pace, and further anxieties and pressure are brought to bear on the child and there is extreme pressure on the family. That is unacceptable, given that part of the whole ethos of social work in most cases is to try to retain the link between the family and the child. Even if at the end of the day the court makes a determination order for either a short or a long period, the child will not live in the family context.
At some stage during the passage of the Bill will the Minister provide clear advice to local authorities in court? Where, in specific circumstances, it is necessary to maintain the link with the family, will he set out clear instructions detailing the tasks that will have to be carried out on behalf of the court by the social services to maintain the vital family link?

The Solicitor-General: All those matters are covered at one point or another in the Bill. There may be an opportunity to debate some of them later today. The amendments before us deal with delay and the desirability of avoiding it wherever possible.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 4

ACQUISITION OF PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY BY FATHER

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move amendment No.268, in page 3, line 36, leave out subsections (2) and (3) and insert—
'(2) No parental responsibility agreement shall have effect for the purposes of this Act unless—

(a) it is made in the form prescribed by regulations made by the Lord Chancellor; and
(b) where regulations are made by the Lord Chancellor prescribing the manner in which such agreements must be recorded, it is recorded in the prescribed manner.'.

Mr. Speaker: With this it will be convenient to consider Government amendment No. 38.

The Solicitor-General: Again, these amendments deal with the question of the prescribed form for parental responsibility agreements and, in future, with methods of recording them as laid down as and when the Lord Chancellor comes to lay them down.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 38, in page 3, line 42, after 'may', insert 'only'.—[The Solicitor-General.]

Clause 5

APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move amendment No. 269,
That Clause 5 be divided into two Clauses, the first consisting of page 4, subsections 1–8 and page 5, subsections (16) and (17) and the second of page 4, subsections (9) to (15) on page 5.

Mr. Speaker: With this it will be convenient to consider Government amendments Nos. 274, 275, 277, 279, 280 and 282.

The Solicitor-General: The amendments are largely technical. They deal with the splitting of clause 5 into two parts with detailed provisions about the appointment of guardians and with amendments consequent upon the splitting of the clause and some other drafting amendments.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made:

No. 270, in page 4, line 4, leave out from `(1)' to end of line and insert
'Where an application with respect to a child is made to the court by any individual, the court may by order appoint that individual to be the child's'.

No. 271, in page 4, line 9, at end insert—
'(1A) The power conferred by subsection (1) may also be exercised in any family proceedings if the court considers that the order should be made even though no application has been made for it.'.

No. 272, in page 4, line 15 leave out 'is signed by the person making it' and insert
'is signed by the person making the appointment or—

(a) in the case of an appointment made by a will which is not signed by the testator, is signed at the direction of the testator in accordance with the requirements of section 9 of the Wills Act 1837; or
(b) in any other case, is signed at the direction of the person making the appointment, in his presence and in the presence of two witnesses who each attest the signature.'.

No. 273, in page 4, line 16, after 'a', insert 'child's'.

No. 274, in page 4, line 36, leave out 'subsection (2) or (3)' and insert 'section 5(2) or (3)'.

No. 275, in page 4, line 42 leave out 'subsection (2) or (3)' and insert 'section 5(2) or (3)'.

No. 276, in page 4, line 45, leave out `by him' and insert—

(a) by him; or
(b) at his direction, in his presence and in the presence of two witnesses who each attest the signature.'.

No. 277, in page 5, line 1, leave out 'subsection (2) or (3)' and insert 'section 5(2) or (3)'.

No. 278, in page 5, line 2, leave out from `if' to end of line 3 and insert
with the intention of revoking the appointment, the person who made it—

(a) destroys the instrument by which it was made; or
(b) has some other person destroy that instrument in his presence.'.

No. 279, in page 5, line 4, leave out 'subsection (2) or (3)' and insert 'section 5(2) or (3)'.

No. 280, in page 5, line 6, leave out 'subsection (2) or (3)' and insert 'section 5(2) or (3)'.

No. 281, in page 5, line 10, leave out subsection (14) and insert—
'(14) Where regulations are made by the Lord Chancellor prescribing the manner in which such disclaimers must be recorded, no such disclaimer shall have effect unless it is recorded in the prescribed manner.'.

No. 282, in page 5, line 13, leave out 'this section' and insert 'section 5'.

No. 283, in page 5, line 14, at end insert—

'(a) on the application of any person who has parental responsibility for the child;
(b) on the application of the child concerned, with leave of the court; or
(c) in any family proceedings, if the court considers that it should be brought to an end even though no application has been made.'.

No. 284, in page 5, line 17, at end insert—
`(16A) Subject to any provision made by rules of court, no court shall exercise the High Court's inherent jurisdiction to appoint a guardian of the estate of any child.
(16B) Where rules of court are made under subsection (16A) they may prescribe the circumstances in which, and conditions subject to which, an appointment of such a guardian may be made.'.

No. 285, in page 5, line 18, after 'guardian', insert 'of a child'.—[The Solicitor-General.]

Clause 7

RESIDENCE, CONTACT AND OTHER ORDERS WITH RESPECT TO CHILDREN

Amendment made: No. 39, in page 6, line 17, leave out 'issue' and insert 'question'.—[The Solicitor-General.]

Clause 8

RESTRICTIONS ON MAKING SECTION 7 ORDERS

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move amendment No. 286, in page 7, line 12, at end insert—
'(5A) No court shall make any section 7 order which is to have effect for a period which will end after the child has reached the age of sixteen unless it is satisfied that the circumstances of the case are exceptional.'.

Mr. Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendment No. 147.

The Solicitor-General: These amendments provide that section 7 orders should not be made in relation to children over the age of 16 except in exceptional circumstances. This is obviously sensible. Amendment No. 147 simply corrects a slip. I commend the amendments to the House.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 9

POWER OF COURT TO MAKE SECTION 7 ORDERS

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move amendment No. 287, in page 8, line 8, at end insert—
'(5A) A person who would not otherwise be entitled (under the previous provisions of this section) to apply for the variation or discharge of a section 7 order shall be entitled to do so if—

(a) the order was made on his application; or
(b) in the case of a contact order, he is named in the order.'.

This concerns the application for variations for section 7 orders. I commend it to the House

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 10

GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS

Amendments made: No. 40, in page 8, line 30, leave out subsection (1).

No. 41, in page 8, line 36, leave out 'such a question' and insert
'any question of making a section 7 order, or any other qustion with respect to such an order,'.—[The Solicitor General.]

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move amendment No. 288, in page 9, line 24, leave out from 'made' to end of line 26 and insert—
'(ii) who is a parent of the child concerned;
(iii) who is not a parent of his but who has parental responsibility for him; or
(iv) with whom the child is living,'.
This amendment and the two in the next group extend the range of people obliged to comply with the conditions under section 7 orders to unmarried fathers and to anyone with whom the child is living. They fall well within the context of what we discussed in Committee, and I commend them to the House.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 11

RESIDENCE ORDERS AND PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY

Amendments made: No. 289, in page 9, line 38, leave out 'if he would not otherwise'.

No. 290, in page 9, line 38, leave out 'have that responsibility'. —[The Solicitor-General.]

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move amendment No. 42, in page 9 line 44, leave out
'or section 18 of the Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978'.

Mr. Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 43, 76 and 77.

The Solicitor-General: These amendments simply remove references to the Adoption (Scotland) Act 1878. It was thought more appropriate to deal with it elsewhere. I commend them to the House.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 43. in page 9, line 46 leave out 'or section 49 of the Act of 1978'.—[The Solicitor-General.]

Clause 13

ORDERS FOR FINANCIAL RELIEF WITH RESPECT TO CHILDREN

Amendment made: No. 291, in page 10, line 23, at end Insert—
'(2) The powers of a magistrates' court under section 60 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 to revoke, revive or vary an order for the periodical payment of money shall not apply in relation to an order made under Schedule 1.'.—[The Solicitor-General.]

Clause 14

FAMILY ASSISTANCE ORDERS

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move amendment No. 292, in page 11, line 13, at end insert—
'(7) A family assistance order shall not be made so as to require a local authority to make an officer of theirs available unless—

(a) the authority agree; or


(b) the child concerned lives or will live within their area.

(8) Where a family assistance order requires a probation officer to be made available, the officer shall be selected in accordance with arrangements made by the probation committee for the area in which the child lives or will live.
(9) If the selected probation officer is unable to carry out his duties, or dies, another probation officer shall be selected in the same manner.'.
This amendment deals with the selection of a local authority or probation official to befriend the person named in the family assistance order. I commend the amendment to the House.

Amendment agreed to.

Schedule 1

FINANCIAL PROVISION FOR CHILDREN

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move amendment No.168, in page 82, line 3, leave out
'High Court, a county court or a magistrates'.

Mr. Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 365, 404 to 406, 318, 319, 169, 170, 366 and 367.

The Solicitor-General: These are drafting and tidying-up amendments consequential on others. I commend them to the House.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 365, in page 83, line 8, leave out
`the parents of the child'

and insert—

'(a) any parent making or securing the payments; and
(b) any parent to whom the payments are made or secured,'.

No. 404, in page 83, line 26, leave out 'or 2'.

No. 405, in page 83, line 34, at end insert—
'(2A) Where the court makes an order under paragraph 1 against a person who is not the father of the child, it shall record in the order that the order is made on the basis that the person against whom the order is made is not the child's father.'

No. 406, in page 83, leave out line 36 and insert—

'(a) in relation to a decision whether to exercise its powers under paragraph 1, any parent of the child;
(aa) in relation to a decision whether to exercise its powers under paragraph 2, the mother and father of the child:.

No. 318, in page 84, line 2, leave out '£500' and insert `£1,000'.

No. 319, in page 85, line 9, leave out 'or 2'.

No. 169, in page 86, line 32, leave out
'High Court, a county court or a magistrates'.

No. 170, in page 88, line 4, leave out `(4)' and insert '(3)'

No. 366, in page 89, line 5, leave out 'and;' and insert—
'(2) In this Schedule except paragraphs 2 and 15.

No. 367, in page 89, line 7, at end insert
'; and for this purpose any reference to either parent or both parents shall be construed as references to any parent of his and to all of his parents'.—[The Solicitor-General.]

Clause 47

PROVISION OF COMMUNITY HOMES BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move amendment No. 457, in page 45, line 27, leave out subsection (6).

Mr. Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 122, 459 and 164.

Mr. Mellor: These amendments tighten up the definitions of "voluntary home" and "voluntary organisa-tion". I commend them to the House.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 53

REGISTRATION AND REGULATION OF VOLUNTARY HOMES

Amendments made: No. 122, in page 50, line 20, leave out
'in the case of a home or other institution which is supported wholly or partly by endowments'.

No. 459, in page 50, line 22, at end insert—
`(cc) any community home;'.—[The Solicitor-General.]

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move amendment No. 460, in page 50, line 23, leave out from 'institution' to '; or' in line 24 and insert
'provided, equipped and maintained by the Secretary of State'.

Mr. Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 458, 466, 469, 468, 140 and 141.

Mr. Mellor: These are purely drafting amendments.

Amendment agreed to.

Schedule 5

REGISTERED CHILDREN'S HOMES

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move amendment No. 370, in page 113, line 1, leave out
`require the approval of the Secretary of State for the provision and'
and insert 'prohibit the'.

Mr. Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 371 to 373.

Mr. Mellor: These are substantive amendments, so I should say a word or two about them. They make an important but, I hope in the light of the debates that we had in Committee, a welcome change to the Secretary of State's regulatory power in connection with voluntary and registered children's homes. In both schedule 5 and schedule 6, the Bill makes provision for the Secretary of State by regulation to give his approval to the provision and use of accommodation for the purpose of restricting liberty in such homes.
Amendments were tabled in Committee designed to remove these powers and to replace them with the power to prohibit the provision of secure accommodation in voluntary and registered children's homes completely. At that time I explained that although the Secretary of State had no current intention to give his approval to the provision of secure accommodation in such homes, we thought it right to provide some flexibility in the arrangements should the need for such future provision become apparent.
4 pm
I undertook to consider the matter further. Having carefully considered the points made in Committee, I have concluded that the Bill should be amended and that the Secretary of State's power to approve the provision of


secure accommodation in registered and voluntary homes should be replaced by a regulation-making power to prohibit the use of such accommodation.
Amendments Nos. 370 and 371 make the necessary changes in so far as they affect voluntary homes, and amendments Nos. 372 and 373 make comparable changes affecting registered children's homes. I think that the changes will be welcomed in the House.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 371, in page 113, line 3, leave out from 'homes' to end of line 6.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move amendment No. 199, in page 113, line 12, after 'on' insert 'or in charge of.'

Mr. Speaker: With this we shall discuss Government amendments Nos. 411, 205 and 206.

Mr. Mellor: These amendments amend the powers to make regulations in respect of voluntary and registered children's homes. I do not believe that they are controversial.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 411, in page 113, line 18, at end insert—

Disqualification

7A. The Secretary of State may by regulation make provision with respect to the disqualification of persons in relation to voluntary homes of a kind similar to that made in relation to children's homes by section 58.'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move amendment No. 201, in page 113, leave out lines 19 to 27.

Mr. Speaker: With this we may discuss Government new clause 15.

Mr. Mellor: This is a substantive amendment and a substantial new clause. Their effect would be to clarify the powers of voluntary organisations to provide accommoda-tion for children, mainly by bringing the powers together in one place.
New clause 15 sets out the powers of voluntary organisations to provide accommodation by placing the child with a family, a relative or others, in a home—for example, a voluntary or registered children's home—or by making other arrangements. The provisions are equivalent to those in clause 20 that deal with the placement of children by local authorities.
I hope that by bringing the powers together in one place, the effect of the new clause will be helpful to practitioners in what is otherwise a complex area.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 54

DUTIES OF VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move amendment No. 123, in page 51, line 12, at end insert "and linguistic'.

Mr. Speaker: With this we may discuss Government amendments Nos. 129, 54, 407, 75 and 131.

Mr. Mellor: This formidable list of amendments deals with the welfare responsibilities of the local authority, voluntary organisation or person running a children's home who is looking after a child. They include a

requirement to give due consideration to the religious persuasion, racial origin and cultural background of the child. An example of that can be found in clause 19(5)(c).
Hon. Members who sat through the Committee stage will be aware that the Commission for Racial Equality supported amendments that would add a reference to the child's language. I agreed in Committee that that point should be met and that is the intention of Government amendments Nos. 123, 129, 54 and 131. The child's linguistic background is quite likely to have a bearing on his development and on how he should be cared for, and I am only too happy to put that point into the Bill. I am sure that it will be welcome news to the House.
Amendment No. 75 is purely a drafting amendment, changing a reference to religious creed to "religious persuasion". The word "persuasion" is generally used in the Bill; "creed" must have slipped in through an oversight.—

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 55

DUTIES OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move amendment No. 124, in page 51, line 23, at end insert—
'(2A) The Secretary of State may make regulations—

(a) requiring every child who is accommodated within a local authority's area, by or on behalf of a voluntary organisation, to be visited by an officer of the authority—

(i) in prescribed circumstances; and
(ii) on specified occasions or within specified periods; and

(b) imposing requirements which must be met by any local authority, or officer of a local authority, carrying out functions under this section.'.

The intention of the amendment is to enable the Secretary of State to regulate the exercise by local authorities of their general duty in clause 55 to visit children in their area who are accommodated by or on behalf of voluntary organisations.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 56

CHILDREN NOT TO BE CARED FOR AND ACCOMMODATED IN UNREGISTERED CHILDREN'S HOMES

Amendment made: No. 125, in page 52, line 25, leave out subsection (3).—[Mr. Mellor.]

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move amendment No. 126, in page 52, line 37, leave out subsection (5) and insert—
'(4A) A child is not cared for and accommodated in a children's home when he is cared for and accommodated by—

(a) a parent of his;
(b) a person who is not a parent of his but who has parental responsibility for him; or
(c) any relative of his.'.

Mr. Speaker: With this we may take Government amendment No. 127.

Mr. Mellor: The amendments tighten up the definition of a children's home in clause 56: they are drafting amendments.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 458, in page 53, line 1, leave out from 'home' to '; or' in line 2 and insert `provided, equipped and maintained by the Secretary of State'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Amendment No. 407 is intended to deal with the concern expressed by the hon. Member for Monklands, West (Mr. Clarke) and others that some local authorities needed to take better account of the ethnic composition of their areas and make greater efforts to recruit day and foster carers from ethnic minority families. The amendment requires local authorities to have regard to the different racial groups of children in need in their areas when they are providing day care services or encouraging applications from potential foster parents. I hope that it will be a welcome amendment.

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move amendment No. 301, in page 53, line 6, leave out from beginning to 'and' in line 7.

Mr. Speaker: With this we may take Government amendment No. 313.

Mr. Mellor: The amendments are concerned with the definition of a children's home. Amendment No. 301 is part of the package of new measures to which I referred when moving the motion for the order of consideration, aimed at safeguarding the welfare of children in independent schools. The amendment extends the definition of a children's home to include all independent schools which provide accommodation for not more than 50 pupils and which are not approved for special education. The requirement has been removed that at least one of the children being accommodated must be looked after by a local authority. All such independent schools, in addition to being registered with the Department of Education and Science, will now have to register with the local authority within whose boundaries they lie. As regards independent schools, the definition of a children's home will mirror that of a residential care home.

Ms. Hilary Armstrong: May I make it clear that the amendment, in a sense, technically "sorts out" clause 56, while the new clause that we shall be debating later spells out the implications for independent schools?

Mr. Mellor: The hon. Lady is quite right. The amendment deals with the special arrangements for very small schools with fewer than 50 pupils. As I have said, the Bill as originally drafted required one of the children to be looked after by a local authority if such a school was to be within the definition of a children's home. Now any such school, whether or not any single pupil is placed there by a local authority, will fall within that definition, and so will have to be registered with the local authority.
The arrangements made for independent schools more generally do not involve registration but involve certain inspection arrangements with which we shall deal later. The proposal is part of a package, so I thought it right to refer to it as a part of the careful reconsideration that we have been giving that section of the Bill, in the light of discussions in Committee and of certain matters that were the subject of television programmes and, I think, a good deal of public concern a couple of months ago.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No 127, in page 53, leave out from beginning of line 10 to end of line 30 and insert—
'(7A) A child shall not be treated as cared for and accommodated in a children's home when—

(a) any person mentioned in subsection (4A)(a) or (b) is living at the home; or

(b) the person caring for him is doing so in his personal capacity and not in the course of carrying out his duties in relation to the home.'.

No. 128, in page 53, line 40, at end insert—
'(15) Schedule 6A shall have effect for the purpose of setting out the circumstances in which a person may foster more than three children without being treated as carrying on a children's home.'.—[Mr. Mellor]

Schedule 6

REGISTERED CHILDREN'S HOMES

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move amendment No. 202, in page 114, line 4, at end insert—
'(4A) Before deciding whether or not to grant an application a local authority shall comply with any prescribed requirements.
(4B) Regulations made for the purposes of sub-paragraph (4A) may, in particular, make provision as to the inspection of the home in question.'.

Mr. Speaker: With this we may take Government amendments Nos. 203 and 204.

Mr. Mellor: Amendment No. 202 provides that, in considering applications for registration of registered children's homes, regulations may require a local authority to comply with certain requirements, including carrying out an inspection of a home. Although it is unlikely that any authority would register a home without first inspecting it, the Bill as drafted did not require a pre-registration inspection. The amendment is properly tabled in that it provides power for a specific requirement to inspect to be included in regulations. I do not think that that will be a controversial matter.
Amendment No. 203 is a drafting amendment. Amendment No. 204 requires those running a registered home to supply information about facilities for persons to visit or otherwise to communicate with a child accommodated in a registered home. It mirrors the provisions in respect of voluntary homes already to be found in the Bill.

Mr. Dave Nellist: I wonder whether I can take a couple of minutes of the Minister's time on this group of amendments. Without challenging your ruling, Mr. Speaker, may I say that you will be aware that on 30 June I tabled an amendment to this part of the Bill to seek an assurance from the Minister, and this seems the most appropriate group of amendments.
As I understand it, the amendments amend part VIII of the Bill dealing with the absence of state regulation of privately owned children's homes. It occurred to me and to those who have written to me, most notably Mr. John Harris of the department of applied social studies at Warwick university and Mr. Tom Hopkins of Coventry polytechnic, that, although this part of the Bill is not controversial and, in the words of the Minister, will be welcomed as it provides for pre-registration inspection by local authorities, its enactment will cause some concern. This part of the Bill, together with schedule 6, re-enacts certain amendments that the provisions of the Children's Homes Act 1982 had already raised but never implemented. My correspondence with academics in this field contains references to the Children Act 1975 raising similar questions. Because of the long process of enactment of certain sections it takes years for some of the changes to come about, if ever.
As I tried to discover with a couple of written questions earlier in the year, I want to know from the Minister the Government's intentions about the date of enactment. Although my hon. Friends and I have no detailed objection to this part of the Bill, and although we may not vote for the Bill itself, it is no good without a fairly specific date for these measures to be introduced.
In an amendment which was not in order and to which I shall not refer at length, I suggested that six months was a reasonable time. Within the ambit of this group of amendments, will the Minister give an assurance to the House, and through me to my constituents, that the beneficial aspects of part VIII will be introduced by a certain date—for example, some time next year—so that local authorities will know when they are to have that extra power and plan how to regulate that sector?
Finally, the Registered Homes Act 1984 contained parallel provisions dealing with adults rather than children. In parts of my city, that seemed to lead to an explosion of privately-owned homes. In 1988, in certain British social work journals, an advertisement appeared stating:
Exceptional opportunity in the private sector. Are you a qualified professional with a comprehensive knowledge in all aspects of community home with education? Are you ambitious, self-motivated and willing to contemplate a new challenge at executive level with optional equity/investment?
If the answers are yes, kindly contact us. We are an enterprising new CHE Company focusing our endeavours to combine the ultimate child care service with professional business methods.
I am all in favour of local authorities having powers to inspect and regulate children's homes. I am a little bit worried about the parallels between this Bill and the 1984 Act. When this part of the measure is brought into operation, does the Minister hope for an explosion of privately run children's homes along the lines of the advertisements that appeared in various British social work journals last year?
What will be the date for implementation of those parts of the Bill that we welcome, and will the Minister confirm or deny that this part of the Bill could be used to open more privately run children's homes—which would be less welcome to us?

Mr. Mellor: It is some years since I was able to give the hon. Member for Coventry, South-East (Mr. Nellist) any parliamentary satisfaction. I am glad to be able to make my debut in that respect now by telling him that he is right——

Mr. Speaker: Order. I am sorry to interrupt the Minister. I am afraid I did not see the hon. Member for Makerfield (Mr. McCartney) rise. It might be convenient for the Minister to answer all questions together, as this is not a Committee stage.

Mr. McCartney: Thank you, Mr. Speaker, for protecting little people in this Chamber.
I seek some information from the Minister about the operation of the proposed regulations. I have served on a local authority social services committee and have dealt with quarterly and annual reviews of local authority facilities. As a member of that committee, I have found it difficult to carry out an assessment to the best of my

abilities because very little information was provided about the ethos of a children's home—about contact with outside organisations, the number of children in a home at any time, and the types of learning difficulties in the home.
Is it intended that these regulations will require visits by local government officers from the department of social services, or is it intended that inspections should be incorporated with the current annual inspections that social services departments make on their own homes?
Will the Bill insist that local education authorities and social services departments be involved in developing welfare programmes in the homes? I ask that question, because I am interested in children with learning difficulties. Many children in homes have severe learning difficulties or severe physical handicaps so it is important that the ethos of a home should take account of them and, when trying to regulate the conduct of a home, it is important that the education department in each local authority gets involved and takes responsibility for developing the standards that apply to activities inside and outside the home.
Does the Minister believe that it is important to develop standards in the care provided in a children's home and in the programme for activities in the community? Many children in long-stay homes, whether run by the local authority or the private sector, require a home life, balanced by all the other activities that take place in the wider community.
Does the Minister intend to consider the ethos of a children's home and the activities that it develops in the wider community for the children in it?
For once, I am trying to be helpful to the Minister. I know that, when he comes to the Select Committee on Social Services, things can get aggressive on occasions. I shall raise some practical issues with him and attempt to tease out his attitude towards the specific problems of regulation of children's homes. Can he put more flesh on the bones, and tell the House how he envisages the role of the regulatory organisation in the development of a care policy in children's homes, and co-ordinating, with the voluntary sector and the education departments in each local authority?

Mr. Mellor: I shall continue my efforts to be helpful to the hon. Member for Coventry, South-East (Mr. Nellist) and then, as an encore, I shall try to be helpful to the hon. Member for Makerfield (Mr. McCartney).
I was saying to the hon. Member for Coventry, South-East that he was right to say that these provisions in the Bill replace the Children's Homes Act 1982. We intend to implement all the Bill, when it becomes an Act, in accordance with a strict timetable which we intend should lead to all provisions in the Bill being implemented by the autumn of 1991 at the latest. The hon. Gentleman will appreciate that the Bill is long and complex. However, we do not intend to leave any of its provisions lying around for years on end.
One of the purposes of the Bill has been to look through the whole corpus of children's law and to work out which parts of it we need in future, and which parts we do not need. The House would expect me to say that, having taken the trouble to put existing law into the Bill, we see it as having a role to play. We have no interest, therefore, in delaying its implementation. I hope that those comments are helpful to the hon. Member for Coventry, South-East.
I stress that one of the Bill's purposes is to regulate —often for the first time—aspects of the running of private children's homes. It is unlikely, therefore, to lead to an explosion in the number of such homes. The hon. Gentleman is concerned about undesirable developments, but the impact of regulation may be to control such developments, as is intended. From the debate on community care the other day, the hon. Gentleman knows that our intention is for community care to develop in a way that allows the best possible options to be pursued, whether those options come from the Health Service, local authorities, voluntary organisations or the private sector. In relation to children, any such application has to be examined in accordance with the strictest body of law and this body of law is far stricter than any that has gone before.
It is not part of our policy to see an explosion in the number of private children's homes. We know that the trend is moving away from children's homes of any kind towards fostering and adoption. One of my regular duties is to sign documents that, in effect, remove children's homes. If that means that many kids who would formerly have been brought up in institutions are being brought up in real homes, that is good and that is the direction in which we all seek to go.
I point out to the hon. Member for Makerfield that, as I said in Committee, it will be a major task under the Bill to draw up regulations. The aim of the regulations is to offer more guidance in a slightly less structured way than is possible in primary legislation and to try to ensure that that guidance is kept up to date and can be changed more readily. We intend to consult widely on the regulations and we shall welcome contributions from those who have experience in this area. In that light, I shall look at the hon. Gentleman's contribution. If he wants to write in more detail on those matters, I assure him that his comments will be taken into active consideration.

Mr. McCartney: I will take up the opportunity to make a contribution in writing about the regulations. If the regulations are to operate effectively, it is vital that there are clear contributions from local authority associations in particular and that there is an attempt by the Department of Health to work with them to produce workable regulations which will protect children's development in homes.

Mr. Mellor: The extent to which we have had open and sustained discussions on the Bill has been encouraging, and I am not the only person who thinks so. We intend to continue that process when we exercise our regulation-making powers. Obviously all the regulations will be brought before Parliament, if any hon. Member feels continuing concern on the matter.

Mr. Peter Hardy: I want to make a brief contribution which I believe is relevant to the debate in response to a comment made by the Minister a few moments ago.
It is not simply a question of the law being amended to ensure that the Bill is implemented. I received a letter this morning from the director of social services in my area who states that there are now difficulties in securing space in court timetables. I believe that he speaks for the vast majority of the directors of social services when he states that he is less than clear about how increased court capacity can be created to ensure that the intentions in the

Bill are carried out. That point may not be particularly relevant to this clause. However, as we proceed through the final stages of the Bill, I should be obliged if the Minister would comment on that anxiety expressed by my director of social services.
I hope that at some point during the final stages of this Bill, we can discuss in some detail the other anxiety voiced by directors of social services, which is their belief that if the Bill is implemented in accordance with the Government's intentions and timetable, local authorities will require at least nine or 10 times the Government's estimate of the cost of the legislation.

Mr. Mellor: The hon. Gentleman's latter point will have to be discussed, in the usual way, with the local authority associations.
The hon. Gentleman's first point is important. One of the key aims of the Bill is to ensure that a readily understood and easily manageable body of law can lead to cases being put before the courts within as short a time scale as possible. Some very challenging timetables are set deliberately in the Bill and the power is taken for rules of court to put further flesh on those bones.
My hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General, who expects to participate in a later debate about the family courts, will want to take the opportunity to comment on some of the novel features of the Bill including, for the first time, the ability to move cases from one part of the jurisdiction to another. I know that my hon. and learned Friend will have heard the hon. Member for Wentworth (Mr. Hardy) and he will want to dilate further on it, as may the hon. Member for Wentworth. This is an important matter.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 203, in page 114, line 44, leave out 'above'.

No. 204, in page 117, line 29, at end insert—
'(dd) require the furnishing to the responsible authority of information as to the facilities provided for—

(i) the parents of children in such homes;
(ii) persons who are not parents of such children but who have parental responsibility for them; and
(iii) other persons connected with such children, to visit and communicate with the children.'.

No. 372, in page 117, line 38, leave out
'require the approval of the Secretary of State for the provision'

and insert 'prohibit the'.

No 373, in page 117, line 40, leave out from 'homes' to end of line 43.

No. 205, in page 117, line 45, after 'on' insert 'or in charge of.

No. 206, in page 117, line 46, at end insert—
`(k) make provision similar to that made by regulations under section 23.'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

New Schedule 6A

FOSTER PARENTS

LIMITS ON NUMBER OF FOSTER CHILDREN

The usual fostering limit

2. Subject to what follows, a person may not foster more than three children ("the usual fostering limit").

Siblings

3. A person may exceed the usual fostering limit if the children concerned are all siblings with respect to each other.

Exemption by local authority

4.—(1) A person may exceed the usual fostering limit if he is exempted from it by the local authority within whose area he lives.

(2) In considering whether to exempt a person, a local authority shall have regard, in particular, to—

(a) the number of children whom the person proposes to foster;
(b) the arrangements which the person proposes for the care and accommodation of the fostered children;
(c) the intended and likely relationship between the person and the fostered children;
(d) the period of time for which he proposes to foster the children; and
(e) whether the welfare of the fostered children (and of any other children who are or will be living in the accommodation) will be safeguarded and promoted.

(3) Where a local authority exempt a person, they shall inform him by notice in writing—

(a) that he is so exempted;
(b) of the children, described by name, whom he may foster; and
(c) of any condition to which the exemption is subject.

(4) A local authority may at any time by notice in writing—

(a) vary or cancel an exemption; or
(b) impose, vary or cancel a condition to which the exemption is subject,

and, in considering whether to do so, they shall have regard in particular to the considerations mentioned in subparagraph (2).

(5) The Secretary of State may make regulations amplifying or modifying the provisions of this paragraph in order to provide for cases where children need to be placed with foster parents as a matter of urgency.

Effect of exceeding fostering limit

5.—(1) A person shall cease to be treated as fostering and shall be treated as carrying on a children's home if—

(a) he exceeds the usual fostering limit; or
(b) where he is exempted under paragraph 4,—

(i) he fosters any child not named in the exemption; and
(ii) in so doing, he exceeds the usual fostering limit.

(2) Sub-paragraph (1) does not apply if the children concerned are all siblings in respect of each other.

Complaints etc.

6.—(1) Every local authority shall establish a procedure for considering any representations (including any complaint) made to them about the discharge of their functions under paragraph 4 by a person exempted or seeking to be exempted under that paragraph.

(2) In carrying out any consideration of representations under sub-paragraph (1), a local authority shall comply with any regulations made by the Secretary of State for the purposes of this paragraph.'.— [Mr. Mellor.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

Interpretation

1. For the purposes of this Schedule, a person fosters a child if—

(a) he is a local authority foster parent in relation to the child;
(b) he is a foster parent with whom the child has been placed by a voluntary organisation; or
(c) he fosters the child privately.

Clause 57

WELFARE OF CHILDREN IN CHILDREN'S HOMES

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move amendment No. 382, in page 53, line 41, leave out 'registered'.

Mr. Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 383 to 385, 326 and 467.

Mr. Mellor: The purpose of these amendments is to ensure that the provisions of clauses 57 and 58 will apply where appropriate, whether or not a private children's home is currently registered—for example during the period that an application for registration as a children's home is being considered by the local authority or where a home should be registered, but is not and where the welfare of the children in the home is in issue. I hope that that is a helpful clarification to the Bill.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 129, in page 54, line 22, at end insert 'and linguistic'.

No. 383 in page 54, line 25, leave out `registered'.— [Mr. Mellor.]

Clause 58

PERSONS DISQUALIFIED FROM CARRYING ON, OR BEING EMPLOYED IN, REGISTERED HOMES

Amendments made: Nos. 384, in page 54, line 29, leave out 'registered'.

No. 385, in page 54, line 35, leave out 'registered'.— [Mr. Mellor.]

Schedule 7

PRIVATELY FOSTERED CHILDREN

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move amendment No. 325, in page 118, line 10, leave out from 'any' to 'is', in line 11, and insert—

'(i) parent of his;
(ii) person who is not a parent of his but who has parental responsibility for him; or
(iii) person who is a relative of his and who has assumed responsibility for his care,'.

Mr. Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 207 to 209, 412, 210, 211, 327, 212, 219, 386 and 387.

Mr. Mellor: The effect of these amendments is to tidy up and improve the powers of local authorities to safeguard the welfare of children who are privately placed with foster parents, that is where the decision to place and choice of foster parents have been made by a child's natural parents.
A number of the amendments provide typographical corrections and bring terminology into line with the rest of the Bill and introduce other technical amendments.
The amendments of substance reflect our further consideration of those measures in the light of representations from hon. Members, local authorities and other bodies, such as the Save the Children Fund, concerned with the welfare of those children. Local authorities' powers are extended by giving them the power to prohibit any private fostering placement where the foster parent or the accommodation is unsuitable, or where the placement is prejudicial to the child's welfare. I stress that, because some right hon. and hon. Members will have heard, as I did in the early hours of this morning while I was wallowing in my bath, an interview in which the regulations governing these placements were discussed.
4.30 pm
I am glad to make it clear that local authorities' powers are to be extended to give them the power to prohibit any private fostering placement where the parent or the


accommodation is unsuitable or the placement is prejudicial to the child's welfare. Previously, that power applied only where the local authority had not been properly notified of the placement. On reflection, that appeared to be too restrictive. Even where a placement has at first been deemed suitable by an authority, circumstances may change and the authority should be able to act to safeguard the child. There are important changes in the regulation-making power in respect of notification of fostering arrangements.
It is now clearly stated, for the avoidance of doubt, that parents and those with parental responsibility can be required to give the appropriate authority prior notice of a proposed fostering arrangement, subject only to the proviso that they are aware the child is to be fostered. That will be an important element of the regulations that we intend to make in accordance with those powers. Prior notice of a proposed placement is vital to enable authorities to investigate in advance the suitability of the proposed foster parents and placement.
It is essential that the authorities should be able to contact the child's parents. There are sad examples of parents who have behaved in an irresponsible manner by failing to keep in touch with their children or with foster parents. We shall also now be able to require foster parents to give notice when a person leaves or joins their household. That will be an additional safeguard against a privately fostered child being exposed to risks in a replacement.
There are particular anxieties about the welfare of west African children placed by their parents with white foster parents with insufficient regard to the children's race and culture.
We expect authorities, as part of their pre-placement inquiries and duty, to give advice to foster parents on the children's needs arising from their racial origin and cultural background.
That issue rightly arouses anxiety in hon. Members on both sides of the House. I am particularly grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Kent (Mr. Rowe) for putting forward the points that I have mentioned most eloquently in Committee. I hope that my comments this afternoon will be of some comfort to him.

Mr. Andrew Rowe: I thank my hon. and learned Friend for taking such care to say that the number of west African children coming to this country and being placed with foster parents while their parents return to west Africa is still a cause for anxiety. Do I understand that one of the elements that will be considered when a placement is regarded as prejudicial to the child's welfare is the cultural background of that child? I am sure that that is what he meant.

Mr. Mellor: That is certainly what I meant.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made:No. 326, in page 118, line 13, leave out 'registered'.

No. 466, in page 118, line 19, leave out from 'but' to end of line 20 and insert
'provided, equipped and maintained by the Secretary of State.'

No. 207, in page 118, line 21, after '(1)' insert `(b) to (g)'

No. 208, in page 118, line 41, leave out
'local authority for the area concerned'

and insert 'appropriate local authority'.

No. 209, in page 118, line 43, after 'be' insert 'privately'.

'.No. 412, in page 119, line 14, at end insert—
'(4A) A local authority may at any time vary any requirement, impose any additional requirement or remove any requirement.'.

No. 210, in page 119, line 15, leave out 'paragraph' and insert 'Schedule—
(a) "the appropriate local authority" means—

(i) the local authority within whose area the child is being fostered; or
(ii) in the case of a proposal to foster a child, the local authority within whose area it is proposed that he will be fostered;

and

(b) No. 211, in page 119, line 27, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—
'(b) require any person who is—

 (i) a parent of a child; or
 (ii) a person who is not a parent of his but who has parental responsibility for a child,

and who knows that it is proposed that the child should be fostered privately, to notify the appropriate authority.'.

No. 327, in page 119, line 40, at end insert—
'(ff) require any person who is fostering a child privately to notify the appropriate authority in writing of any person who begins, or ceases, to be part of his household;'.

No. 212, in page 119, leave out lines 44 to 48.

No. 213, in page 120, line 5, leave out 'or'.

No. 214, in page 120, line 6, at end insert —

'(e) a refusal to make an exemption under paragraph 4 of Schedule 6A;
(f) a condition imposed in such an exemption; or
(g) a variation or cancellation of such an exemption,'.

No. 215, in page 120, line 9, leave out 'or prohibition' and insert prohibition, condition, variation or cancellation'.

No. 216, in page 120, line 10, leave out 'a requirement, the requirement' and insert'—

(a) a requirement imposed under paragraph 6;
(b) a condition of an exemption imposed under paragraph 4 of Schedule 6A; or
(c) a variation or cancellation of such an exemption, the requirement, condition, variation or cancellation.'.

No. 217, in page 120, line 22, at end insert—
'(5A) Where it allows an appeal against a refusal to make an exemption, a condition imposed in such an exemption or a variation or cancellation of such an exemption, the court may—

(a) make an exemption;
(b) impose a condition; or
(c) vary the exemption.

(5B) Any exemption made or varied under sub-paragraph (5A), or any condition imposed under that sub-paragraph, shall be deemed for the purposes of Schedule 6A (but not for the purposes of this paragraph) to have been made, varied or imposed under that Schedule.'.

No. 413, in page 120, line 23, leave out sub-paragraph (6).

No. 218, in page 120, line 24, at end insert—
'(6A) Nothing in sub-paragraph (1)(e) to (g) confers any right of appeal on—

(a) a person who is, or would be if exempted under Schedule 6A, a local authority foster parent; or
(b) a person who is, or would be if so exempted, a person with whom a child is placed by a voluntary organisation.'.

No. 219, in page 120, line 31, leave out 'as if'—[Mr Mellor.]

Clause 61

PERSONS DISQUALIFIED FROM BEING PRIVATE FOSTER PARENTS

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move amendment No. 461, in page 56, line 38, leave out 'the child' and insert
'any child who has been in his care'.

Madam Deputy Speaker (Miss Betty Boothroyd): With this, it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 462, 258, 259, 463, 464, 260, 261, 264 to 267.

Mr. Mellor: This group of amendments deals with the disqualification of persons from providing day care to children under eight years of age and similar provisions to disqualify persons from acting as foster parents or from running voluntary or private children's homes. Broadly, they are people who have, among other things, committed offences, failed to register with the local authority, or failed to notify the presence of a disqualified person in their household. In other words, the amendments are directly relevant to the issues that were raised in the media this morning.
Again, I hope that the existence of these amendments and what I have said about them will be of further comfort to hon. Members who are concerned about this issue. Effective action is being taken in this Bill to apply proper regulations, particularly on sensitive matters, about disqualified persons. Obviously, who should have an influence over a child is a matter of intense concern to all of us.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 462, in page 56, line 40, leave out 'the' and insert 'any such'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Clause 62

POWER TO PROHIBIT PRIVATE FOSTERING

Amendments made: No. 386, in page 57, line 20, leave out from 'privately' to end of line 21.

No. 387, in page 57, line 22, after `(2)' insert 'Where'. —[Mr. Mellor.]

Schedule 9

AMENDMENTS OF ADOPTION LEGISLATION

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move amendment No. 335, in page 124, line 11, leave out 'and'.

Madam Deputy Speaker: With this we will take Government amendments Nos. 336, 222, 415 to 417 and 223.

Mr. Mellor: These are consequential and technical changes to terminology used in the Bill.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 336, in page 124, line 12, after 'children', insert
'and children accommodated by health authorities and local education authorities or in residential care, nursing or mental nursing homes or in independent schools.'.

No. 222, in page 125, line 25, leave out 'subsection (7)' and insert 'subsections (7) and (8)'.

No. 415, in page 126, leave out lines 35 and 36 and insert

'after subsection (1) there shall be inserted the following subsections—
(1A) An application for such an adoption order shall not be made unless the person wishing to make the application has, within the period of two years preceding the making of the application, given notice as mentioned in subsection (1).
(1B) In subsections (1) and (1A) the references to the area in which the applicant or person has his home are references to the area in which he has his home at the time of giving the notice".'.

No. 416, in page 126, line 38, leave out from 'and' to end of line 40 and insert
'for the words "in the care of" there shall be substituted "looked after by".'

No. 417, in page 127, line 16, at end insert—
'(3) In subsection (5) of that section—
(a) for the word "receives" there shall be substituted "receive"; and

No. 469, in page 128, line 29, leave out from 'but' to end of line 30 and insert
'provided, equipped and maintained by the Secretary of State;'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move amendment No. 418, in page 129, line 9, leave out from `children)' to end of line 30 and insert
'in subsection (1) for the words "subsections (4) and (6)" there shall be substituted "what follows".
(2) For subsections (3) to (7) of that section there shall be substituted—
(3) Before supplying any information to an applicant under subsection (1), the Registrar General shall inform the applicant that counselling services are available to him—

(a) if he is in England and Wales

(i) at the General Register Office;
(ii) from the local authority in whose area he is living;
(iii) where the adoption order relating to him was made in England and Wales, from the local authority in whose area the court which made the order sat; or
(iv) from any other local authority;

(b) if he is in Scotland—

(i) from the regional or islands council in whose area he is living;
(ii) where the adoption order relating to him was made in Scotland, from the council in whose area the court which made the order sat; or
(iii) from any other regional or islands council;

(c) if he is in Northern Ireland—

(i) from the Board in whose area he is living;
(ii) where the adoption order relating to him was made in Northern Ireland, from the Board in whose area the court which made the order sat; or
(iii) from any other Board;

(d) if he is in the United Kingdom and his adoption was arranged by an adoption society—

(i) approved under section 3,
(ii) approved under section 3 of the Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978,
(iii) registered under Article 4 of the Adoption (Northern Ireland) Order 1987,

from that society.
(4) Where an adopted person who is in England and Wales—

(a) applies for information under—

(i) subsection (1), or
(ii) Article 54 of the Adoption (Northern Ireland) Order 1987, or

(b) is supplied with information under section 45 of the Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978,



it shall be the duty of the persons and bodies mentioned in subsection (5) to provide counselling for him if asked by him to do so.
(5) The persons and bodies are—

(a) the Registrar General;
(b) any local authority falling within subsection (3)(a)(ii) to (iv);
(c) any adoption society falling within subsection (3)(d) in so far as it is acting as an adoption society in England and Wales.

(6) If the applicant chooses to receive counselling from a person or body falling within subsection (3), the Registrar General shall send to the person or body the information to which the applicant is entitled under subsection (1).
(7) Where a person—

(a) was adopted before 12th November 1975, and
(b) applies for information under subsection (1), the Registrar General shall not supply the information to him unless he has attended an interview with a counsellor arranged by a person or body from whom counselling services are available as mentioned in subsection (3).

(8) Where the Registrar General is prevented by subsection (7) from supplying information to a person who is not living in the United Kingdom, he may supply the information to any body which—

(a) the Registrar General is satisfied is suitable to provide counselling to that person, and
(b) has notified the Registrar General that it is prepared to provide such counselling.

(9) In this section—

"a Board" means a Health and Social Services Board established under Article 16 of the Health and Personal Social Services (Northern Ireland) Order 1972; and
"prescribed" means prescribed by regulations made by the Registrar General.'.

Madam Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 419 to 424.

Mr. Mellor: These amendments to schedule 9, which relates to the Adoption Act 1976, are largely technical changes to clarify the operation of adoption legislation throughout the United Kingdom.

Amendment agreed to.

Mr. Ronnie Fearn: I beg to move amendment No. 472, in page 129, leave out from line 32 to line 47 on page 130 and insert—
'51A.—(1) The Registrar General shall cause to be maintained a register to he called the Adoption Contact Register which shall be governed by regulations.
(2) The Register shall include adopted persons, their adoptive parents/guardians and relatives, adoptive parents/ guardians only shall be able to register on behalf of a child under 18. At that age the adopted person may complete a new registration in his/her own right.
(3) In this section "relative" means any person other than an adoptive relative who is related to the adopted person by blood (including half blood) or marriage.
(4) A fee as prescribed may be charged for inclusion in the Register.
(5) An entry made on the Register may be amended on request.
(6) Any notice given under this section must be in such form as may be determined by the Registrar General.
(7) The holder of the Register shall facilitate contact or an exchange of information between persons on the Register, offering appropriate assistance.
(8) The Register shall not be open to public inspection or search, and the holder of the Register shall not supply any person with information entered in the Register, except in accordance with this section.
(9) The Register may be kept by means of a computer.
(10) In this section "prescribed" means prescribed by the Secretary of State.'.

Madam Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 337 to 339.

Mr. Fearn: Amendment No. 472 was tabled in response to a consortium of adoption support groups who have had a working party looking into the possibility of setting up an adoption contact register for some time now. They were naturally pleased when this measure was introduced as part of the Bill. However, they felt that the proposed operation of the service as outlined in paragraph 21 of schedule 9 will benefit few and have the potential to result in great distress for many individuals and their families. Their key concern is that the use of the expression "wishes to contact", which is used throughout the clause, is open to many interpretations, and they would like those words to be removed. There is concern also that no support services are offered to the person attempting to make contact. In the Bill as drafted, it is contact initiated by the adoptive person.
Potential users of the register require a more flexible service to meet their needs in a more sensitive way. There is great emotion and potential heartache, and in some cases there is potential for lives to be destroyed in this difficult matter, and we must be sure that adequate support services exist.
There was concern that the clause did not contain a minimum age limit, but I accept that Government amendments have properly addressed that problem. Government amendments have partly met the working party's concern that the register should provide for the exchange of non-identifying information and advice, but it is important also that there is an opportunity for adoptive parents and their families to exchange mutually useful information during the childhood of the adopted person.
Paragraph 21 includes operational detail which, in primary legislation, may prove to be restrictive. Therefore, the working groups would like to see the register governed by legislation. My amendment will meet the needs of those concerned in a more sensitive and appropriate manner. I should like the Minister to refer to the key concern, which is to remove the phrase "wishes to contact".

Mr. Mellor: I am grateful to the hon. Member for Southport (Mr. Fearn) for his recognition of the extent to which the changes made by the Government have had an impact on the area of concern that he has outlined. However, I am afraid that I cannot advise the House to accept his amendment.
The register will be held by the registrar general in circumstances where he will have no facilities for offering assistance to those who wish to make contact. However, the changes that we have introduced will enable people to make use of professional and other specialist services. As part of the administration of the scheme, the registrar general will inform all users of the services, such as the social services departments and other agencies, from whom advice and assistance may be obtained. Therefore, the registrar general will be of some assistance, but I am afraid that that assistance will be limited by the nature of the registrar general's operations. I do not believe that an expansion of those operations to meet the point that the hon. Gentlemen has raised can be justified. For the reasons that have already been given, it is not appropriate for the contact register to be used by children under 18.
I hope that the hon. Gentleman will feel that a lot has been done to tighten up this area, and I hope that he will understand why I cannot invite the House to accept the amendment in the terms that he has tabled it.
Three amendments in this group are Government amendments and I shall refer to them briefly, the hon. Member for Southport having kindly commended some of them already. We want to improve the adoption contact register. It has been brought to our notice by groups and individuals who have a special interest in this provision that it would be more helpful if relatives seeking to contact an adopted person could offer, for the purposes of the contact register, the address of a third party who would act as an intermediary. The provisions as amended will therefore enable the registrar general to enter on the register, for transmission to an adopted person, an address at or through which a relative may be contacted, even though it is not the relative's own address. That will meet a practical point. Many relatives will no doubt be happy to give their own address, but care and sensitivity are needed where people are seeking knowledge of each other in these often delicate circumstances. Some people prefer to make a first approach through an intermediary with skill and experience in smoothing the path for both parties. These arrangements will also allow relatives to explain through a sympathetic intermediary that they prefer to restrict contact to, say, the exchange of information or letters, rather than a meeting. Some voluntary agencies, I am glad to say, have already expressed a willingness to provide their addresses and services and no doubt others will be equally willing.
The other amendments provide, as I have already explained, for use of the register to be restricted to people of 18 years old or more. That is the age limit for access by an adopted person to his original birth record, which we believe is the right approach.
Obviously, all those issues will, in due course, be part of a wider review of adoption law, but I cannot advocate any further changes until that point. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not be offended if I do not invite the House to accept his amendment. I hope that he will take some comfort from the fact that, as he acknowledged in his speech, we have done a good deal to make the register workable and will keep under review the way that it works.

Mr. Fearn: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: No. 337, in page 130, line 4 at end insert
'has attained the age of 18 years and'.

No. 338, in page 130, line 18, after '(5)', insert
has attained the age of 18 years and'.

No. 339, in page 130, line 45, after 'marriage;' insert—
'(aa) "address" includes any address at or through which the person concerned may be contacted;'.

No. 419, in page 133, leave out lines 26 to 29.

No. 223, in page 133, line 43, leave out
'After section 72(1) there shall be inserted—'
and insert 'For section 72(1A) there shall be substituted the following subsections—'.

No. 420, in page 134, leave out lines 2 to 14 and insert—
'"(3) This Act extends to England and Wales only.".'.

No. 421, in page 135, line 28, leave out from '"receive"' to end of line 30.

No. 422, in page 135, leave out lines 37 to 43 and insert—
'41. In section 45 (adopted children register)—
(a) for the words from "or an approved" in subsection (5) to the end of subsection (6) there shall be substituted—
Board or adoption society falling within subsection (6) which is providing counselling for that adopted person.
(6) Where the Registrar General for Scotland furnishes an adopted person with information under subsection (5), he shall advise that person that counselling services are available—

(a) if the person is in Scotland—

(i) from the local authority in whose area he is living;
(ii) where the adoption order relating to him was made in Scotland, from the local authority in whose area the court which made the order sat; or
(iii) from any other local authority in Scotland;

(b) if the person is in England and Wales—

(i) from the local authority in whose area he is living;
(ii) where the adoption order relating to him was made in England and Wales, from the local authority in whose area the court which made the order sat; or
(iii) from any other local authority in England and Wales;

(c) if the person is in Northern Ireland—

(i) from the Board in whose area he is living;
(ii) where the adoption order relating to him was made in Northern Ireland, from the Board in whose area the court which made the order sat; or
(iii) from any other Board;

(d) if the person is in the United Kingdom and his adoption was arranged by an adoption society—

(i) approved under section 3;
(ii) approved under section 3 of the Adoption Act 1976; or
(iii) registered under Article 4 of the Adoption (Northern Ireland) Order 1987,

from that society.
(6A) Where an adopted person who is in Scotland—

(a) is furnished with information under subsection (5); or
(b) applies for information under—

(i) section 51(1) of the Adoption Act 1976; or
(ii) Article 54 of the Adoption (Northern Ireland) Order 1987,

any body mentioned in subsection (6B) to which the adopted person applies for counselling shall have a duty to provide counselling for him.
(6B) The bodies referred to in subsection (6A) are—

(a) any local authority falling within subsection (6)(a); and
(b) any adoption society falling within subsection (6)(d) so far as it is acting as an adoption society in Scotland.";
(b) in subsection (7)—

(i) for the word "under" there shall be substituted "from a local authority, Board or adoption society falling within";
(ii) for the words "or adoption society which is providing that counselling" there shall be substituted ", Board or adoption society"; and
(iii) after the word "authority" where it second occurs there shall be inserted ", Board"; and

(c) after subsection (9) there shall be inserted the following subsection—

(10) In this section—

"Board" means a Health and Social Services Board established under Article 16 of the Health and Personal Social Services (Northern Ireland) Order 1972; and
"local authority", in relation to England and Wales, means the council of a county (other than a


metropolitan county), a metropolitan district, a London borough or the Common Council of the City of London.".'.

No. 423, in page 136, leave out lines 38 to 41.

No. 424, in page 136, leave out from beginning of line 47 to end of line 10 on page 137.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Schedule 10

MINOR AMENDMENTS

The Solicitor-General: These are important amendments. Amendment No. 231 amends the Legal Aid Act to provide that civil legal aid is available for all civil proceedings in magistrates courts. Proceedings in the High Court and county court, including those under the Bill, automatically attract civil legal aid without the need for specific provision to be made. New clause 17 provides that civil legal aid is to be available for proceedings under the Bill——

Madam Deputy Speaker: Order. I wonder whether the hon. and learned Gentleman is dealing with the amendment that I called. I called amendment No. 341 and the other Government amendments listed with it.

The Solicitor-General: I apologise, Madam Deputy Speaker.
I beg to move amendment No. 341, in page 137, line 20, at end insert—

'The Education Act 1944 (c. 31)

3A. In section 40(1) of the Education Act 1944 (enforcement of school attendance), the words from "or to imprisonment" to the end shall cease to have effect.

The Marriage Act 1949 (c. 76)

3B. In section 3 of the Marriage Act 1949 (consent required to the marriage of a child by common licence or superintendent registrar's certificate), in subsection (1) for the words "the Second Schedule to this Act" there shall be substituted "subsection (1A) of this section".

(2) After that subsection there shall be inserted—

"(1A) The consents are—

(a) subject to paragraphs (b) to (d) of this subsection, the consent of—

(i) each parent (if any) of the child who has parental responsibility for him; and
(ii) each guardian (if any) of the child;

(b) where a residence order is in force with respect to the child, the consent of the person or persons with whom he lives, or is to live, as a result of the order (in substitution for the consents mentioned in paragraph (a) of this subsection);
(c) where a care order is in force with respect to the child, the consent of the local authority designated in the order (in addition to the consents mentioned in paragraph (a) of this subsection);
(d) where neither paragraph (b) nor (c) of this subsection applies but a residence order was in force with respect to the child immediately before he reached the age of sixteen, the consent of the person or persons with whom he lived, or was to live, as a result of the order (in substitution for the consents mentioned in paragraph (a) of this subsection).

(1B) In this section 'guardian of a child', 'parental responsibility', 'residence order' and 'care order' have the same meaning as in the Children Act 1989."

The Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953 (c. 20)

.—(1) Sections 10 and 10A of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953 (registration of father, and re-registration, where parents not married) shall be amended as follows.

(2) In sections 10(1) and 10A(1) for paragraph (d) there shall be substituted—

"(d) at the request of the mother or that person on production of—


(i) a copy of a parental responsibility agreement made between them in relation to the child; and
(ii) a declaration in the prescribed form by the person making the request stating that the agreement was made in compliance with section 4 of the Children Act 1989 and has riot been brought to an end by an order of a court; or

(e) at the request of the mother or that person on production of—

(i) a certified copy of an order under section 4 of the Children Act 1989 giving that person parental responsibility for the child; and
(ii) a declaration in the prescribed form by the person making the request stating that the order has not been brought to an end by an order of a court; or

(f) at the request of the mother or that person on production of

(i) a certified copy of an order under paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989 which requires that person to make any financial provision for the child and which is not an order falling within paragraph 4(2A) of that Schedule; and
(ii) a declaration in the prescribed form by the person making the request stating that the order has not been discharged by an order of a court; or

(g) at the request of the mother or that person on production of—

(i) a certified copy of any of the orders which are mentioned in subsection (1A) of this section which has been made in relation to the child; and
(ii) a declaration in the prescribed form by the person making the request stating that the order has not been brought to an end or discharged by an order of a court."

(3) After sections 10(1) and 10A(1) there shall be inserted—

"(1A) The orders are—

(a) an order under section 4 of the Family Law Reform Act 1987 that that person shall have all the parental rights and duties with respect to the child;
(b) an order that that person shall have custody or care and control or legal custody of the child made under section 9 of the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971 at a time when such an order could only be made in favour of a parent;
(c) an order under section 9 of 11B of that Act which requires that person to make any financial provision in relation to the child;
(d) an order under section 4 of the Affiliation Proceedings Act 1957 naming that person as putative father of the child."

(4) In section 10(2) for the words "or (d)" there shall be substituted "to (g)".

(5) In section 10(3) for the words from "'relevant order' to the end there shall be substituted "'parental responsibility agreement' has the same meaning as in the Children Act 1989".

(6) In section 10A(2), in paragraphs (b) and (c) for the words "paragraph (d)" in both places where they occur there shall be substituted "any of paragraphs (d) to (g)".'.

Amendment No. 341 is much less contentious and is less interesting. It contains amendments to schedule 10, which makes minor amendments to existing statutes.

Madam Deputy Speaker: With this, it will be convenient to consider Government amendments Nos. 229, 364 and 342.

Mr. McCartney: Although the Solicitor-General said that this is a non-contentious issue, I believe that the Government have failed to take advantage of a real opportunity to deal with the important issue of child abduction. In June I introduced the Prevention of Child Abduction Bill, which has attracted support from hon. Members of all parties because of the growing incidence of that special crime which, in the main, involves members of the families concerned. There is great emotional stress as a result of the way in which more than 100 children per year are abducted illegally from the United Kingdom to all parts of the world. From hon. Members' records and from work with the voluntary sector, I estimate that more than 500 British citizens—young children—have been abducted from the United Kingdom and cannot be returned at the moment.
The Government are aware of this situation and are to be congratulated on participating in the development of the Hague convention, on the way in which it has been constructed, and on being one of the first Governments to be a signatory to it. In addition, they have provided legislation to enable it to have effect. However, despite the introduction of the Hague convention, there has been no abatement in the ability of people illegally to abduct young children from the United Kingdom and to fail to return them to their family homes. In many instances, the children are abducted to environments that are completely different in culture, language and geography from the communities in which they live and have their wider families in the United Kingdom.
I had hoped that during the summer the Government would give some thought to the arguments put forward in Committee by my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mrs. Golding). In Committee the Government gave a hint that they would consider the serious points made by my hon. Friend in our debates. However, since those debates, no practical amendments have been brought forward which provide even the hope that there might be some new legislation to protect children who are abused and exploited by abduction.
My Bill tried to introduce four basic criteria—three introducing new opportunities for the Government to take legislative action and the fourth relating to the Family Law Act 1986 and to amendments to make it more difficult for court proceedings to be disrupted and rendered meaningless by the activities of child abducters. The Government could have used the opportunity afforded by schedule 10 to amend the Family Law Act in relation to court proceedings.
The main priorities of my Bill were those raised in our Committee debates by my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme and dealt with the creation of a children's ombudsman to give legal aid, advice and assistance that would enable parents or guardians to retrieve children who have been illegally abducted from the United Kingdom. It also sought to provide advice on the prevention of abduction and to mediate between Governments and courts when children have been abducted. It would not apply only to the countries of the Hague convention because many of the children who have been abducted have been taken to countries that either do not recognise the convention or have not implemented it.
Although I am sad that the Government have missed an opportunity to deal with this problem, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs has now positively attempted to assist me, following my failure to gain parliamentary time for the Bill.
In August of this year, in response to cases in Italy, which has not implemented the Hague convention, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office accepted for the first time the need for mediation between the Governments and the courts of the United Kingdom and Italy. The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and his Italian counterpart have provided for mediation services in specific cases currently before the Italian courts or cases that should go before those courts because of the nature of the abduction from the United Kingdom to Italy. The measures taken by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office represent a major response from the Government because, until August, the Government had steadfastly refused to become involved in mediating in cases where children had been abducted from the United Kingdom.
The Home Office has some specific responsibilities in this connection and it has responded positively to talks with my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Ms. Short), the hon. Member for Ealing Acton (Sir G. Young) and myself. Last week the Lord Chancellor, in discussion with the Minister of State, Home Office, proposed to assist the funding of the charity, Reunite, through the voluntary services unit. That charity counsels and assists families whose children have been abducted.
This summer two Government Departments have moved significantly in terms of how they perceive their role with regard to child abduction and in relation to providing practical assistance and resources to ensure that they carry out their roles on behalf of families whose children have been abducted.
When the amendments to the Bill were tabled I expected that the Minister would make practical propositions to bring into line certain court practices that undermine the concept of the Hague convention. The Family Law Act 1986 should have been amended today to ensure that it was obligatory on judges acting within the bounds of that Act to provide new arrangements for passports. As the law currently stands, if a court order is obtained for the temporary or long-term care and control of a child there is no way in which a child may be intercepted at a port or airport if it is abducted after the decision of the court. In many instances an abduction takes place even as the court is considering the long-term care of a child. An amendment to the Family Law Act under schedule 10 would require the court to ensure that passports are automatically surrendered prior to, during and after the court proceedings. It would also require that any court decision relating to those proceedings be recorded in the passport. Without such an amendment children will continue to be abducted prior to, during and after court proceedings.
I had also hoped that an amendment would be tabled under schedule 10 to establish a register of abducted children. Sad to say, we have no accurate record of how many children have been abducted from the United Kingdom and we must rely on information provided either to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office by distraught parents or from self-help groups such as Reunite, which have been approached by the parents. Every time we


discuss this issue we receive communications from parents whose children have been abducted and who are unable to seek help and advice or who do not realise that such help and advice is available from Reunite and the social services departments.
If the Minister cannot introduce substantial amendments today I hope that he will consider finding time in the Session to introduce a substantial Bill that will take account of the considerable and unacceptable level of child abduction from the United Kingdom. Without such Government commitment throuth the Department of Health we shall continue, week in, week out, to see children taken from the custody of United Kingdom courts and scattered throughout the world. They have no opportunity of being returned to the United Kingdom.
I have met mothers who last saw their children when they were two and they are now eight, nine or 10. I have met mothers who cannot communicate on the telephone with their children because those children have been so long out of the family environment that they cannot speak in the mother tongue. All those individual cases amount to a scandalous situation. For all the might of the state, such as the social services departments and the police authorities, and despite all the resources at our disposal, we cannot protect a small, but vulnerable, group of children.
I hope that the Minister will respond positively because without such a response the small and significant steps that have been taken by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Home Office will be washed away and we shall be back here next year when another 120 children will have been abducted. We will then have to add those children to the 500 plus already abducted from the United Kingdom.
I hope that the Minister will respond positively and give a commitment that, for once, he will make practical suggestions to assist those families who suffer unbelievable emotional stress. Those families do not know where to turn and they cannot see any light at the end of the tunnel. I hope that the Minister will give a commitment that legislation will be introduced in the new Session to end the crime of child abduction.

Mr. Tim Devlin: I support what the hon. Member for Makerfield (Mr. McCartney) has said. Further legislation is required, but, for several reasons, I do not feel that the Bill is the appropriate vehicle for the sort of changes advocated by the hon. Gentleman.
It is worth noting that the hon. Gentleman in his short intervention overlooked to say that most of the children abducted from this country are abducted by one of their parents. In certain of those cases it would be draconian to say to one parent who has saved up for a considerable time to take the child on holiday that he or she cannot he allowed to take that child for fear that he may not come back. That is a difficult matter. Children who are already under court orders, such as wardship, are subject to legislation preventing them from being abducted from the jurisdiction of the court. I am sure that the Solicitor-General will refer to that when he answers the hon. Member for Makerfield.
The difficulty is that many countries are not signatories to the Hague convention. Since I served on the Standing Committee a number of people have written airmail letters to me with colourful stamps from exotic parts of the world complaining of just this problem. I draw the attention of the House to Mr. Rait, a former constituent of mine, who

is currently in South Africa. He has made a number of applications to the South African courts for access to his two young daughters who were taken there by their South African mother. The courts have repeatedly refused him any contact or access to the children. I know of other children in countries such as Tunisia and Egypt who have lived in those countries for five or six years, and who, as the hon. Member for Makerfield said, can no longer speak English.
This is a subject of considerable concern to all of us. From the correspondence I have seen this summer from the Lord Chancellor's Department and the Foreign Office, I can assure the hon. Gentleman that the matter is under consideration. These difficult issues must be resolved before any further progress is made, but I do not think that the Bill is the appropriate vehicle for the measures advocated by the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Robert Hughes: The issue of child abduction is full of complications and it is a legal labyrinth. It seems that no matter what legislation is in place there is a lack of will to try to resolve the position. For nearly as long as I have been a Member of this House I have been concerned with abductions to Spain—I know of two cases, but I will not mention them in any detail— as Spain is a difficult country with which to get such matters resolved.
I pay tribute to those who, with me, over the years have fought hard to obtain an international convention. There are now two such conventions in place, one European and the other the Hague convention, which makes it clear that where parents are separated or divorced and the child is given into the custody of one of the parents, the country in which the primary wardship of custody was given is the one in which the child must remain.
However, often, with the best will in the world, courts allow the husband or wife access to the child. We would not wish to destroy that accessibility. However, too often, after a quite legitimate access weekend or couple of days, the next thing the parent with custody knows is that he or she receives a telephone call from Spain and the spouse says, "Ha, ha, I'm in Spain. I've got our son or daughter with me. What are you going to do about it?"
5 pm
Under the terms of the Hague and the international conventions, the next step should be straightforward. The child should be immediately returned. In the two cases to which I referred the child would be returned to Scotland. However, the difficulty arises because Spain, while a signatory to the two conventions, has not passed its own domestic legislation to give effect to the conventions. Therefore, one is stymied.
When these issues are raised with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, its representatives say that it is nothing to do with them but a matter for the Lord Chancellor's Department. However, those at the Lord Chancellor's Department say that there is nothing that they can do because the issue is an internal matter for Spain and they cannot compel Spain to ratify the conventions by passing domestic legislation.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Makerfield (Mr. McCartney) said, these are heart rending matters in which parents sometimes do silly things. In one case I know an attempt was made to re-abduct the child back from Spain. The attempt went wrong but, having failed, it could be


used in the Spanish courts against the child's parent when she tried to use Spain's legal channels because, apparently, there would be no other redress.
The Government must act more strongly. I do not accept that the Foreign Office has no locus in this matter. It should press hard on this issue. At every opportunity Ministers should press the Government to deal with these matters. It is no use having international conventions which are not worth the paper they are written on.
I understand that there is to be a meeting quite soon —I think at the end of this week or next week—either in the Hague or Amsterdam at which these matters may be pursued. I am not sure if representatives of the Lord Chancellor's Department will be present or whether it is purely an officials meeting. Whoever is present I hope that they will use the strongest terms to insist that the Spanish Government must honour their responsibilities.
Those of us who have been involved during this long period have consistently been told when we have sought to meet the Spanish ambassador to discuss these issues that he cannot meet us because they are matters of purely domestic legislation. I do not accept that. This is a European and international matter. I hope that the strong message will go forth from every quarter of this House that hon. Members believe family abductions of this sort are intolerable. They are bad for children, bad for parents and bad for international recognition. I hope that we shall say clearly to the Spanish Government that they should bring about domestic legislation and sort out the matters because great human tragedies have not only happened already, but will lie in store for future generations of children unless we act vigorously and with certainty.

The Solicitor-General: I well understand the strength of feeling which this short debate has provoked. The hon. Member for Makerfield (Mr. McCartney) will appreciate that the amendments for which he calls in legislative form are outside the scope of the Bill. However, I hope to say something positive to him, to my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton, South (Mr. Devlin) and to the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hughes) who contributed to this debate and has such a deep knowledge of the subject.
My hon. Friend the Member for Stockton, South and the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North put their fingers on one of the primary aspects of the problem: enforcement. The hon. Member for Aberdeen, North referred to the Hague and the European conventions. The United Kingdom is a party to both conventions on the recognition, enforcement and return of children taken abroad. The Government take every opportunity to encourage other Governments to sign, ratify and put into effect such conventions.
As the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North rightly said, there is a meeting this week at the Hague to review the working of the Hague convention. The United Kingdom will be represented at the meeting and will discuss shortfalls in the operation of the convention. I shall write to the representatives who are to attend the meeting to draw to their attention the strength of feeling in today's debate and what has been said about the need for action, to strengthen their hand in the discussions. It will be readily recognised that the Government cannot force foreign Governments to sign or operate the conventions.

Mr. McCartney: There is one way in which practical measures can be taken even without primary legislation: the advice which could be given to judges in relation to the interpretation of present legislation. Often, a judge has to use his discretion about rescinding passports, and identifying in passports that care proceedings have taken place. In almost every case in my case files and those of other hon. Members, when the judge has discretion he fails to utilise it. Despite court orders having been made and despite the decisions of the court, abductions still take place. Therefore, even without primary legislation could the Government give a commitment that the Lord Chancellor's Department will give clear and unequivocal advice to judges about the marking of passports and asking for passports to be given to the courts during proceedings? Provisions for that already exist in current legislation; the tragedy is that the courts are not utilising them.

The Solicitor-General: We shall certainly take careful note of what the hon. Member for Makerfield said, ponder on it and see how the matter might be taken forward.

Mr. Robert Hughes: Is the Solicitor-General aware that provisions exist which state that when there is a clear custody order no child should be removed from the United Kingdom but that nevertheless people slip through the net? Will he have discussions with the Home Office to consider a system whereby every port of exit is told about custody orders? It is known that the Home Office operates a stop list of people coming in so there should be no problem about the machinery to make every immigration office aware of the court order. Could the Solicitor-General institute a mechanism whereby as soon as a court order is given on custody it is made known to immigration officials? In that way perhaps we could stop some of the abductions.

The Solicitor-General: I would not like to comment off the cuff about the practicality of such a measure. There could be formidable practical difficulties, but I take note of what the hon. Gentleman says. I shall write to him and refer the matter to the Home Office.

Amendment agreed to.

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move amendment No. 224, in page 139, line 31, leave out from Sin' to end of line 33 and insert `local authority accommodation.
(1A) A residence requirement shall designate the local authority who are to receive the child or young person and that authority shall be the authority in whose area the child or young person resides.
(1B) The court shall not impose a residence requirement without consulting the designated authority first.'.

Madam Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendment No. 225.

Mr. Mellor: The effect of amendment No. 224 is to make it clear that the responsibility of the designated authority is to receive the child, not just to provide the child with accommodation. Amendment No. 225 is a consequential amendment.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 225, in page 140, leave out lines 34 and 35.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move amendment No. 226, in page 141, line 6, at end insert—
'22A. For section 23 of that Act (remand to care of local authorities etc.) there shall be substituted—

Remand to local authority accommodation, committal of young persons of unruly character, etc.

23.—(1) Where a court—

(a) remands or commits for trial a child charged with homicide or remands a child convicted of homicide; or
(b) remands a young person charged with or convicted of one or more offences or commits him for trial or sentence,

and he is not released on hail, then, unless he is a young person who is certified by the court to be of unruly character, the court shall remand him to local authority accommodation.

(2) A court remanding a person to local authority accommodation shall designate the authority who are to receive him and that authority shall be the authority in whose area it appears to the court that—

(a) he resides; or
(b) the offence or one of the offences was committed.

(3) Where a person is remanded to local authority accommodation, it shall be lawful for any person acting on behalf of the designated authority to detain him.

(4) The court shall not certify a young person as being of unruly character unless—

(a) he cannot safely be remanded to local authority accommodation; and
(b) the conditions prescribed by order made by the Secretary of State under this subsection are satisfied in relation to him.

(5) Where the court certifies that a young person is of unruly character, it shall commit him—

(a) to a remand centre, if it has been notified that such a centre is available for the reception from the court of such persons; and
(b) to a prison, if it has not been so notified.

(6) Where a young person is remanded to local authority accommodation, a court may, on the application of the designated authority, certify him to be of unruly character in accordance with subsection (4) (and on so doing he shall cease to be remanded to local authority accommodation and subsection (5) of this section shall apply).

(7) For the purposes of subsection (6), "a court" means—

(a) the court which remanded the young person; or
(b) any magistrates' court having jurisdiction in the place where that person is for the time being,

and in this section "court" and "magistrates' court" include a justice.

(8) This section has effect subject to—

(a) section 37 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 (committal to the Crown Court with a view to a sentence of detention in a young offender institution); and
(b) section 128(7) of that Act (remands to the custody of a constable for periods of not more than three days),

but section 128(7) shall have effect in relation to a child or young person as if for the reference to three clear days there were substituted a reference to twenty-four hours."

22B.—(1) In section 32 of that Act (detention of absentees), for subsection (1A) there shall be substituted the following subsections—

"(1A) If a child or young person is absent, without the consent of the responsible person—

(a) from a place of safety to which he has been taken under section 16(3) of this Act; or
(b) from local authority accommodation—

(i) in which he is required to live under section 12AA of this Act; or
(ii) to which he has been remanded under section 23(1) of this Act,

he may be arrested by a constable anywhere in the United Kingdom or Channel Islands without a warrant.

(1B) A person so arrested shall be conducted to—

(a) the place of safety;
(b) the local authority accommodation; or
(c) such other place as the responsible person may direct,

at the responsible person's expense.

(1C) In this section 'the responsible person' means the person who made the arrangements under section 16(3) of this Act or, as the case may be, the authority designated under section 12AA or 23 of this Act."

(2) In subsection (2B) of that section for the words "person referred to in subsection (1A)(a) or (b) (as the case may be) of this section" there shall be substituted 'responsible person.'.

Madam Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 227, 228, 232, 234, 235 and 238; Government new clause 12; and Government amendments Nos. 70, 409, 490, 71 and 121.

Mr. Mellor: This is a formidable group, but I think that I can boil it down for the House. The amendments fall into two parts: the first group is intended to clarify and consolidate the provisions for young people charged with a criminal offence who are on remand or have been detained by the police while awaiting a court hearing.
The second group consists of technical Government amendments.

Mr. David Hinchliffe: I want to raise one point on new clause 12. Perhaps I have misinterpreted its contents; if so, I should appreciate the Minister's advice.
New clause 12 deals with the provision of accommodation for children in police protection or detention or on remand, and requires that local authorities shall themselves make provision for the reception of such children. Can the Minister clarify whether the new clause accepts the existing practice under which many local authorities do not provide such facilities themselves but use other authorities' accommodation? As I read it, the new clause will certainly involve a great deal of expenditure for local authorities which do not now directly provide these facilities. I hope that I am correct in assuming that they can continue to use the facilities of adjoining authorities or those of authorities in the same region, as facilitated under the regional planning procedures. I should be grateful for the Minister's advice and help on that.

Mr. Mellor: That is a perfectly reasonable point. As far as I am aware, there is no interference in what is, for the reasons described by the hon. Member for Wakefield (Mr. Hinchliffe), a perfectly sensible way for local authorities to pool their resources. If there is any difficulty about that in the event I shall write to him, but I know of nothing that impedes the continuation of these common sense arrangements.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 227, in page 141, line 8, after`ages)' insert `—
(a) in paragraph (a),'.

No. 228, in page 141, line 9, at end insert—
`; and
(b) in paragraph (e) for the words "section 23(2) or (3)" there shall be substituted "section 23(4) to (6)".
23A. In section 70(1) of that Act (interpretation)—
(a) after the definition of "local authority" there shall be inserted—
'''local authority accommodation' means accommoda-tion provided by or on behalf of a local authority (within the meaning of the Children Act 1989)"; and
(b) in the definition of "reside" for "12(4) and (5)" there shall be substituted "12B(1) and (2)".
23B. In section 73 of that Act (extent, etc.)

(a) in subsection (4)(a) for "32(1), (3) and (4)" there shall be substituted "32(1) to (1C) and (2A) to (4)"; and


(b) in subsection (6) for "32(1), (1A)" there shall be substituted "32(1) to (1C)".'.

No. 229, in page 141, line 46, leave out second `marriage' and insert 'family'.

No. 364, in page 141, line 46, at end insert—
' . In section 52(1) of that Act (interpretation), in the definition of "child of the family", for the words "has been boarded-out with those parties" there shall be substituted "is placed with those parties as foster parents".'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move amendment No. 230, in page 142, line 2, at end insert—

`THE EDUCATION ACT 1981 (c. 60.)

26A. The following section shall be inserted in the Education Act 1981, after section 3—

provision outside England and Wales for certain children

3A.—(1) A local authority may make such arrangements as they think fit to enable any child in respect of whom they maintain a statement under section 7 to attend an establishment outside England and Wales which specialises in providing for children with special needs.

(2) In subsection (1) above "children with special needs" means children who have particular needs which would be special educational needs if those children were in England and Wales.

(3) Where an authority make arrangements under this section with respect to a child, those arrangements may, in particular, include contributing to or paying—

 fees charged by the establishment;
(b) expenses reasonably incurred in maintaining him while he is at the establishment or travelling to or from it;
(c) those travelling expenses;
(d) expenses reasonably incurred by any person accompanying him while he is travelling or staying at the establishment.

(4) This section is not to be taken as in any way limiting any other powers of a local education authority.".'.

Madam Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment No. 369, Government amendment new clause 26 and Government amendment No. 368.

Mr. Mellor: I am glad to see my hon. Friend the Member for Salisbury (Mr. Key) in his place, because amendment No. 230 fulfils the Government's undertaking in Committee to bring forward a new clause to deal with an important matter related to the public interest in the Budapest Peto institute for severely brain damaged children. Although I have taken over this matter to produce an amendment for the benefit of the Government draftsman, the authorship of the concept belongs to my hon. Friend, and I hope that, if he catches your eye, Madam Deputy Speaker, he will be able to talk about it later.
This useful amendment puts beyond doubt the legal basis for the existing arrangements whereby some local education authorities in England and Wales make a contribution to the costs of certain placements abroad for children with special educational needs. The amendment is particularly designed to enable local education authorities to support children at the Peto institute, because in recent years both that institute and the principles of conductive education as practised there have attracted the attention of many parents of handicapped children, especially the parents of those with cerebral palsy.
Large numbers of British parents have taken their children to the institute. Such trips are very expensive for the children and for the parents, who often have to live for several months on end in Budapest. The Peto approach has inspired a number of British educational institutions, but at present conductive education is not widely available here. As the House knows, we are trying to do something about that with our support for the Birmingham centre and by means of other discussions that are in hand, but until parents feel that it is not necessary to take their children to Budapest we want to make it possible for British families to go there without suffering undue financial hardship.
It is also important that parents be able to learn how to carry back to Britain the methods that they learn. For that purpose the amendment allows local education authorities to contribute to parents' expenses.
I have visited the Peto institute and been deeply impressed by the work there and deeply moved by some of the things I saw, so it gives me particular pleasure to be associated with the amendment.
I should like to deal briefly with the other amendments in the group. Amendment No. 369 will take effect when Royal Assent is given to the Bill, as will the commencement provisions in amendment No. 368. which we have already dealt with. It is a short-term measure to amend the Child Care Act 1980 until that Act is repealed by the Bill. The amendment will improve the position of the unmarried father whose child is in care. For certain purposes, references to a child's parents in the 1980 Act will include both parents, whether or not married to each other at the time of the child's birth.
I commend these amendments and the new clause to the House.

Mr. Tom Clarke: I echo the opening remarks of the hon. and learned Gentleman about the manner in which our discussions were conducted in Committee and about the positive way in which both sides of the House have approached these matters. I trust that the point that I am about to make will not be regarded as politically controversial, but it is important that it should be made.
Of course, we welcome the Government's view of the Peto institute and consider the Minister's recommendation reasonable, but one question is begging to be asked. It is the one that many people are bound to put to hon. Members—that perhaps we should ask ourselves why these facilities and this research are not more widely available here in Great Britain. I unreservedly accept the work being done in the Peto institute, and I know that my hon. Friends agree that, in the absence of such facilities in this country, it is absolutely right that they should be accessible to children from Britain. Although I fully appreciate that much research is going on in Birmingham, we have evidence that children in need of conductive education, and their parents, have to travel many miles to, for example, the brain injuries rehabilitation and development centre at Chester which, as far as I can tell, is a first-class institute recognised by the Welsh Office. In time it hopes to be recognised by the Scottish Office and the Department of Education and Science.
The BIRD institute has not developed to the extent that the Peto institute has. Although I welcome the Minister's wish to ensure that local authorities can feel that resources should be made available for the Peto institute, the urgent


question that I have asked remains. I hope that the House will agree that this country urgently needs to be able to provide the services and research which are so brilliantly performed by the Peto institute.

Mr. Robert Key: I congratulate and thank my hon. and learned Friend the Minister for Health on and for his amendment which he promised in Committee. I recognise its substance as that of the one that I introduced in Committee and I am grateful to the Government for honouring their commitment.
Shortly after I introduced the new clause in Committee many people who had got hold of the wrong end of the stick wrote to me from all around the country. I sought to remove a discrimination against groups of parents and education authorities who thought that the Peto institute was the right thing for some children. I also sought to remove the uncertainty which undoubtedly faced education and local authorities, some of which felt able to finance children travelling overseas while others felt that they were prohibited from doing so. I did not say or intend at any stage that everyday work being carried out in institutions in almost every health district in this country was in any way devalued by what I was seeking to do. I think that that is now generally accepted, and I certainly hope that it is.
During the summer I and my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test (Mr. Hill) visited the Cedars school at Southampton which carries out remarkable work with cerebral palsy and spina bifida children. There are such schools all over Britain and there is one in my constituency, the Kestrel unit at Odstock hospital. I have also visited physiotherapy departments in our hospitals which are doing everyday, normal, professional work for such children. Nothing that the House is doing in, I hope, accepting the amendment in any way devalues such work. We are simply saying that this must be a step forward until such time as we can provide further help in Britain.

Mr. Rowe: Does my hon. Friend agree that as we become more integrated in Europe it is likely that there will be considerable exchanges of expertise and more centres of excellence on both sides of the Channel? Does he agree that that is an admirable innovation?

Mr. Key: That is right. Of course, the amendment allow not only exchanges with the Peto institute but, perhaps, with many other institutions and methods in Europe and throughout the world.
I welcome the comments of the hon. Member for Monklands, West (Mr. Clarke) and agree entirely with what he said. There are many research projects for evaluating the work of the Peto institute and other methods of treating and alleviating the symptoms of children. Such projects would repay a great deal more work and more money. Times are hard for some of the schools. I know of one in Hampshire that approached the local education authority, but it was decided that there was not enough money for the scheme. There is much scope for more money to be spent on research.
I have been involved for many years in special education. Perhaps not many people know about such education unless they are directly involved. However, such work is exciting and I urge the Minister to give special attention to the research needs of special education. I welcome the proposals in the amendment and hope that

they will make a substantial difference to the lives of the families as well as to the children who will go to the Peto institute in Hungary.

Mr. Frank Doran: My constituency contains the Raeden centre which is funded by the local authority and does a tremendous amount of work. It recently sent a team to Hungary to the Peto institute to see it in operation. The members of the team came back incredibly frustrated by what they had seen of the work being carried out there in comparison with what is done in Aberdeen. As they saw it, the only difference was the amount of money being poured into the Peto institute.
It causes me a certain amount of frustration when I hear the Minister speak about supporting British people with unfortunate children who deserve all the help that they can get. The amendment will encourage them to look for help in Budapest. However, we are not doing such people a service by raising their hopes that there is some miracle cure somewhere while at the same time denying the tremendous work that is carried out in this country. I would rather see the resources channeled to institutes such as those mentioned by the hon. Member for Salisbury (Mr. Key) and to the one in my constituency.
My frustration was increased when I recently heard the Under-Secretary of State for Scotland, the hon. Member for Stirling (Mr. Forsyth), talking about the input proposed by the Scottish Education Department to encourage parents to go to the Peto institute. The hon. Gentleman ignores the institute in my constituency that I have mentioned and which is under his Department's direct control and authority. At the same time he attempts to make political capital out of the magic that seems to surround the word "Peto". We do not intend to divide the House on the amendment, but we need to emphasise that there are facilities in Britain that need to be encouraged and which are not encouraged by the amendment.

Mr. Hinchliffe: Like other hon. Members, I have been engaged in raising money for young people to go to the Peto institute. One of my constituents, Sabrina Archbold, has made great strides since being there. It annoys me that in this day and age we have to raise money for as basic a right as children such as Sabrina to learn to walk. I see the Government giving money to people who have every advantage in life and it makes me angry when we have to come down to scraping up money from raffles and other events.
Let me make it clear that I have no doubt about the sincerity of the hon. Member for Salisbury (Mr. Key) on this issue. I listened to him in Committee and I understand perfectly the points that he has made, although I appreciate that they have been misunderstood by some people outside. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Monklands, West (Mr. Clarke) who expressed concern about why in all this time and in view of the tremendous advances made at Peto we have not been able to carry out work in this country along the same lines. I suspect that one of the reasons is a lack of will and effort at Government level.
I am slightly worried about the implications of the amendment. I understand the principle that it sets out, but I can foresee people coming to the Government and saying, "Why do you not do something about it?" and being told to go to the local authority. They will say that the local authority can do something about it and will


advise people to go to the local council for assistance. It is yet another case of powers and duties being given to local authorities when the financial back-up needed to carry out such duties will not be there.
We all know that the poll tax will cause local budgets to become even tighter and issues such as this will add to the burden. As my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Doran) said, people's hopes will be built up, but at the end of the day nothing may come of them.
Another point which stems directly from the Archbold case in my constituency is that families are not assisted by the policies of the Department of Social Security. In the Archbold case, the husband, who was unemployed at the time, took the young lady to Peto while the mother stayed at home with the other child. He was penalised in that he lost benefit because he was not available for work. The local office of the Department interpreted the law quite correctly, but adopted an unsympathetic attitude when it could have been a little more flexible in the application of the rules and could have helped the family to take the action which was greatly in the interests of their daughter.

Mr. Mellor: I shall respond briefly to some of the interesting points that have been made. While the hon. Member for Monklands, West (Mr. Clarke) was speaking, one of the rather sinister machines in the Chamber swung round and focused on the back of his head. I am sure that when television arrives here people will be delighted to know that the hon. Gentleman has a truly monastic tonsure. I hope that that will vindicate the decision of the House to introduce television cameras.
I remember asking myself the question about the availability here of the kind of treatment that is available at Peto. I went there as a Foreign Office Minister, little thinking that I would subsequently have responsibility in this area. I watched an eight-year-old British girl who had been in the Peto institute for just a month walking across the room with the assistance of guide ropes. For seven years and 11 months in the United Kingdom she had not been able to walk a step but after one month at the Peto institute she was able to walk. I shall not forget in a hurry the look of triumph on that child's face.
Most British visitors who have been to the institute come back and say, "Why not here?". The answer is somewhat complex. First of all, there has been a genuine commitment here to the British principles of doing things. As the hon. Member for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Doran) made clear, those principles have yielded good results in a significant number of cases. One or two British schools offer what they used to call conductive education, but they have acknowledged, in the aftermath of the publicity that has been attached to the work of the Peto institute, that what they offer is not conductive education as devised at Peto. However, we need to acknowledge that a good range of institutions exists in the United Kingdom which offer considerable opportunities to severely handicapped children.
5.30 pm
There is no doubt that the Peto institute has a particular success in encouraging mobility in a number of severely brain-damaged youngsters. It has been criticised by some British experts for placing what they see as too much emphasis on mobility, and too little on intellectual

development. My conviction was then, and remains, that the work that is done at Peto, involving as it does physical mastery, can lead on to all manner of other challenges. The extent of the achievement of some of the youngsters there is, of itself, a significant stimulus to other achievements. That is why considerable steps forward are being taken on the development of conductive education in the United Kingdom.
For example, the Birmingham centre is training, in the context of a co-operation agreement with the Peto institute, a range of young British people as conductors. Unfortunately, as a result of the inevitable limitation on the ability of the Peto institute to train people from other countries, the number of conductors that can be trained at any one time is limited. It amounts to about 10 a programme. The foundations of an institue within the United Kingdom are being laid. That will follow on the Peto institute and should not—I say to the hon. Member for Aberdeen, South—be seen as in any sense opposing other United Kingdom institutes. It should be seen as broadening the amount of different kinds of care, treatment and education that are on offer. Needless to say, substantial resources are going to all of these.
Quite a lot of work is going on at the moment in discussion with the Hungarians about strengthening our links with the Peto institute, and I hope that, in due course, that will lead to substantial further development of the principles of conductive education in this country.

Mr. Tom Clarke: I was grateful for the Minister's advice about the possibility of a certain television image, which is not entirely inappropriate for an hon. Member representing Monklands, West, although I do not know whether my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Monklands, East (Mr. Smith) would agree.
I remind the Minister that I referred to my visit to the BIRD institute at Chester in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Alyn and Deeside (Mr. Jones), who has just joined us. While I was there, I met some constituents of my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Doran), and others who had come from Dundee. They had a long distance to travel. That underlines a point that a number of hon. Members have made and that I hope that the Minister will take on board, which is that whatever research there may be, and there should be some, it is essential that more resources are provided.

Mr. Mellor: I understand what the hon. Gentleman says. While these centres of excellence have to be established in places that, unfortunately, require people to travel long distances, I know that my hon. Friend the Minister with special responsibility for the disabled keeps under review the various efforts that go on in both the public and voluntary sectors. We wish to see both a growth in provision and a growth in variety of provision. There is no doubt that, for reasons that relate not to resources but to logistics, it will take some time before the United Kingdom has an institute that can cope with the demand for the kind of work that is done at Peto.
Furthermore, not all youngsters are suitable for the work that is done at Peto. They have to be assessed and where they are suitable and a place can be found, this is a modest but significant way to assist them. As the hon. Member for Wakefield (Mr. Hinchliffe) said, there are voluntary subscriptions to help people with the fares, and


that is proper. As I understand it, the Spastics Society also makes contributions. However, if a local authority—we should remember we are talking about local authorities with budgets of tens of millions and sometimes hundreds of millions of pounds—wishes to make a contribution, it is right and proper that it should do so. That is what my hon. Friend's amendment secures.

Dame Elaine Kellett-Bowman: Two weeks ago, I returned from a visit to the Peto institute. I can make a point about its capacity to train. It is limited in the number of children that it has there, and it cannot train more conductors than it has children to train them on. It takes 15 years to train a conductor properly. When I was there, a team from the Spastics Society was also there, being trained in some of the institute's methods of education.

Mr. Mellor: I am glad to hear that because at one time there were difficulties in reconciling some members of the Spastics Society to the work being done there. I am glad that that has been resolved.
The Hungarians have plans for an international institute, which would focus international interest on the Peto. There are discussions between the two Governments about a British contribution to that. We are alive to the many benefits of the work done there. I am glad that my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster (Dame E. Kellett-Bowman) was impressed. I do not know anybody who has been there who does not carry a memory of it for long after other memories have faded. I hope that we shall be able to develop equivalent facilities here, that will enable us to keep close to the exciting and pioneering work that has been going on at Peto since the war. Those who are critical about the developments should remember that if we have taken some time to catch up, others beside the present team of Ministers need to ask themselves why. The time has come for us to take a step forward, and that is what we are trying to do. I commend the amendments to the House.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 342, in page 142, line 2, at end insert—

'The Child Abduction Act 1984 (c. 37)

26B.—(1) Section 1 of the Child Abduction Act 1984 (offence of abduction by parent, etc.) shall be amended as follows.

(2) For subsections (2) to (4) there shall be substituted—

"(2) A person is connected with a child for the purposes of this section if—

(a) he is a parent of the child; or
(b) in the case of a child whose parents were not married to each other at the time of his birth, there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is the father of the child; or
(c) he is a guardian of the child; or
(d) he is a person in whose favour a residence order is in force with respect to the child; or
(e) he has custody of the child.

(3) In this section 'the appropriate consent', in relation to a child, means—

(a) the consent of each of the following—

(i) the child's mother;
(ii) the child's father, if he has parental responsibility for him;
(iii) any guardian of the child;
(iv) any person in whose favour a residence order is in force with respect to the child;
(v) any person who has custody of the child; or

(b) the leave of the court granted under or by virtue of any provision of Part II of the Children Act 1989; or

(c) if any person has custody of the child, the leave of the court which awarded custody to him.

(4) A person does not commit an offence under this section by taking or sending a child out of the United Kingdom without obtaining the appropriate consent if—

(a) he is a person in whose favour there is a residence order in force with respect to the child, and
(b) he takes or sends him out of the United Kingdom for a period of less than one month.

(4A) Subsection (4) above does not apply if the person taking or sending the child out of the United Kingdom does so in breach of an order under Part II of the Children Act 1989."

(3) In subsection (5) for the words from "but" to the end there shall be substituted—

"(5A) Subsection (5)(c) above does not apply if—

(a) the person who refused to consent is a person—

(i) in whose favour there is a residence order in force with respect to the child; or
(ii) who has custody of the child; or

(b) the person taking or sending the child out of the United Kingdom is, by so acting, in breach of an order made by a court in the United Kingdom."

(4) For subsection (7) there shall be substituted—

"(7) For the purposes of this section—

(a) 'guardian of a child', 'residence order' and 'parental responsibility' have the same meaning as in the Children Act 1989; and
(b) a person shall be treated as having custody of a child if there is in force an order of a court in the United Kingdom awarding him (whether solely or jointly with another person) custody, legal custody or care and control of the child."

(5) In subsection (8) for the words from "or voluntary organisation" to "custodianship proceedings or" there shall be substituted "detained in a place of safety, remanded to a local authority accommodation or the subject of".

26C.—(1) In section 2 of that Act (offence of abduction of child by other persons), in subsection (1) for the words from "Subject" to "above" there shall be substituted "Subject to subsection (3) below, a person, other than one mentioned in subsection (2) below".

(2) For subsection (2) of that section there shall be substituted—

"(2) The persons are—

(a) where the father and mother of the child in question were married to each other at the time of his birth, the child's father and mother;
(b) where the father and mother of the child in question were not married to each other at the time of his birth, the child's mother; and
(c) any other person mentioned in section 1(2)(c) to (e) above.

(3) In proceedings against any person for an offence under this section, it shall be a defence for that person to prove—

(a) where the father and mother of the child in question were not married to each other at the time of his birth—

(i) that he is the child's father; or
(ii) that, at the time of the alleged offence, he believed, on reasonable grounds, that he was the child's father; or

(b) that, at the time of the alleged offence, he believed that the child had attained the age of sixteen."

26D. At the end of section 3 of that Act (construction of references to taking, sending and detaining) there shall be added "and

(d) references to a child's parents and to a child whose parents were (or were not) married to each other at the time of his birth shall be construed in accordance with section 1 of the Family Law Reform Act 1987 (which extends their meaning)."

26E.—(1) The Schedule to that Act (modifications of section 1 for children in certain cases) shall be amended as follows.

(2) in paragraph 1(1) for the words "or voluntary organisation" there shall be substituted "within the meaning of the Children Act 1989".

(3) For paragraph 2(1) there shall be substituted—

"(1) This paragraph applies in the case of a child who is—

(a) detained in a place of safety under section 16(3) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969; or
(b) remanded to a local authority accommodation under section 23 of that Act."

(4) In paragraph 3(1)—

(a) in paragraph (a) for the words "section 14 of the Children Act 1975" there shall be substituted "section 18 of the Adoption Act 1976"; and
(b) in paragraph (d) for the words "section 25 of the Children Act 1975 or section 53 of the Adoption Act 1958" there shall be substituted "section 55 of the Adoption Act 1976".

(5) In paragraph 3(2)(a)—

(a) in sub-paragraph (i), for the words from "order or," to "Children Act 1975" there shall be substituted "section 18 order or, if the section 18 order has been varied under section 21 of that Act so as to give parental responsibility to another agency", and
(b) in sub-paragraph (ii), for the words "(c) or (e)" there shall be substituted "or (c)".

(6) At the end of paragraph 3 there shall be added—

"(3) Sub-paragraph (2) above shall be construed as if the references to the court included, in any case where the court is a magistrates' court, a reference to any magistrates' court acting for the same area as that court".

(7) For paragraph 5 there shall be substituted—

"5. In this Schedule—

(a) 'adoption agency' and 'adoption order' have the same meaning as in the Adoption Act 1976; and
(b) 'area', in relation to a magistrates' court, means the petty sessions area (within the meaning of the Justices of the Peace Act 1979) for which the court is appointed.".'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move amendment No. 343, in page 142, line 2, at end insert—

'The Foster Children (Scotland) Act 1984 (c.56)

26F. In section 1 of the Foster Children (Scotland) Act 1984 (definition of foster child)—

(a) for the words "he is- (a)" there shall be substituted "(a) he is"; and
(b) the words "for a period of more than 6 days" and the words from "The period" to the end shall cease to have effect.

26G. In section 2(2) of that Act (exceptions to sectionl), for paragraph (1) there shall be substituted—

"(f) if he has been in that person's care for a period of less than 28 days and that person does not intend to undertake his care for any longer period."

26H. In section 7(1) of that Act (persons disqualified from keeping foster children)—

(a) the word "or" at the end of paragraph (e) shall be omitted; and
(b) after paragraph (f) there shall be inserted "or
(g) he is disqualified from fostering a child privately (within the meaning of the Children Act 1989) by regulations made under section 61 of that Act,".'.

Madam Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 344, 354 and 358.

Mr. Mellor: These are technical amendments to the Foster Children (Scotland) Act 1984.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 369, in page 142, line 2, at end insert—

'The Child Care Act 1980 (c.5)

26AA. Until the repeal of the Child Care Act 1980 by this Act takes effect, the definition of "parent" in section 87 of that Act shall have effect as if it applied only in relation to Part I and sections 13, 24, 64 and 65 of that Act (provisions excluded by section 2(1)(f) of the Family Law Reform Act 1987 from the application of the general rule in that Act governing the meaning of references to relationships between persons).'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move amendment No. 231, in page 142, line 8, at end insert—

The Legal Aid Act 1988 (c. 34)

27A. In paragraph 2 of Part I of Schedule 2 to the Legal Aid Act 1988 (proceedings in magistrates' courts to which the civil legal aid provisions of Part IV of the Act apply), the following sub-paragraph shall be added at the end—

"(g) proceedings under the Children Act 1989".'.

Madam Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendment No. 239, Government new clause 17 and Government amendment No. 64.

The Solicitor-General: These are important amendments about legal aid, which I was overhasty in seeking to reach but which deserve the attention of the House. Government amendment No. 231 amends the Legal Aid Act to provide that civil legal aid is available for all civil proceedings under the Bill in a magistrates court. Proceedings at the High Court and the county court, including those under the Bill, automatically attract civil legal aid without the need for specific provision to be made.
Amendment No. 239 will repeal all the provisions under the Legal Aid Act that are no longer required as a consequence of the Bill.
New clause 17 provides that civil legal aid is to be available for proceedings under the Bill, and this clause, in conjunction with amendments Nos. 64, 231 and 239 and powers already available under the Legal Aid Act, will permit this.
A report of the Law Society's annual conference that appeared in The Times on Saturday highlighted my next point, when Sir Stephen Brown, president of the Family Division, said that there will be concern to ensure that the Legal Aid Board can grant legal aid swiftly, particularly in care cases. He emphasised that this was essential, and said that he hoped very much that it would come about, because otherwise all the hard work that had gone into the legislation would not be put into effect.
We are concerned to ensure that the Legal Aid Board can grant legal aid swiftly, particularly in care cases. Therefore, the Government intend to waive the merits test for those who are automatically parties in care proceedings to grant legal aid in advance of the means test and to waive the means test entirely for children who are the subject of a care application. The clause also makes a number of tidying up provisions consequent on this repeal. Where a child is to be put in secure accommodation, this clause ensures that he must be granted legal aid if he wishes it without any merits test, as now, and without a means test. Proceedings relating to the supervision orders under the Children and Young Persons Act 1969, which are criminal in character and are not being repealed by the Bill, will also attract criminal legal aid under the clause.
These are important amendments, and although I do not need to dwell on them I wish to draw them to the attention of the House. I take this opportunity to note that in the report of the Law Society annual conference proceedings, Sir Stephen Brown, the president of the Law Society—and this is a trailer for a debate that we shall reach shortly—interestingly said that the Bill would set up what would be, in essence, a family court. There is a great deal of truth in what he said, but we shall come to that matter later.
The legal aid provisions are important and I commend them to the House.

Mr. Doran: When I consider new legislation such as new clause 17, I am often struck by the thought that it is somewhat pedantically drawn. I assume that there must be a motive for including local authorities in subsection (2), which excludes them from applying for legal aid. Is the reason for that simply that the Solicitor-General is anticipating that most local authorities will fail the means test?

The Solicitor-General: The new clause naturally ensures only that legal aid is available to individuals for proceedings under the Bill. It would not be appropriate for it to be available to local authorities, as the amendment naturally makes clear.

Mr. Vaz: Although we welcome the amendments, especially those relating to the extension of representation, I am concerned about one matter. The Solicitor-General will recall that we both sat on the Legal Aid Bill Committee, when I was concerned about the same matter —that is, the amount of resources available for legal aid. It is all very well amending legislation to provide for representation, but if the legal aid system is starved of resources and if the eligibility limits remain unchanged, the numbers of people who can gain through the amendment will be limited. What assurances can the Solicitor-General give us about a new Government attitude towards the provision of greater resources to the legal aid system?

The Solicitor-General: I do not think that the problem is simply a matter of resources. We have debated the question of resources on a number of occasions and, as the hon. Gentleman knows, the resources devoted to legal aid have been rising very quickly indeed. I do not think that the question of eligibility applies because those who need it are entitled to it under the amendment.

Amendment agreed to.

Schedule 11

CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS

Madam Deputy Speaker: I wish to make a correction to the next group of amendments. The lead amendment is No. 243, and we shall be debating an additional Government amendment, No. 426, with the amendments grouped with the lead amendment. It comes after Government amendment No. 346.

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move amendment No. 243, in page 143, line 16, leave out sub-paragraph (b) and insert—
`(b) for the definition of legal guardian there shall be substituted—
'legal guardian', in relation to a child or young person, means a guardian of a child as defined in the Children Act 1989".'

Madam Deputy Speaker: With this we may discuss Governments amendments Nos. 347, 425, 245, 346, 426, 348 to 350, 246, 427, 247, 433 and 434.

The Solicitor-General: These are consequential amendments to existing legislation and I commend them to the House.

Mr. Hardy: It is appropriate to raise an area of anxiety at this point in our debate. Although the amendments are consequential, consequences flow from them, one of which is causing real concern to the professionals involved in

child welfare. It is almost inevitable that the consequence of the amendments and of the Bill will be greatly to increase the need for guardians ad litem. There will have to be significant increases in the numbers of people available to fill that role.
The Minister will recognise that in most, and probably all, parts of the country there are already difficulties in finding people to serve in that capacity. The panels concerned with those appointments are already stressed and the task is difficult. It is possible that the change in the law, especially the amendment to the 1933 Act, will substantially increase demand.
The Minister may prefer to comment on that matter, which could be a serious problem, on another occasion during the debate. However, I felt it appropriate to raise the matter and point out that the amendments before us could create real difficulties. I know that a number of directors of social services are extremely anxious. I hope that the Minister can offer the House and those responsible for such appointments some relief from their serious anxiety.

The Solicitor-General: The hon. Gentleman is right—there are other opportunities to debate this important matter.

Amendment agreed to.

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move amendment No. 244, in page 143, line 19, at end insert—

'THE EDUCATION ACT 1944 (C.31)

7A.—(1) Section 40 of the Education Act 1944 (enforcement of school attendance) shall be amended as follows.

(2) For subsection (2) there shall be substituted—

"(2) Proceedings for such offences shall not be instituted except by a local education authority.

(2A) Before instituting such proceedings the local education authority shall consider whether it would be appropriate, instead of or as well as instituting the proceedings, to apply for an education supervision order with respect to the child."

(3) For subsections (3) and (4) there shall be substituted—

"(3) The court—

(a) by which a person is convicted of an offence under section 37 of this Act; or
(b) before which a person is charged with an offence under section 39 of this Act,

may direct the local education authority instituting the proceedings to apply for an education supervision order with respect to the child unless the authority, having consulted the appropriate local authority, decide that the child's welfare will be satisfactorily safeguarded even though no education supervision order is made.

(3A) Where, following such a direction, a local education authority decide not to apply for an education supervision order they shall inform the court of the reasons for their decision.

(3B) Unless the court has directed otherwise, the information required under subsection (3A) shall be given to the court before the end of the period of eight weeks beginning with the date on which the direction was given.

(4) Where—

(a) a local education authority apply for an educational supervision order with respect to a child who is the subject of a school attendance order; and
(b) the court decides that section 33(3) of the Children Act 1989 prevents it from making the order;

the court may direct that the school attendance order shall cease to be in force."

(4) After subsection (4) there shall be inserted

"(5) In this section—

`appropriate authority' has the same meaning as in section 33(9) of the Children Act 1989; and

`education supervision order' means an education supervision order under that Act."

7B. In section 71 of that Act (complaints with respect to independent schools), the following paragraph shall be added after paragraph (d), in subsection (1)—

"(e) there has been a failure, in relation to a child provided with accommodation by the school, to comply with the duty imposed by section (Welfare of children accommodated in independent schools) of the Children Act 1989 (welfare of children accommodated in independent schools);"

7C. After section 114(1C) of that Act (interpretation) there shall be inserted the following subsections—

"(1D) 'Parent', in relation to a child or young person, includes any person—

(a) who is not a parent of his but who has parental responsibility for him, or
(b) who has care of him,

except for the purposes of the enactments mentioned in subsection (1E) of this section, where it only includes such a person if he is an individual.

(1E) The enactments are—

(a) sections 5(4), 15(2) and (6), 31 and 65(1) of the Education (No. 2) Act 1986; and
(b) sections 53(8), 54(2), 58(5)(k), 60 and 61 of the Education Reform Act 1988.

(1F) For the purposes of subsection (1D) of this section—

(a) 'parental responsibility' has the same meaning as in the Children Act 1989; and
(b) in determining whether an individual has care of a child or young person any absence of the child or young person at a hospital or boarding school and any other temporary absence shall be disregarded."'

Madam Deputy Speaker: With this we may discuss Government amendments Nos. 248, 186 to 190, 192, 194, 471 and 198.

Mr. Mellor: These are drafting and technical amendments relating to education supervision orders and provisions in the Education Acts.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 347, in page 143, leave out lines 27 to 45.

No. 425, in page 143, line 45, at end insert—

`THE RESERVE AND AUXILIARY FORCES (PROTECTION OF CIVIL INTERESTS) ACT 1951 (C.65)

For section 2(1)(d) of the Reserve and Auxiliary Forces (Protection of Civil Interests) Act 1951 (cases in which leave of the appropriate court is required before enforcing certain orders for the payment of money), there shall be substituted—

"(d) an order for alimony, maintenance or other payment made under sections 21 to 33 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 or made, or having effect as if made, under Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989".'.

No. 245, in page 144, line 6, at end insert—

`THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE ACT 1960 (C.65)

. In section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 (publication of information relating to proceedings in private), in subsection (1) for paragraph (a) there shall be substituted—

"(a) where the proceedings—

(i) relate to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court with respect to minors;
(ii) are brought under the Children Act 1998; or
(iii) otherwise relate wholly or mainly to the maintenance or upbringing of a minor;".'

No. 232, in page 144, line 12, at end insert—

`THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1967 (C.80)

. In section 67(1A)(c) of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 (computation of sentences of imprisonment passed in England and Wales) for the words "in the care of a local authority" there shall be substituted "remanded to local authority accommodation".'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move amendment No. 470, in page 144, line 19, leave out from '1989' to end of line 21.

Madam Deputy Speaker: With this we may discuss Government amendments Nos. 345, 241, 428 to 432, 351 and 435.

Mr. Mellor: These are technical amendments that update existing legislation to take account of changes in the Bill and to ensure consistency between public Acts of Parliament.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 344, in page 144, line 28, leave out
'In section 21(3) of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968' and insert—
'In section 2(2) of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 (matters referred to social work committee) after paragraph (j) there shall be inserted—
(k) section 17 and Part X of the Children Act 1989,".
13A. In section 5(2)(c) of that Act (power of Secretary of State to make regulations) for the words "and (j)" there shall be substituted "to (k)".
13B. In section 21(3) of that Act.'.

No. 345, in page 145, column 2, leave out lines 18 to 29 and insert—



`Functions under Part III of the Act (local authority support for children and families).



Care and Supervision.



Protection of Children.



Functions in relation to community homes, voluntary homes and voluntary organisations, registered children's homes, private arrangements for fostering children, child minding and day care for young children.



Inspection of children's homes on behalf of Secretary of State.



Research and returns of information.



Functions in relation to children accommodated by health authorities and local education authorities or in residential care, nursing or mental nursing homes or in independent schools.'.

No. 241, in page 146, line 3 leave out from 'Tribunals)' to end of line 6 and insert—
'for paragraph 4 there shall be substituted—


"Registration of voluntary homes and children's homes under the Children Act 1989.
4. Registered Homes Tribunals constituted under Part III of the Registered Homes Act 1984.".'.

No. 346, in page 146, line 14, at end insert—

The Employment of Children Act 1973 (c. 24)

24a.—(1) In section 2 of the Employment of Children Act 1973 (supervision by education authorities), in subsection 2(a) for the words "guardian or a person who has actual custody of there shall be substituted "any person responsible for".

(2) After that subsection there shall be inserted—

"(2A) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a) above a person is responsible for a child—

(a) in England and Wales, if he has parental responsibility for the child or care of him; and
(b) in Scotland, if he is his guardian or has actual custody of him.".'.

No. 426, in page 146, line 14, at end insert—

The Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 (c. 45)

24B.—(1) In Schedule 1 to the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 (proceedings in divorce etc. stayed by reference to proceedings in other jurisdiction), paragraph 11(1) shall be amended as follows—

(a) at the end of the definition of "lump sum" there shall be added "or an order made in equivalent circumstances under Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989 and of a kind mentioned in paragraph 1(2) of that Schedule";
(b) in the definition of "relevant order", at the end of paragraph (b), there shall be added "or an order made in equivalent circumstances under Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989 and of a kind mentioned in paragraph 1(2)(a) or (b) of that Schedule";
(c) in paragraph (c) of that definition, after the word "children)" there shall be inserted "or a section 7 order under the Children Act 1989"; and
(d) in paragraph (d) of that definition for the words "the custody, care or control" there shall be substituted "care".

(2) In paragraph 11(3) of that Schedule—

(a) the word "four" shall be omitted; and
(b) for the words "the custody of a child and the education of a child" there shall be substituted "or any provision which could be made by a section 7 order under the Children Act 1989".'.

No. 348, in page 146, line 23, leave out 'In section 7(2)' and insert '—(1) Section 7(2)'.

No. 349, in page 146, line 24, after 'Act')' insert
`shall be amended as follows.
(2) For paragraph (c) there shall be substituted—
(c) in any proceedings relating to adoption, the marriage of any minor, the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court with respect to minors or the provision by any person of accommodation, care or schooling for minors;
(cc) in any proceedings brought under the Children Act 1989;".'.
(3)'

No. 350, in page 146, leave out lines 28 to 30.

No. 246, in page 146, line 30, at end insert—

THE DOMESTIC PROCEEDINGS AND MAGISTRATES' COURTS ACT 1978 (C.22)

26A. For section 8 of the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates' Courts Act 1978 (orders for the custody of children) there shall be substituted—

Restrictions on making of orders under this Act: welfare of children

8. Where an application is made by a party to a marriage for an order under section 2, 6 or 7 of this Act, then, if there is a child of the family who is under the age of eighteen, the court shall not dismiss or make a final order on the application until it has decided whether to exercise any of its powers under the Children Act 1989 with respect to the child."

26B. In section 19(3A)(b) (interim orders) for the words "subsections (2) and" there shall be substituted "subsection".

26C. For section 20(12) of that Act (variation and revocation of orders for periodical payments) there shall be substituted—

"(12) An application under this section may be made—

(a) where it is for the variation or revocation of an order under section 2, 6, 7 or 19 of this Act for periodical payments, by either party to the marriage in question; and
(b) where it is for the variation of an order under section 2(1)(c), 6, or 7 of this Act for periodical payments to or in respect of a child, also by the child himself, if he has attained the age of sixteen."

26D.—(1) For section 20A of that Act (revival of orders for periodical payments) there shall be substituted—

Revival of orders for periodical payments

20A.—(1) Where an order made by a magistrates' court under this Part of this Act for the making of periodical payments to or in respect of a child (other than an interim maintenance order) ceases to have effect—

(a) on the date on which the child attains the age of sixteen, or
(b) at any time after that date but before or on the date on which he attains the age of eighteen,

the child may apply to the court which made the order for an order for its revival.

(2) If on such an application it appears to the court that—

(a) the child is, will be or (if an order were made under this subsection) would be receiving instruction at an educational establishment or undergoing training for a trade, profession or vocation, whether or not while in gainful employment, or
(b) there are special circumstances which justify the making of an order under this subsection.

the court shall have power by order to revive the order from such date as the court may specify, not being earlier than the date of the making of the application.

(3) Any order revived under this section may be varied or revoked under section 20 in the same way as it could have been varied or revoked had it continued in being."

26E. In section 23(1) of that Act (supplementary provisions with respect to the variation and revocation of orders) for the words "14(3), 20 or 21" there shall be substituted "20" and for the words "section 20 of this Act" there shall be substituted "that section".

26F.—(1) In section 25 of that Act (effect on certain orders of parties living together), in subsection (1)(a) for the words "6 or 11(2)" there shall be substituted "or 6".

(2) In subsection (2) of that section—

(a) in paragraph (a) for the words "6 or 11(2)" there shall be substituted "or 6"; and
(b) after paragraph (a) there shall be inserted "or".

26G. In section 29(5) of that Act (appeals) for the words "sections 14(3), 20 and 21" there shall be substituted "section 20".

26H. In section 88(1) of that Act (interpretation)—

(a) in the definition of "child", for the words from "an illegitimate" to the end there shall be substituted "a child whose father and mother were not married to each other at the time of his birth"; and
(b) in the definition of "child of the family", for the words "being boarded-out with those parties" there shall be substituted "placed with those parties as foster parents".

No. 427, in page 146, line 30, at end insert—

'The Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 (c.43)

261.—(1) In section 59(2) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 (periodical payments through justices' clerk) for the words "the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971 and 1973" there shall be substituted "(or having effect as if made under) Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989".

(2) For section 62(5) of that Act (payments to children) there shall be substituted—

"(5) In this section references to the person with whom a child has his home—

(a) in the case of any child who is being looked after by a local authority (within the meaning of section 19 of the Children Act 1989), are references to that local authority; and
(b) in any other case, are references to the person who, disregarding any absence of the child at a hospital or boarding school and any other temporary absence, has care of the child.".`.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move amendment No. 233, in page 146, line 37, at end insert—
Page 146, line 37, at end insert—
`( ) In section 41 of that Act (wards of court), the following subsection shall be inserted after subsection (2)—
(2A) Subsection (2) does not apply with respect to a child who is the subject of a care order (as defined by section 89 of the Children Act 1989.)".'.

Madam Deputy Speaker: With this we shall discuss Government amendments Nos. 410, 146, 395, 148 to 150.

Mr. Mellor: This group of amendments mainly concern the effect of care and supervision orders and their interaction with other orders.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 247, in page 146, leave out lines 40 and 41 and insert—
'"(ii) the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court with respect to minors, the maintenance of minors and any proceedings under the Children Act 1989, except proceedings solely for the appointment of a guardian of a minor's estate".'.

No. 428, in page 146, line 41, at end insert—

'The Armed Forces Act 1981 (c. 55)

27A. In section 14 of the Armed Forces Act 1981 (temporary removal to, and detention in, place of safety abroad or in the United Kingdom of service children in need of care and control), in subsection (9A) for the words "the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, the Children and Young Persons Act 1969" there shall be substituted "the Children Act 1989".'.

No. 429, in page 146, line 41, at end insert—

'The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (c.27)

27B. In paragraph 5(a) of Schedule 5 to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (maintenance and similar payments excluded from Schedule 4 to that Act) for the words "section 47 or 51 of the Child Care Act 1980" there shall be substituted "paragraph 21 of Schedule 2 to the Children Act 1989".'.

No. 430, in page 146, line 43, after '28.' Insert—
' .—(1) For section 27 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (children and young persons in care of local authority) there shall be substituted the following section—

'Children and young persons in care

27. Where—

(a) a patient who is a child or young person is in the care of a local authority by virtue of a care order within the meaning of the Children Act 1989; or
(b) the rights and powers of a parent of a patient who is a child or young person are vested in a local authority by virtue of section 16 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968,

the authority shall be deemed to be the nearest relative of the patient in preference to any person except the patient's husband or wife (if any)."

(2) Section 28 of that Act (nearest relative of minor under guardianship, etc.) is amended as mentioned in subparagraphs (3) and (4).

(3) For subsection (1) there shall be substituted—

"(1) Where—

(a) a guardian has been appointed for a person who has not attained the age of eighteen years; or
(b) a residence order (as defined by section 7 of the Children Act 1989) is in force with respect to such a person,

the guardian (or guardians, where there is more than one) or the person named in the residence order shall, to the exclusion of any other person, be deemed to be his nearest relative."

(4) For subsection (3) there shall be substituted—

"(3) In this section "guardian" does not include a guardian under this Part of this Act.".28A'.

No. 431, in page 146, line 43, leave out
'the Mental Health Act 1983'
and insert 'that Act'.

No. 432, in page 146, line 46, at end insert—

'The Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 (c.36)

28A. For section 54 of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 (children and young persons in care of local authority) there shall be substituted the following section—

Children and young persons in care of local authority

54. Where—


(a) the rights and powers of a parent of a patient who is a child or young person are vested in a local authority by virtue of section 16 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968; or
(b) a patient who is a child or young person is in the care of a local authority by virtue of a care order made under the Children Act 1989,

the authority shall be deemed to be the nearest relative of the patient in preference to any person except the patient's husband or wife (if any).'.".'.

No. 351, in page 146, line 46, at end insert—

'The Registered Homes Act 1984 (c.23)

.—(1) In section 1(5) of the Registered Homes Act 1984 (requirement of registration) for paragraphs (d) and (e) there shall be substituted—

"(d) any community home, voluntary home or children's home within the meaning of the Children Act 1989."

(2) In section 39 of that Act (preliminary) for paragraphs (a) and (b) there shall be substituted—

"(a) the Children Act 1989."

The Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (c.42)

. In section 38(2)(b) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (transfer of family proceedings from High Court to county court) after the words "a ward of court" there shall be inserted "or any other proceedings which relate to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court with respect to minors".'.

No. 234, in page 147, line 6, leave out from '(6)' to end of line 7 and insert
'for the words from "make arrangements" to the end there shall be substituted "secure that the arrested juvenile is moved to local authority accommodation".
( ) After that subsection there shall be inserted—
(6A) In this section 'local authority accommodation' means accommodation provided by or on behalf of a local authority (within the meaning of the Children Act 1989).
(6B) Where an arrested juvenile is moved to local authority accommodation under subsection (6) above, it shall be lawful for any person acting on behalf of the authority to detain him.".'.

No. 235, in page 147, line 9, at end insert—
'30A. In section 39(4) of that Act (responsibilities in relation to persons detained) for the words "transferred to the care of a local authority in pursuance of arrangements made" there shall be substituted "moved to local authority accommodation".
30B. In Schedule 2 to that Act (preserved powers of arrest) in the entry relating to the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 for the words "Sections 28(2) and" there shall be substituted "Section".'.

No. 433, in page 147, line 13, at end insert—

'The Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985 (c. 60)

31A.—(1) In sections 9(a) and 20(2)(a) of the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985 (orders with respect to which court's powers suspended), for the words "any other order under section 1(2) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969" there shall be substituted "a supervision order under section 28 of the Children Act 1989".

(2) At the end of section 27 of that Act (interpretation), there shall be added—

"(4) In this Act a decision relating to rights of access in England and Wales means a decision as to the contact which a child may, or may not, have with any person."

(3) In Part I of Schedule 3 to that Act (orders in England and Wales which are custody orders for the purposes of the Act), for paragraph 1 there shall be substituted—

"1. The following are the orders referred to in section 27(1) of this Act—

(a) a care order under the Children Act 1989 (as defined by section 28(11) of that Act, read with section 89(1) and Schedule 12);
(b) a residence order (as defined by section 7 of the Act of 1989); and
(c) any order made by a court in England and Wales under any of the following enactments—

(i) section 9(1), 10(1)(a) or 11(a) of the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971;


(ii) section 42(1) or (2) or 43(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973;
(iii) section 2(2)(b), 4(b) or (5) of the Guardianship Act 1973 as applied by section 34(5) of the Children Act 1975;
(v) section 8(2)(a), 10(1) or 19(l)(ii) of the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates Courts Act 1978;
(vi) section 26(1)(b) of the Adoption Act 1976.".'.

No. 434, in page 148, line 9, at end insert—

'The Family Law Act 1986 (c. 55)

35A.—(1) The Family Law Act 1986 shall be amended as follows.

(2) Subject to paragraphs 35B to 35J, in Part I—

(a) for the words "custody order", in each place where they occur, there shall be substituted "Part I order";
(b) for the words "proceedings with respect to the custody of', in each place where they occur, there shall be substituted "Part I proceedings with respect to"; and
(c) for the words "matters relating to the custody of", in each place where they occur, there shall be substituted "Part I matters relating to".

(3) For section 42(7) (general interpretation of Part I) there shall be substituted—

"(7) In this Part—

(a) references to Part I proceedings in respect of a child are references to any proceedings for a Part I order or an order corresponding to a Part I order and include, in relation to proceedings outside the United Kingdom, references to proceedings before a tribunal or other authority having power under the law having effect there to determine Part I matters; and
(b) references to Part I matters are references to matters that might be determined by a Part I order or an order corresponding to a Part I order."

35B.—(1) In section 1 (orders to which Part I of the Act of 1986 applies), in subsection (1)—

(a) for paragraph (a) there shall be substituted—

"(a) a section 7 order by a court in England and Wales under the Children Act 1989, other than an order varying or discharging such an order"; and

(b) for paragraph (d) there shall be substituted the following paragraphs—

"(d) an order made by a court in England and Wales in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court with respect to children—

(i) so far as it gives care of a child to any person or provides for contact with, or the education of, a child; but
(ii) excluding an order varying or revoking such an order;

(e) an order made by the High Court in Northern Ireland in the exercise of its jurisdiction relating to wardship—

(i) so far as it gives care and control of a child to any person or provides for the education of or access to a child; but
(ii) excluding an order relating to a child of whom care or care and control is (immediately after the making of the order) vested in the Department of Health and Social Services or a Health and Social Services Board."

(2) In subsection (2) of that section, in paragraph (c) for "(d)" there shall be substituted "(e)".

(3) For subsections (3) to (5) of that section there shall be substituted—

"(3) In this Part, 'Part I order'—

(a) includes any order which would have been a custody order by virtue of this section in any form in which it was in force at any time before its amendments by the Children Act 1989; and

(b) (subject to sections 32 and 40 of this Act) excludes any order which would have been excluded from being a custody order by virtue of this section in any such form."

35C. For section 2 there shall be substituted the following sections—

Jurisdiction: general.

2.—(1) A court in England and Wales shall not have jurisdiction to make a section 1(1)(a) order with respect to a child in or in connection with matrimonial proceedings in England and Wales unless the condition in section 2A of this Act is satisfied.

(2) A court in England and Wales shall not have jurisdiction to make a section 1(1)(a) order in a non-matrimonial case (that is to say, where the condition in section 2A of this Act is not satisfied) unless the condition in section 3 of this Act is satisfied.

(3) A court in England and Wales shall have jurisdiction to make a section 1(1)(d) order unless—

(a) the condition in section 3 of this Act is satisfied, or
(b) the child concerned is present in England and Wales on the relevant date and the court considers that the immediate exercise of its powers is necessary for his protection.

Jurisdiction in or in connection with matrimonial proceedings

2A.—(1) The condition referred to in section 2(1) of this Act is that the matrimonial proceedings are proceedings in respect of the marriage of the parents of the child concerned and—

(a) the proceedings—

(i) are proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, and
(ii) are continuing;

(b) the proceedings—

(i) are proceedings for judicial separation,
(ii) are continuing,and the jurisdiction of the court is not excluded by subsection (2) below; o

(c) the proceedings have been dismissed after the beginning of the trial but—

(i) the section 1(1)(a) order is being made forthwith, or
(ii) the application for the order was made on or before the dismissal.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) above, the jurisdiction of the court is excluded if, after the grant of a decree of judicial separation, on the relevant date, proceedings for divorce or nullity in respect of the marriage are continuing in Scotland or Northern Ireland.

(3) Subsection (2) above shall not apply if the court in which the other proceedings there referred to are continuing has made—

(a) an order under section 13(6) or 21(5) of this Act (not being an order made by virtue of section 13(6)(a)(i)), or
(b) an order under section 14(2) or 22(2) of this Act which is recorded as being made for the purpose of enabling Part I proceedings to be taken in England and Wales with respect to the child concerned.

(4) Where a court—

(a) has jurisdiction to make a section 1(1)(a) order in or in connection with matrimonial proceedings, but
(b) considers that it would be more appropriate for Part I matters relating to the child to be determined outside England and Wales,

the court may by order direct that, while the order under this subsection is in force, no section 1(1)(a) order shall be made by any court in or in connection with those proceedings."

35D.—(1) In section 3 (habitual residence or presence of child concerned) in subsection (1) for "section 2" there shall be substituted "section 2(2)".

(2) In subsection (2) of that section for the words "proceedings for divorce, nullity or judicial separation" there shall be substituted "matrimonial proceedings".

35E.—(1) In section 6 (duration and variation of Part I orders), for subsection (3) there shall be substituted the following subsections—

"(3) A court in England and Wales shall not have jurisdiction to vary a Part I order if, on the relevant date,


matrimonial proceedings are continuing in Scotland or Northern Ireland in respect of the marriage of the parents of the child concerned.

(3A) Subsection (3) above shall not apply if—

(a) the Part I order was made in or in connection with proceedings for divorce or nullity in England and Wales in respect of the marriage of the parents of the child concerned; and
(b) those proceedings are continuing.

(3B) Subsection (3) above shall not apply if—

(a) the Part I order was made in or in connection with proceedings for judicial separation in England and Wales;
(b)those proceedings are continuing; and
(c) the decree of judicial separation has not yet been granted."

(2) In subsection (5) of that section for the words from "variation or' to "if the ward" there shall be substituted "variation of a section 1(1)(d) order if the child concerned".

(3) For subsections (6) and (7) of that section there shall be substituted the following subsections—

"(6) Subsection (7) below applies where a Part I order which is—

(a) a residence order (within the meaning of the Children Act 1989) in favour of a person with respect to a child,
(b) an order made in the exercise of the High Court's inherent jurisdiction with respect to children by virtue of which a person has care of a child, or
(c) an order—

(i) of a kind mentioned in section 1(3)(a) of this Act,
(ii) under which a person is entitled to the actual possession of a child,

ceases to have effect in relation to that person by virtue of subsection (1) above.

(7) Where this subsection applies, any family assistance order made under section 14 of the Children Act 1989 with respect to the child shall also cease to have effect.

(8) For the purposes of subsection (7) above the reference to a family assistance order under section 14 of the Children Act 1989 shall be deemed to include a reference to an order for the supervision of a child made under—

(a) section 7(4) of the Family Law Reform Act 1969,
(b) section 44 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973,
(c) section 2(2)(a) of the Guardianship Act 1973,
(d) section 34(5) or 36(3)(b) of the Children Act 1975, or
(e) section 9 of the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates' Courts Act 1978;

but this subsection shall cease to have effect once all such orders for the supervision of children have ceased to have effect in accordance with Schedule 12 to the Children Act 1989."

35F. For section 7 (interpretation of Chapter II) there shall be substituted—

Interpretation of Chapter II

7. In this Chapter—

(a) 'child' means a person who has not attained the age of eighteen;
(b) 'matrimonial proceedings' means proceedings for divorce, nullity of marriage or judicial separation;
(c) 'the relevant date' means in relation to the making or variation of an order—

(i) where an application is made for an order to be made or varied, the date of the application (or first application, if two or more are determined together), and
(ii) where no such application is made, the date on which the court is considering whether to make or, as the case may be, vary the order; and

(d) 'section 1(1)(a) order' and 'section 1(1)(d) order' mean orders falling within section 1(1)(a) and (d) of this Act respectively."

35G. In each of the following sections—


(a) section 11(2)(a) (provisions supplementary to sections 9 and 10),
(b) section 13(5)(a) (jurisdiction ancillary to matrimo-nial proceedings),
(c) section 20(3)(a) (habitual residence or presence of child),
(d) section 21(4)(a) (jurisdiction in divorce proceedings, etc.), and
(e) section 23(4)(a) (duration and variation of custody orders),

for "4(5)" there shall be substituted "2A(4)".

35H. In each of the following sections—

(a) section 19(2) (jurisdiction in cases other than divorce, etc.),
(b) section 20(6) (habitual residence or presence of child), and
(c) section 23(5) (duration and variation of custody orders),

for "section 1(1)(d)" there shall be substituted "section 1(1)(e)".

35I. In section 34(3) (power to order recovery of child) for paragraph (a) there shall be substituted—

"(a) section (Enforcement of residence orders) of the Children Act 1989".

35J.—(1) In section 42 (general interpretation of Part I), in subsection (4)(a) for the words "has been boarded out with those parties" there shall be substituted "is placed with those parties as foster parents".

(2) In subsection (6) of that section, in paragraph (a) after the word "person" there shall be inserted "to be allowed contact with or".'.

No. 435, in page 148, line 14, at end insert—

'Amendments of local Acts

.—(1) Section 16 of the Greater London Council (General Powers) Act 1981 (exemption from provisions of Part IV of the Act of certain premises) shall be amended as follows.

(2) After paragraph (g) there shall be inserted—

"(gg) used as a children's home as defined in section 56 of the Children Act 1989".

(3) In paragraph (h)—

(a) for the words "section 56 of the Child Care Act 1980" there shall be substitued "section 53 of the Children Act 1989";
(b) for the words "section 57" there shall be substituted "section 53"; and
(c) for the words "section 32" there shall be substitued "section 47".

(4) In paragraph (i), for the words "section 8 of the Foster Children Act 1980" there shall be substituted "section 60 of the Children Act 1989".

.—(1) Section 10(2) of the Greater London Council (General Powers) Act 1984 (exemption from provisions of Part IV of the Act of certain premises) shall be amended as follows.

(2) In paragraph (d)—

(a) for the words "section 56 of the Child Care Act 1980" there shall be substituted "section 53 of the Children Act 1989";
(b) for the words "section 57" there shall be substituted "section 53"; and
(c) for the words "section 31" there shall be substituted "section 47".

(3) In paragraph (e), for the words "section 8 of the Foster Children Act 1980" there shall be substituted "section 60 of the Children Act 1989".

(4) In paragraph (1) for the words "section 1 of the Children's Homes Act 1982" there shall be substituted "section 56 of the Children Act 1989";.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Schedule 12

TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move amendment No. 436, in page 148, leave out lines 17 to 26 and insert—

'Pending Proceedings, Etc.

1.—(1) Subject to sub-paragraph (4), nothing in any provisions of this Act (other then the repeals mentioned in


sub-paragraph (2)) shall affect any proceedings which are pending immediately before the commencement of that provision.

(2) The repeals are those of—

(a) section 42(3) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (declaration by court that party to marriage unfit to have custody of children of family); and
(b) section 38 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 (power of court to divest person of authority over girl or boy in cases of incest).

(3) For the purposes of the following provisions of this Schedule, any reference to an order in force immediately before the commencement of a provision of this Act shall be construed as including a reference to an order made after that commencement in proceedings pending before that commencement.

(4) Sub-paragraph (3) is not to be read as making the order in question have effect from a date earlier than that on which it was made.

(5) An order under section (Evidence given by, or with respect to, children) (3) may make such provision with respect to the application of the order in relation to proceedings which are pending when the order comes into force as the Lord Chancellor considers appropriate.

2. Where, immediately before the day on which part IV comes into force, there was in force an order under section 3(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1963 (order directing a local authority to bring a child or young person before a juvenile court under section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969), the order shall cease to have effect on that day.

Custody Orders, Etc.

Cessation of declarations of unfitness, etc.

3. Where, immediately before the day on which Parts I and II come into force, there was in force—

(a) a declaration under section 42(3) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (declaration by court that party to marriage unfit to have custody of children of family); or
(b) an order under section 38(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 divesting a person of authority over a girl or boy in a case of incest;

the declaration or, as the case may be, the order shall cease to have effect on that day.

Family Law Reform Act 1987 (c. 42)

Conversion of orders under section 4

4. Where, immediately before the day on which Parts I and II come into force, there was in force an order under section 4(1) of the Family Law Reform Act 1987 (order giving father parental rights and duties in relation to a child), then, on and after that day, the order shall be deemed to be an order under section 4 of this Act giving the father parental responsibility for the child.

Orders to which paragraphs 6 to 11 apply

5.—(1) In paragraphs 6 to 11 "an existing order" means any order which—

(a) is in force immediately before the commencement of Parts I and II;
(b) was made under any enactment mentioned in sub-paragraph (2);
(c) determines all or any of the following—

(i) who is to have custody of a child;
(ii) who is to have care and control of a child;
(iii) who is to have access to a child;
(iv) any matter with respect to a child's education or upbringing; and

(d) is not an order of a kind mentioned in paragraph 15(1).

(2) The enactments are—

(a) the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates' Courts Act 1978;
(b) the Children Act 1975;
(c) the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973
(d) the Guardianship of Minors Acts 1971 and 1973;
(e) the Matrimonial Causes Act 1965;
(f) the Matrimonial Proceedings (Magistrates' Courts) Act 1960.

(3) For the purposes of this paragraph and paragraphs 6 to 11 "custody" includes legal custody and joint as well as sole custody but does not include access.

Parental responsibility of parents

6.—(1) Where—

(a) a child's father and mother were married to each other at the time of his birth; and
(b) there is an existing order with respect to the child. each parent shall have parental responsibility for the child in accordance with section 2 as modified by sub-paragraph (3).

(2) Where—

(a) a child's father and mother were not married to each other at the time of his birth; and
(b) there is an existing order with respect to the child, section 2 shall apply as modified by sub-paragraphs (3) and (4).

((3) The modification is that for section 2(8) there shall be substituted—

"(8) The fact that a person has parental responsibility for a child does not entitle him to act in a way which would be incompatible with any existing order or any order made under this Act with respect to the child".

(4) The modifications are that—

(a) for the purposes of section 2(2), where the father has custody or care and control of the child by virtue of any existing order, the court shall be deemed to have made (at the commencement of that section) an order under section 4(1) giving him parental responsibility for the child; and
(b) where by virtue of paragraph (a) a court is deemed to have made an order under section 4(1) in favour of a father who has care and control of a child by virtue of an existing order, the court shall not bring the order under section 4(1) to an end at any time while he has care and control of the child by virtue of the order.

Persons who are not parents but who have custody or care and control

7.—(1) Where a person who is not the parent or guardian of a child has custody or care and control of him by virtue of an existing order, that person shall have parental responsibility for him so long as he continues to have that custody or care and control by virtue of the order.

(2) Where sub-paragraph (1) applies, Parts I and Il shall have effect as modified by this paragraph.

(3) The modifications are that—

(a) for section 2(8) there shall be substituted—

"(8) The fact that a person has parental responsibility for a child does not entitle him to act in a way which would be incompatible with any existing order or with any order made under this Act with respect to the child"

(b) at the end of section 9(4) there shall be inserted—

"(c) any person who has custody or care and control of a child by virtue of any existing order"; and

(c) at the end of section 31(1)(c) there shall be inserted—

"(c) where immediately before the care order was made there was an existing order by virtue of which a person had custody or care and control of the child, that person."

Persons who have care and control

8.—(1) Sub-paragraphs (2) to (6) apply where a person has care and control of a child by virtue of an existing order, but they shall cease to apply when that order ceases to have effect.—

(2) Section 5 shall have effect as if—

(a) for any reference to a residence order in favour of a parent or guardian there were substituted a reference to any existing order by virtue of which the parent or guardian has care and control of the child; and

(b) for subsection (8) there were substituted—

"(8) Subsections (1) and (6) do not apply if the existing order referred to in paragraph (b) of those subsections was one by virtue of which a surviving parent of the child also had care and control of him."

(3) Section 9 shall have effect as if for subsection (5)(c)(i) there were substituted—

"(i) in any case where by virtue of an existing order any person or persons has or have care and control of the child, has the consent of that person or each of those persons".

(4) Section 18 shall have effect as if for subsection (9)(a) there were substituted "who has care and control of the child by virtue of an existing order."

(5) Section 20 shall have effect as if for subsection (4)(c) there were substituted—

"(c) where the child is in care and immediately before the care order was made there was an existing order by virtue of which a person had care and control of the child, that person."

(6) In Schedule 1, paragraphs 1(1) and 14(1) shall have effect as if for the words "in whose favour a residence order is in force with respect to the child" there were substituted "who has been given care and control of the child by virtue of an existing order".

Persons who have access

9.—(1) Sub-paragraphs (2) to (4) apply where a person has access by virtue of an existing order.

(2) Section 9 shall have effect as if after subsection (5) there were inserted—

"(5A) Any person who has access to a child by virtue of an existing order is entitled to apply for a contact order."

(3) Section 14(2) shall have effect as if after paragraph (b) there were inserted—

"(bb) any person who has access to the child by virtue of an existing order."

(4) Sections (Child assessment orders) (11), 38(10) and 40(10) shall have effect as if in each case after paragraph (d) there were inserted—

"(dd) any person who has been given access to him by virtue of an existing order."

Enforcement of certain existing orders

10.—(1) Sub-paragraph (2) applies in relation to any existing order which, but for the repeal by this Act of—

(a) section 13(1) of the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971;
(b) section 43(1) of the Children Act 1975; or
(c) section 33 of the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates' Courts Act 1978,

(provisions concerning the enforcement of custody orders) might have been enforced as if it were an order requiring a person to give up a child to another person.

(2) Where this sub-paragraph applies, the existing order may, after the repeal of the enactments mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a) to (c), be enforced under section (Enforcement of residence orders) as if—

(a) any reference to a residence order were a reference to the existing order; and
(b) any reference to a person in whose favour the residence order is in force were a reference to a person to whom actual custody of the child is given by an existing order which is in force.

(3) In sub-paragraph (2) "actual custody", in relation to a child, means the actual possession of his person.

Discharge of existing orders

11.—(1) The making of a residence order or a care order with respect to a child who is the subject of an existing order discharges the existing order.

(2) Where the court makes any section 7 order (other than a residence order) with respect to a child to whom any existing order is in force, the existing order shall have effect subject to the section 7 order.

(3) The court may discharge an existing order which is in force with respect to a child—

(a) in any family proceedings relating to the child or in which any question arises with respect to the child's welfare; or
(b) on the application of—

(i) any parent or guardian of the child;
(ii) the child himself; or
(iii) any person named in the order.

(4) A child may not apply for the discharge of an existing order except with the leave of the court.

(5) The power in sub-paragraph (3) to discharge an existing order includes the power to discharge any part of the order.

(6) In considering whether to discharge an order under the power conferred by sub-paragraph (3) the court shall, if the discharge of the order is opposed by any party to the proceedings, have regard in particular to the matters mentioned in section 1(2).

GUARDIANS

Existing guardians to be guardians under this Act

12.—(1) Any appointment of a person as guardian of a child which—

(a) was made

(i) under sections 3 to 5 of the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971;
(ii) under section 38(3) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956; or
(iii) under the High Court's inherent jurisdiction with respect to children; and

(b) has taken effect before the commencement of section 5,

shall (subject to sub-paragraph (2)) be deemed, on and after the commencement of section 5, to be an appointment made and having effect under that section.

(2) Where an appointment of a person as guardian of a child has effect under section 5 by virtue of sub-paragraph (1)(a)(ii), the appointment shall not have effect for a period which is longer than any period specified in that order.

Appointment of guardian not yet in effect

13. Any appointment of a person to be a guardian of a child—

(a) which was made as mentioned in paragraph 12(1)(a)(i); but
(b) which, immediately before the commencement of section 5, had not taken effect,

shall take effect in accordance with section 5 (as modified, where it applies, by paragraph 8(2)).

Persons deemed to be appointed as guardians under existing wills

14. For the purposes of the Wills Act 1837 and of this Act any disposition by will and testament or devise of the custody and tuition of any child, made before the commencement of section 5 and paragraph 1 of Schedule 11, shall be deemed to be an appointment by will of a guardian of the child.

CHILDREN IN CARE

Children in compulsory care

15.—(1) Sub-paragraph (2) applies where, immediately before the day on which Part IV comes into force, a person was—

(a) in care by virtue of—

(i) a care order under section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969;
(ii) a care order under section 15 of that Act, on discharging a supervision order made under section 1 of that Act; or
(iii) an order or authorisation under section 25 or 26 of that Act;

(b) deemed, by virtue of—

(i) paragraph 7(3) of Schedule 5A to the Army Act 1955;
(ii) paragraph 7(3) of Schedule 5A to the Air Force Act 1955; or
(iii) paragraph 7(3) of Schedule 4A to the Naval Discipline Act 1957,

to be the subject of a care order under the Children and Young Persons Act 1969;

(c) in care—

(i) under section 2 of the Child Care Act 1980; or
(ii) by virtue of paragraph 1 of Schedule 4 to that Act (which extends the meaning of a child in care under section 2 to include children in care under section 1 of the Children Act 1948),

and a child in respect of whom a resolution under section 3 of the Act of 1980 or section 2 of the Act of 1948 was in force;

(d) a child in respect of whom a resolution had been passed under section 65 of the Child Care Act 1980;

(e) in care by virtue of an order under—

(i) section 2(1)(e) of the Matrimonial Proceedings (Magistrates' Courts) Act 1960;


(ii) section 7(2) of the Family Law Reform Act 1969;
(iii) section 43(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973; or
(iv) section 2(2(b) of the Guardianship Act 1973;
(v) section 10 of the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates' Courts Act 1978,

(orders having effect for certain purposes as if the child had been received into care under section 2 of the Child Care Act 1980);

(f) in care by virtue of an order made, on the revocation of a custodianship order, under section 36 of the Children Act 1975;
(g) in care by virtue of an order made, on the refusal of an adoption order, under section 26 of the Adoption Act 1976 or any order having effect (by virtue of paragraph 1 of the Schedule 2 to that Act) as if made under that section.

(2) Where this sub-paragraph applies, then, on and after the day on which Part IV commences—

(a) the order or resolution in question shall be deemed to be a care order;
(b) the authority in whose care the person was immediately before that commencement shall be deemed to be the authority designated in that deemed care order; and
(c) any reference to a child in the care of a local authority shall include a reference to a person who is the subject of such a deemed care order,

and the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly, subject to paragraph 16.

Modifications

16.—(1) Sub-paragraph (2) only applies where a person who is the subject of a care order by virtue of paragraph 15(2) is a person falling within sub-paragraph (1)(a) or (b) of that paragraph.

(2) Where the person would otherwise have remained in care until reaching the age of nineteen, by virtue of—

(a) section 20(3)(a) or 21(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969; or
(b) paragraph 7(5) (c)(i) of—

(i) Schedule 5A to the Army Act 1955;
(ii) Schedule 5A to the Air Force Act 1955; or
(iii) Schedule 4A to the Naval Discipline Act 1957,

this Act applies as if in section 81(8) for the word "eighteen" there were substituted "nineteen".

(3) Where a person who is the subject of a care order by virtue of paragraph 15(2) is a person falling within sub-paragraph (1)(b) of that paragraph, this Act applies as if section 85 omitted.

(4) Sub-paragraph (5) only applies where a child who is the subject of a care order by virtue of paragraph 15(2) is a person falling within sub-paragraph (1)(e) to (g) of that paragraph.

(5) Where a court, on making the order, or at any time thereafter, gave directions under—

(a) section 4(4)(a) of the Guardianship Act 1973; or
(b) section 43(5)(a) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973,

as to the exercise by the authority of any powers, those directions shall continue to have effect (regardless of any conflicting provision in this Act) until varied or discharged by a court under this sub-paragraph.

Children placed with parent etc. while in compulsory care

17.—(1) This paragraph applies where a child is deemed by paragraph 15 to be in the care of a local authority under an order or resolution which is deemed by that paragraph to be a care order.

(2) If, immediately before the day on which Part III comes into force, the child was allowed to be under the charge and control of—

(a) a parent or guardian under section 21(2) of the Child Care Act 1980; or
(b) a person who, before the child was in the authority's care, had care and control of the child by virtue of an order falling within paragraph 5,

on and after that day the provision made by and under section 20(5) shall apply as if the child had been placed with the person in question in accordance with that provision.

Orders for access to children in compulsory care.

18.—(1) This paragraph applies to any access order—

(a) made under section 12C of the Child Care Act 1980 (access orders with respect to children in care of local authorities); and
(b) in force immediately before the commencement of Part IV.

(2) On and after the commencement of Part IV, the access order shall have effect as an order made under section 31 in favour of the person named in the order.

19.—(1) This paragraph applies where, immediately before the commencement of Part IV, an access order made under section 12C of the Act of 1980 was suspended by virtue of an order made under section 12E of that Act (suspension of access orders in emergencies).

(2) The suspending order shall continue to have effect as if this Act had not been passed.

(3) If—

(a) before the commencement of Part IV; and
(b) during the period for which the operation of the access order is suspended, the local authority concerned made an application for its variation or discharge to an appropriate juvenile court, its operation shall be suspended until the date on which the application to vary or discharge it is determined or abandoned.

Children in voluntary care

20.—(1) This paragraph applies where, immediately before the day on which Part III comes into force—

(a) a child was in the care of a local authority—

(i) under the section 2(1) of the Child Care Act 1980; or
(ii) by virtue of paragraph 1 of Schedule 4 to that Act (which extends the meaning of references to children in care under section 2 to include references to children in care under section 1 of the Children Act 1948); and

(b) he was not a person in respect of whom a resolution under section 3 of the Act of 1980 or section 2 of the Act of 1948 was in force.

(2) Where this paragraph applies, the child shall, on and after the day mentioned in sub-paragraph (1), be treated for the purposes of this Act as a child who is provided with accommodation by the local authority under Part III, but he shall cease to be so treated once he ceases to be so accommodated in accordance with the provisions of Part III.

(3) Where—

(a) this paragraph applies; and
(b) the child, immediately before the day mentioned in sub-paragraph (1), was (by virtue of section 21(2) of the Act of 1980) under the charge and control of a person falling within paragraph 17(2)(a) or (b),

the child shall not be treated for the purposes of this Act as if he were being looked after by the authority concerned.

Boarded out children

21.—(1) Where, immediately before the day on which Part III comes into force, a child in the care of a local authority—

(a) was—

(i) boarded out with a person under section 21(1)(a) of the Child Care Act 1980; or
(ii) placed under the charge and control of a person, under section 21(2) of that Act; and

(b) the person with whom he was boarded out, or (as the case may be) placed, was not a person falling within paragraph 17(2)(a) or (b),

on and after that day, he shall be treated (subject to sub-paragraph (2)) as having been placed with a local authority foster parent and shall cease to be so treated when he ceases to be placed with that person in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

(2) Regulations made under section 20(2)(a) shall not apply in relation to a person who is a local authority foster parent by virtue of sub-paragraph (1) before the end of the period of twelve months beginning with the day on which Part III comes into force and accordingly that person shall for that period be subject—

(a) in a case falling within sub-paragraph (1)(a)(i), to terms and regulations mentioned in section 21(1)(a) of the Act of 1980; and

(b) in a case within sub-paragraph (1)(a)(ii), to terms fixed under section 21(2) of that Act and regulations made under section 22A of that Act,

as if that Act has not been repealed by this Act.

Children in care to qualify for advice and assistance

22. Any reference in Part III to a person qualifying for advice and assistance shall be construed as including a reference to a person within the area of a local authority in question who is under twenty-one and who was, at any time after reaching the age of sixteen but while still a child—

(a) a person falling within—

(i) any of paragraphs (a) to (g) of paragraph 15(1); or
(ii) paragraph 20(1); or

(b) the subject of a criminal care order (within the meaning of paragraph 34).

Emigration of children in care

23. Where—

(a) the Secretary of State has received a request in writing from a local authority that he give his consent under section 24 of the Child Care Act 1980 to the emigration of a child in their care; but
(b) immediately before the repeal of the Act of 1980 by this Act, he has not determined whether or not to give his consent,

section 24 of the Act of 1980 shall continue to apply (regardless of that repeal) until the Secretary of State has determined whether or not to give his consent to the request.

Contributions for maintenance of children in care

24.—(1) Where, immediately before the day on which Part III of Schedule 2 comes into force, there was in force an order made (or having effect as if made) under any of the enactments mentioned in sub-paragraph (2), then, on and after that day—

(a) the order shall have effect as if made under paragraph 21(2) of Schedule 2 against a person liable to contribute; and
(b) Part III of Schedule 2 shall apply to the order, subject to the modifications in sub-paragraph (3).

(2) The enactments are—

(a) section 11(4) of the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates' Courts Act 1978;
(b) section 26(2) of the Adoption Act 1976;
(c) section 36(5) of the Children Act 1975;
(d) section 2(3) of the Guardianship Act 1973;
(e) section 2(1)(h) of the Matrimonial Proceedings (Magistrates' Courts) Act 1960,

(provisions empowering the court to make an order requiring a person to make periodical payments to a local authority in respect of a child in care).

(3) The modifications are that, in paragraph 21 of Schedule 2—

(a) in sub-paragraph (4), paragraph (a) shall be omitted;
(b) for sub-paragraph (6) there shall be substituted—"(6) Where—
(a) a contribution order is in force;
(b) the authority serve a contribution notice under paragraph 20; and
(c) the contributor and the authority reach an agreement under paragraph 20(7) in respect of the contribution notice,

the effect of the agreement shall be to discharge the order from the date on which it is agreed that the agreement shall take effect"; and

(c) at the end of sub-paragraph (10) there shall be inserted—

"and

(c) where the order is against a person who is not a parent of the child, shall be made with due regard to——

(i) whether that person had assumed responsibility for the maintenance of the child, and, if so, the extent to which and basis on which he

assumed that responsibility and the length of the period during which he met that responsibility;

(ii) whether he did so knowing that the child was not his child;

(iii) the liability of any person to maintain the child."

Supervision Orders Orders under section 1(3)(b) or 21(2) of the 1969 Act

25.—( l) This paragraph applies to any supervision order—

(a) made—

(i) under section 1(3)(b) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969; or
(ii) under section 21(2) of that Act on the discharge of a care order made under section 1(3)(c) of that Act; and

(b) in force immediately before the commencement of Part IV.

(2) On and after the commencement of Part IV, the order shall be deemed to be a supervision order made under section 28 and—

(a) any requirement of the order that the child reside with a named individual shall continue to have effect while the order remains in force, unless the court otherwise directs;
(b) any other requirement imposed by the court, or directions given by the supervisor, shall be deemed to have been imposed or given under the appropriate provisions of Schedule 3.

(3) Where, immediately before the commencement of Part IV, the order had been in force for a period of more than six months, it shall cease to have effect at the end of the period of six months beginning with the day on which Part IV comes into force unless—

(a) the court directs that it shall cease to have effect at the end of a different period (which shall not exceed three years);
(b) it ceases to have effect earlier in accordance with section 81; or
(c) it would have ceased to have had effect earlier had this Act not been passed.

(4) Where sub-paragraph (3) applies, paragraph 6 of Schedule 3 shall not apply.

(5) Where, immediately before the commencement of Part IV, the order had been in force for less than six months it shall cease to have effect in accordance with section 81 and paragraph 6 of Schedule 3 unless—

(a) the court directs that it shall cease to have effect at the end of a different period (which shall not exceed three years); or
(b) it would have ceased to have had effect earlier had this Act not been passed.

Other supervision orders

26.—(1) This paragraph applies to any order for the supervision of a child which was in force immediately before the commencement of Part IV and was made under—

(a) section 2(1)(f) of the Matrimonial Proceedings (Magistrates' Courts) Act 1960;
(b) section 7(4) of the Family Law Reform Act 1969;
(c) section 44 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973;
(d) section 2(2)(a) of the Guardianship Act 1973;
(e) section 34(5) or 36(3)(b) of the Children Act 1975;
(f) section 26(1)(a) of the Adoption Act 1976; or
(g) section 9 of the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates' Courts Act 1978.

(2) The order shall not be deemed to be a supervision order made under any provision of this Act but shall nevertheless continue in force for a period of one year beginning with the day on which Part IV comes into force unless—

(a) the court directs that it shall cease to have effect at the end of a lesser period; or
(b) it would have ceased to have had effect earlier had this Act not been passed.

Place of Safety Orders

27.—(1) This paragraph applies to—

(a) any order or warrant authorising the removal of a child to a place of safety which—


(i) was made, or issued, under any of the enactments mentioned in subparagraph (2); and
(ii) was in force immediately before the commencement of Part IV; and

(b) any interim order made under section 23(5) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1963 or section 28(6) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969.

(2) The enactments are—

(a) section 40 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (warrant to search for or remove child);
(b) section 28(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (detention of child in place of safety);
(c) section 34(1) of the Adoption Act 1976 (removal of protected children from unsuitable surroundings);
(d) section 12(1) of the Foster Children Act 1980 (removal of foster children kept in unsuitable surroundings).

(3) The order or warrant shall continue to have effect as if this Act had not been passed.

(4) Any enactment repealed by this Act shall continue to have effect in relation to the order or warrant so far as is necessary for the purposes of securing that the effect of the order is what it would have been had this Act not been passed.

(5) Sub-paragraph (4) does not apply to the power to make an interim order or further interim order given by section 23(5) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1963 or section 28(6) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969.

(6) Where, immediately before section 28 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 is repealed by this Act, a child is being detained under the powers granted by that section, he may continue to be detained in accordance with that section but subsection (6) shall not apply.

Recovery of Children

28. The repeal by this Act of subsection (1) of section 16 of the Child Care Act 1980 (arrest of child absent from compulsory care) shall not affect the operation of that section in relation to any child arrested before the coming into force of the repeal.

29.—(1) This paragraph applies where—

(a) a summons has been issued under section 15 or 16 of the Child Care Act 1980 (recovery of children in voluntary or compulsory care); and
(b) the child concerned is not produced in accordance with the summons before the repeal of that section by this Act comes into force.

(2) The summons, any warrant issued in connection with it and section 15 or (as the case may be) section 16, shall continue to have effect as if this Act had not been passed.

30. The amendment by paragraph 22B of Schedule 10 of section 32 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (detention of absentees) shall not affect the operation of that section in relation to—

(a) any child arrested; or
(b) any summons or warrant issued,

under that section before the coming into force of that paragraph.

Voluntary Organisations: Parental Rights Resolutions

31.—(1) This paragraph applies to a resolution—

(a) made under section 64 of the Child Care Act 1980 (transfer of parental rights and duties to voluntary organisations); and
(b) in force immediately before the commencement of Part IV.

(2) The resolution shall continue to have effect until the end of the period of six months beginning with the day on which Part IV comes into force unless it is brought to an end earlier in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1980 preserved by this paragraph.

(3) While the resolution remains in force, any relevant provisions of, or made under, the Act of 1980 shall continue to have effect with respect to it.

(4) Sub-paragraph (3) does not apply to—

(a) section 62 of the Act of 1980 and any regulations made under that section (arrangements by voluntary organisations for emigration of children); or
(b) section 65 of the Act of 1980 (duty of local authority to assume parental rights and duties).

(5) Section 5(2) of the Act of 1980 (which is applied to resolutions under Part VI of that Act by section 64(7) of that

Act) shall have effect with respect to the resolution as if the reference in paragraph (c) to an appointment of a guardian under section 5 of the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971 were a reference to an appointment of a guardian under section 5 of this Act.

Foster Children

32.—(1) This paragraph applies where—

(a) immediately before the commencement of Part V II, a child was a foster child within the meaning of the Foster Children Act 1980; and
(b) the circumstances of the case are such that, had Parts VIII and IX then been in force, he would have been treated for the purposes of this Act as a child who was being provided with accommodation in a children's home and not as a child who was being privately fostered.

(2) If the child continues to be cared for and provided with accommodation as before, section 56(1) and (13) shall not apply in relation to him if—

(a) an application for registration of the home in question is made under section 56 before the end of the period of three months beginning with the day on which Part VIII comes into force; and
(b) the application has not been refused or, if it has been refused

(i) the period for an appeal against the decision has not expired; or
(ii) an appeal against the refusal has been made but has not been determined or abandoned.

(3) While section 56(1) and (13) does not apply, the child shall be treated as a privately fostered child for the purposes of Part IX.

Nurseries and Child Minding

33.—(1) Sub-paragraph (2) applies where, immediately before the commencement of Part X, any premises are registered under section 1(1)(a) of the Nurseries arid Child-Minders Regulation Act 1948 (registration of premises, other than premises wholly or mainly used as private dwellings, where children are received to be looked after).

(2) During the transitional period, the provisions of the Act of 1948 shall continue to have effect with respect to those premises to the exclusion of Part X.

(3) Nothing in sub-paragraph (2) shall prevent the local authority concerned from registering any person under section 64(1)(b) with respect to the premises.

(4) In this paragraph "the transitional period" means the period ending with—

(a) the first anniversary of the commencement of Part X; or
(b) if earlier, the date on which the local authority concerned registers any person under section 64(1)(b) with respect to the premises.

34.—(1) Sub-paragraph (2) applies where, immediately before the commencement of Part X—

(a) a person is registered under section 1(1)(b) of the Act of 1948 (registration of persons who for reward receive into their homes children under the age of five to be looked after); and
(b) all the children looked after by him as mentioned in section 1(1)(b) of that Act are under the age of five.

(2) During the transitional period, the provisions of the Act of 1948 shall continue to have effect with respect to that. person to the exclusion of Part X.

(3) Nothing in sub-paragraph (2) shall prevent the local authority concerned from registering that person under section 64(1)(a).

(4) In this paragraph "the transitional period" means the period ending with—

(a) the first anniversary of the commencement of Part X; or
(b) if earlier, the date on which the local authority concerned registers that person under section 64(1)(a).

Children Accommodated in Certain Establishments

35. In calculating, for the purposes of section 77(1)(a) or 78(1)(a), the period of time for which a child has been accommodated any part of that period which fell before the day on which that section came into force shall be disregarded.

Criminal Care Orders

36.—(1) This paragraph applies where, immediately before the commencement of section 80(2) there was in force an order ("a criminal care order") made—

(a) under section 7(7)(a) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (alteration in treatment of young offenders etc.); or
(b) under section 15(1) of that Act, on discharging a supervision order made under section 7(7)(b) of that Act.

(2) The criminal care order shall continue to have effect until the end of the period of six months beginning with the day on which section 80(2) comes into force unless it is brought to an end earlier in accordance with—

(a) the provisions of the Act of 1969 preserved by sub-paragraph (3)(a); or
(b) this paragraph.

(3) While the criminal care order remains in force, any relevant provisions—

(a) of the Act of 1969; and
(b) of the Child Care Act 1980.

shall continue to have effect with respect to it.

(4) While the criminal care order remains in force, a court may, on the application of the appropriate person, make—

(a) a residence order;
(b) a care order or a supervision order under section 28;
(c) an education supervision order under section 33 (regardless of subsection (6) of that section); or
(d) an order falling within sub-paragraph (5), and shall, on making any of those orders, discharge the criminal care order.

(5) the order mentioned in sub-paragraph (4)(d) is an order having effect as if it were a supervision order of a kind mentioned in section 12AA of the Act of 1969 (as inserted by paragraph 20 of Schedule 10), that is to say, a supervision order—

(a) imposing a requirement that the child shall live for a specified period in local authority accommodation; but
(b) in relation to which the conditions mentioned in subsection (4) of section 12AA are not required to be satisfied.

(6) The maximum period which may be specified in an order made under sub-paragraph (4)(d) is six months and such an order may stipulate that the child shall not live with a named person.

(7) Where this paragraph applies, section 5 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (rehabilitation periods for particular sentences) shall have effect regardless of the repeals in it made by this Act.

(8) In sub-paragraph (4) "appropriate person" means—

(a) in the case of an application for a residence order, any person (other than a local authority) who has the leave of the court;
(b) in the case of an application for an education supervision order, a local education authority; and
(c) in any other case, the local authority to whose care the child was committed by the order.

Miscellaneous

Consents under the Marriage Act 1949

37.—(1) In the circumstances mentioned in sub-paragraph (2), section 3 of and Schedule 2 to the Marriage Act 1949 (consents to marry) shall continue to have effect regardless of the amendment of that Act by paragraph 3B of Schedule 10.

(2) The circumstances are that—

(a) immediately before the day on which paragraph 3B of Schedule 10 comes into force, there is in force—

(i) an existing order, as defined in paragraph 5(1); or
(ii) an order of a kind mentioned in paragraph 16(1); and

(b) section 3 of and Schedule 2 to the Act of 1949 would, but for this Act, have applied to the marriage of the child who is the subject of the order.

Children Act 1975

38, The amendments of other enactments made by the

following provisions of the Children Act 1975 shall continue to have effect regardless of the repeal of the Act of 1975 by this Act—

(a) section 68(4), (5) and (7) (amendments of section 32 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969); and
(b) in Schedule 3—

(i) paragraph 13 (amendments of Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953);
(ii) paragraph 43 (amendment of Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1964);
(iii) paragraphs 46 and 47 (amendments of Health Services and Public Health Act 1968); and
(iv) paragraph 77 (amendment of Parliamentary and Other Pensions Act 1972).

Child Care Act 1980

39. The amendment made to section 106(2)(a) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1963) by paragraph 26 of Schedule 5 to the Child Care Act 1980 shall continue to have effect regardless of the repeal of the Act of 1980 by this Act.

Legal aid

40. The Lord Chancellor may by order make such transitional and saving provisions as appear to him to be necessary or expedient, in consequence of any provision made by or under this Act, in connection with the operation of any provisions of the Legal Aid Act 1988 (including any provision of that Act which is amended or repealed by this Act).'.

It may be for the convenience of the House if I mention that there is a printing error in this amendment. Paragraph 27(1)(a)(ii) refers to part IV, but it should read "Part V".

I am moving the amendment with the incorporation of that correction.

It is a transitional amendment, which I commend to the House.

Amendment agreed to.

Schedule 13

REPEALS

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move amendment No. 236, in page 148, leave out line 39.

Madam Deputy Speaker: With this we may take Government amendments Nos. 250, 451, 452, 437, 251, 453, 254, 439, 440, 454, 255 and 266.

The Solicitor-General: Here again I need not detain the House. All the amendments repeal existing legislation in conformity with the general provisions of the Bill, and I commend them to the House.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 248, in page 148, line 42, at end insert—


'1944 c. 31.
The Education Act 1944.
In section 40(1), the words from "or to imprisonment" to the end.




In section 114(1), the definition of parent.'.

No. 352, in page 148, line 46, column 3, at beginning insert—





'In section 3(1), the words "unless the child is subject to a custodianship order, when the consent of the custodian and, where the custodian is the husband or wife of a parent of the child, of that parent shall be required".



Section 78(1A).'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move amendment No. 237, in page 149, line 9, column 3, at end insert—
'Section 53(3).'.

Madam Deputy Speaker: With this we may take Government amendments Nos. 118 to 120.

Mr. Mellor: These are technical amendments concern-ing recovery orders and other powers to recover children in care, or those who are subject to emergency protection powers.

Amendment agreed to.

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move amendment No. 353, in page 149, line 10, at end insert—

Madam Deputy Speaker: With this we may take new clause 1:

Family Courts

'(1) Within each county court and magistrates court there shall be created a family division which, together with the Family Division of the High Court, shall operate as a Family Court.

(2) The Lord Chancellor shall by rules of court specify the procedures to be followed in order to—

(a) identify the welfare of the child;
(b) avoid unnecessary formality;
(c) reduce delay and inconvenience to the public in resolution of family disputes;
(d) reduce the harm to children and families resulting from the court process and
(e) introduce conciliatory methods of dispute resolution.

(3) There shall be a welfare and conciliation service attached to the Family Court and it shall include—

(a) guardians ad litem and reporting officers;
(b) a family conciliation service in respect of children subject to proceedings under part two.
(c) social workers appointed to report to the court in proceedings under part two.

(4) This section shall come into force on such day as the Secretary of State may appoint, being not later than eighteen months after the Children Act receives Royal Assent.'.

Government new clause 18 and Government amend-ments Nos. 240 and 242.

The Solicitor-General: We now come to the debate that the House has been waiting for: the debate on the family court. In this debate will will discuss new clause 1, the Government's new clause 18 and, above all, the Government amendment incorporating new schedule 9A.
We had some interesting debates on the family court in Committee. Now we shall see how the Government's proposals match those of the Opposition—both those in new clause 1 and others that are not formally before us, but which we have had the opportunity to consider. I trailed our proposals a moment ago when speaking to

amendments on legal aid, and mentioned the view of the president of the Family Division that the Bill, in essence, would set up a family court. I must qualify that to some extent because of the scope of the Bill, but I must also make it clear that there is much truth in what the president said about how far it is possible to create a family court in the context of the Bill.
When considering major reforms of this nature, it is essential to assess the extent to which jurisdictional changes can be of any significance unless and until we have got the substantive law right. My right hon. and noble Friend the Lord Chancellor has been making that point ever since he was appointed, and I have done the same In the House in questions to the Attorney-General, answering those who have supported the family courts campaign or the family courts lobby in one form or another.
It is now recognised that, if we are to make progress on procedural aspects, we must first make progress on substantive law. The Bill begins by creating a new and coherent body of child law, which applies in all relevant courts at every level. Let me explain how our proposals, embodied in new clause 18 and amendment No. 240, achieve what, to a great extent, are shared goals. I shall be interested to hear how the hon. Member for Monklands, West (Mr. Clarke) and others on both sides of the House reiterate their goals.
There is, I believe, widespread acceptance of the need for a properly supported specialist jurisdiction in family matters, encompassing the courts at all relevant levels. That includes the magistrates courts, the county courts and the High Courts, and it is the achievement of those goals within the scope of the Bill that we are about to debate.
It is, as I have said, essential to realise that whether we are discussing only matters relating to child law—as covered by the Bill—or the whole range of family law, including divorce, before we can gain any worthwhile benefit from a reform of court structures or from a unified jurisdiction we must create that unified body of law, applicable at all levels and to all relevant matters.

Mr. Vaz: Will the Solicitor-General give way?

The Solicitor-General: I shall do so in a moment.
I propose first to explain how we intend to achieve our goals, and then to demonstrate how they take their place in the Government's rolling programme of review and reform to which I referred in Committee and on Second Reading, and to which my right hon. and noble Friend the Lord Chancellor referred on Second Reading in the other place. We are dealing with children's law not in isolation —although we can go no further than is allowed by the scope of the Bill—but in the context of a general and rolling review of family law as a whole.

Mr. Robert Hughes: Will the Solicitor-General give way?

The Solicitor-General: I feel that it would be courteous for me to give way first to the hon. Member for Leicester, East (Mr.Vaz).

Mr. Vaz: No one in the House disagrees with the Solicitor-General's comment that this is an historic Bill, which will reform the substance of child care law. Does he agree, therefore, that now is the time to reform the


procedure? If Parliament changes child care law radically, and we do not get the support structure right, the Bill will be completely ineffective.

The Solicitor-General: I agree to a considerable extent. That is what we are about to do—indeed, what we are in the process of doing.

Mr. Vaz: So we have a family court.

The Solicitor-General: The hon. Gentleman says, from a sedentary position, "So we have a family court", but it is essential to understand that family proceedings go much wider than proceedings on children. Important as the matters of public and private law dealt with in the Bill may be, the Bill—as must be obvious to everyone in the House and in the country—does not deal with the whole matter of divorce. If we are to have a family court, we must consider how that can encompass the whole area of family proceedings.
Our rolling programme takes what I submit is a first and major step towards what might be described as a family court, although—not least simply because of the scope of the Bill—it cannot go the whole length to create the family court. There is much more to it than the scope of the Bill. As we know, in proceedings relating to children the magistrates court has only a comparatively limited jurisdiction, and one has to jog about from one court to another at different levels, from the county court to the High Court, to exercise different powers.
6 pm
With this Bill we are in the business of creating, first, a single body of law and then a unified jurisdiction that runs through all courts. That is greatly to be welcomed, but it does not apply to other areas. For example, it does not apply to the whole concept of divorce, to domestic violence or to access or denial of access to the matrimonial home. Therefore, a great deal of careful review, which is under consideration by the Law Commission, among others, will need to be thought through to create a substantive body of law which is appropriate to all levels before we can take further steps in that direction.

Mr. Vaz: I do not wish to harass the Solicitor-General; I want to be fair to him and I follow his argument. He has referred to the rolling programme, and he has used the phrase, "the first step" which he used in Committee and he has sought the endorsement of the president of the Family Division for his proposals. If he is on a rolling programme, and bearing in mind the fact that it has taken about 100 years radically to reform the law governing children, what is his timetable? When can Parliament return again to discuss this crucial issue? How long will we have to wait for the second step?

The Solicitor-General: I shall develop that point later in my speech. The timetable is nothing like 100 years; I suggest that it is nothing like a decade. The programme is already in force. For example, the Law Commission is to report on a number of important matters next year. By the time we are digesting this legislation, which will have to be absorbed and implemented and which will require a great deal of training, we will find that thinking is moving

forward faster than the hon. Member for Leicester, East (Mr. Vaz) realises, and possibly faster than his own pace of thinking, but I would not like to do him an injustice.

Mr. Robert Hughes: Will the family courts now being proposed be able to deal with so-called transracial adoptions, where social work practice with which I profoundly disagree takes for granted that if a child has any black parentage or grandparentage the placement should automatically be with a black family?

The Solicitor-General: I shall return to the way in which adoption links into this matter. However, when considering a unified jurisdiction in relation to children, and that is certainly not beyond the scope of our contemplation, we are considering a court which ought to be able to deal with that aspect. I shall give the hon. Gentleman a more precise answer when I have more detailed instructions.
In summary, the Children Bill provides for a single body of substantive child law, and thus it can and does go on to provide for a unified jurisdiction at whatever court level is appropriate for a particular case with swift and expert means to determine and adjust that level as circumstances require, with the same law and the same powers applying at every level. That means that a case that falls within the scope of the Bill may start in the magistrates court, as many cases do, but there may be other family proceedings, for example a divorce, which start in a High Court, or there may be proceedings which start or may be appropriate to go to the High Court, and can rapidly and readily be moved to the appropriate level.
The changes that the Bill will enact and further changes in the wider field of family law are based on and developed from existing structures designed to make the best use of, and to grow out of, existing resources. I refer not only to financial resources, where one starts from where one is today, but, much more importantly, to human resources. The resources of manpower and expertise that are currently available must be built on by way of training and selection. They will require time for absorption and for a formidable programme of selection and training, but I hope to convince the House that when implemented they will constitute a major step towards what I believe are our shared goals.
Turning in detail to a single code, our amendment allows us to create a single concurrent jurisdiction for children's cases in the Bill only because the Bill also creates a single code of substantive law applicable in all the courts. Talk of a single jurisdiction without such a code would be nonsense. I hope that I do not need to overstress the fact that without a code of law that can be applied at every level —and we do not have that until we enact the Bill, and we do not have it in relation to divorce proceedings, for example—it is quite pointless to set up a single jurisdiction. However, elsewhere on the statute book the applicable family law varies from court to court, with, for example, different rules relating to financial provision, domestic violence and rights to occupy the family home depending on the level of court in which a case is heard.
Other parts of the law, such as divorce, are either in a state of transition—I have already said that the Law Commission has a number of works in hand —or they are so carefully grafted on to the structure and constitution of the courts which presently deal with the matter as to make the reorganisation of the wider body of family law an


extremely complex task. For example, one can only commence a divorce case by a petition and no one has ever heard of a petition in a magistrates court; and one can only obtain an injunction out of the county court or out of the High Court as it is wholly inappropriate to the magistrates court. A number of procedures in the magistrates court are equally inappropriate to the higher courts. Having pointed that out, I should add that the job of creating a single body of law is in hand. The Law Commission has already issued discussion papers on domestic violence and the right to occupy the family home and on grounds for divorce. Final reports on both are expected next year and a joint review of adoption law by the Government and the Law Commission is also on foot, and that will be relevant to what the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hughes) said.
As to financial provision, we shall take that on board in the rolling programme to which I shall refer in more detail later when I talk about the work that is going on between relevant Departments. However, it must be recognised that until the same law applies at all levels there can be no overall single family jurisdiction.
The next essential step towards our ultimate goal is to ensure that the courts hearing family proceedings are specialists. That theme has rightly come through all the campaigning and is certainly recognised by my noble Friend the Lord Chancellor and myself. The Government's new clause and schedule provide that, in the case of the magistrates, by creating the new magistrates family proceedings courts we shall meet that specialist need. When I mentioned the magistrates family proceedings court, the hon. Member for Leicester, East sought to pass that off as a mere change of name. I hope that he has thought more about it since, because it involves a great deal more than that.
The magistrates on the new family panels will receive special training on children's and family matters, which they do not receive today. The form of care proceedings which they, the county courts and the High Court will have jurisdiction to hear will differ significantly from those presently heard in the juvenile court. There is to be a move away from what is sometimes called, in rather inelegant jargon, orality—from having everything done by the spoken word—towards the parties being expected to disclose their case, and their evidence, in advance and in writing. I am glad to see the hon. Member for Ynys Môn (Mr. Jones) nodding assent because I think that he recognises, as I do, that early, clear disclosure in writing is of the greatest assistance when one is trying to clarify the real issues in a case and to shorten proceedings, and it concentrates the mind of the court that has to hear the case on the matters it has to determine.
Magistrates will be expected to read papers ahead of the hearing and to give reasons for their decisions. It is expected that the court will take a more active role in the case, ensure that unnecessary delays are avoided and, for example, use the guardians ad litem to ensure that all matters relevant to a case are investigated. The hon. Member for Wakefield (Mr. Hinchliffe) mentioned guardians ad litem and the Government have the issue under consideration.
Generally, it is intended that procedures in magistrates courts and superior courts in care-related cases should be brought into line as far as possible, or at least made compatible. That will ease the movement of cases between different levels of court.
In the High Court, cases will continue to be dealt with in the specialist Family Division. In the county courts, the great majority of orders will be made, as now in the case of divorce proceedings, by divorce county courts. The intention is to concentrate children's and other family proceedings in the hands of selected judges and registrars, many of whom will have had long experience in this area, either as practitioners or on the Bench, and who will have made a special study of such proceedings and built up expertise in family matters. Others who have shown an aptitude, willingness and personal interest in this type of case will be suitable for training. The Government are currently considering how best that can be arranged.
The next step that we would need to take would be to ensure that individual family proceedings within the single jurisdiction are dealt with at the right level. Until the same substantive law is applicable at all levels, that cannot happen. Now, as the Bill creates a single body of child law, it is possible to give the Lord Chancellor power to provide for the allocation of children's cases and some non-children's family cases within the concurrent jurisdiction and to consolidate them with proceedings about a child. We are making real progress towards the objectives set by those who are calling for a family court.
We intend to use the allocation powers in the amendment to specify where proceedings should start and to provide for the transfer of proceedings for three purposes. First, the powers will be used to ensure that, as far as practicable, all proceedings relating to a child and a family are consolidated and heard together.
If there are already family proceedings afoot, such as a divorce or maintenance dispute between parents, we intend that subsequent applications in respect of a child should usually be made to the court hearing those proceedings. If the proceedings are started in different courts, we intend to provide for transfer so that they can be heard together.
For example, if there is an application in a county court to adopt a child who is subject to a care order and the parents are applying to a magistrates family proceedings court to discharge that care order, the rules will ensure that the two applications can be heard together. This important need to consolidate proceedings which may affect the same child is why the powers in these amendments, unlike those which we considered in Committee on the present clause 82, now extend to family proceedings other than those covered by the Bill.
6.15 pm
In proceedings not centred around a child, the powers can be used only to consolidate them with proceedings that are. For example, we could require a divorce case to be started in the same county court in which the spouses were contesting an order about the child, but we could not transfer a divorce case where other family proceedings were unconnected with children. Unfortunately, to attempt to take powers to do that would be outside the scope of the present Bill.
Secondly, subject to rules aimed at consolidating them with other proceedings, care and supervision proceedings will be required to start in a magistrates family proceedings court. However, provision will be made for their transfer to a county court or to the High Court, if it were considered more appropriate for them to be heard by a superior court. In the amendment, we are taking power


to prescribe criteria which will identify the cases which need to transfer up. Consultations and research are already in hand to enable us to draw up those criteria.
Complicated law or forensic complexity—for example, a case that involves a lot of contradictory medical evidence —are the sort of factors which are likely to affect transfer. We consider that it should be possible to transfer cases up or sideways to a court at the same level if the court seized of the case cannot hear it within a reasonable time. We passed an amendment without discussion or controversy that militates against delay in this kind of proceeding. If the court cannot hear a case within a reasonable time, or if the case needs to be expedited or to be heard over several days and the court cannot provide consecutive hearing days—as some courts, with the best will in the world, cannot—the provisions, which I hope we shall enact, will enable the system to divert the case to a court that can hear it promptly and which has all the necessary expertise.
At present, we intend that the magistrates or their clerk should be able to transfer a care case at any stage, but should they refuse to do so and should an aggrieved party wish, he will be able to apply to a county court registrar to pluck up the case if he considers that the statutory criteria are satisfied. That registrar can allocate the case either within a county court or to the High Court. I stress that there will not be a need for a further delay as another transfer procedure is gone through if the case merits a High Court hearing. It is recognised that there will be a need for administrative back-up and co-operation between the courts to run such a scheme for care-related cases. That need will be met through a central committee structure, under the aegis of the president of the Family Division.
The Government consider that it is important to have the flexibility that these powers confer so that transfer criteria and rules relating to where proceedings should be initiated can be altered if experience shows it to be desirable.
As I have already mentioned, we intend, initially, to require all local authority care applications to be made to a family proceedings court. If we find that most of them are subsequently transferred up to a county court, we may wish to allow care applications to be initiated in a county court, while providing for subsequent transfer down to a family proceedings court in appropriate cases.
Conciliation and what are often broadly called the support services need to be thought about separately. Conciliation has been the subject of a very comprehensive research project carried out by the conciliation unit at Newcastle university on the Government's behalf. The unit reported earlier this year, but those concerned with family matters in the Government have had comparatively little opportunity to consider its findings or the comments that have been made on them, because of their work on this Bill.
This is a subject which merits the most careful consideration and the thinking that we have been able to devote to it thus far has led us to the preliminary conclusion that the future of conciliation cannot be properly considered in isolation from the divorce law, on which the Law Commission will report next year.
The intrinsic relationship between the two can be demonstrated if one thinks about the options for change canvassed by the Commission in its discussion paper on grounds for divorce, which was published earlier this year.

Mr. Devlin: I have listened carefully to what my hon. and learned Friend has said and I agree with much of it. What has concerned me in correspondence over the summer has been that the Government appear not to be willing to give any form of commitment about funding needs to existing conciliation services until such time as the Government make up their mind on the issue. That is of great concern to many good conciliation services that currently face financial crises which may not be solved and which may lead to some of the conciliation services going to the wall. May we have an undertaking that, while the Government consider these complex matters, proper funding will be made available for conciliation services so they are still there when the Government recognise that they are necessary?

The Solicitor-General: I shall let my hon. Friend develop that point a little more if he speaks later in the debate and I shall seek to answer him then. I want to develop the point about the intrinsic relationship between conciliation and child cases, and the whole question of family matters and divorce.
One option canvassed by the Law Commission was a system that would require parties to identify—this is an important point—the consequences of divorce and, if they still wished to divorce in the face of all the likely problems, generally to resolve those problems as a precondition to ending the marriage. That will strike a chord with many hon. Members, but such a system would be likely to put reconciliation, as well as conciliation, in the front of the process so that only real disputes ever reached the court and then only as a last resort.
The House will appreciate the difference between conciliation and reconciliation. Conciliation aims to enable the parties who are determined to break up the marriage, or who see no other option, and who regard it as irretrievably broken down to decide what will happen thereafter. Reconciliation, which those who are not used to the jargon often confuse with conciliation, is the idea of getting the parties to go back together and not to get divorced at all.
Arguably, conciliation might be structured and provided for under such a system in a very different way from that which has grown up round the present divorce system, in which the parties initiate the process by seeking a divorce from the court and by making bruising allegations at the outset, which often make conciliation and reconciliation much more difficult. The consequences, such as the custody of children and financial provision, are only then treated as ancillary issues to those opening steps. I throw those ideas out simply as food for thought for the House. We are indebted to the Law Commission for pointing them up. They show how important it is that we see the matter in the round before we achieve anything like the goal that a high proportion of us seek.
It is, of course, too soon to say whether divorce law should be reformed and, if so, how. I merely wish to demonstrate that it and conciliation must be considered together. That task is also to feature as an item in the rolling programme, which I have mentioned.
I shall now deal with the support services. The courts will need support if they are to carry out their functions both under the Bill and under any wider procedures the House may seek to enact in due course and which the Government may seek to bring forward. Those services include the provision of welfare reports, the work of the guardians ad litem, the work of reporting officers and the functions of the Official Solicitor in High Court cases. By virtue of clause 6. welfare reports are to be available to all courts in all children's proceedings, either from a probation officer or through a local authority, which may use one of its own officers or ask a voluntary organisation, such as the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, or any other qualified person to prepare the report. Guardians ad litem are to be available in all the specified proceedings set out in clause 37(6), including applications for a care or supervision order, and are to he appointed unless the court thinks that it is unnecessary to do so to safeguard the child's welfare. Both clause 6 and clause 37 represent improvements on the present law, under which the courts do not always have power to call for welfare reports in children's cases and there is not the same near imperative on the court to appoint a guardian ad litem in care proceedings.

Mr. Hardy: It is relevant at this stage to ask whether the comments of the Solicitor-General make it clear that the Government understand that the implications of this legislation are that inevitably, even where the courts do not exercise the right to appoint, there will be a greater need for more guardians ad litem to be appointed under these arrangements. At present, there are serious difficulties in securing the appointment of a sufficient number of people for that role. What action does the Solicitor-General envisage will be taken to meet the need that arises from these provisions?

The Solicitor-General: The hon. Gentleman has intervened at the appropriate moment. The Government recognise that there is concern about the present arrangements which involve among others not only guardians ad litem, but probation officers, independent social workers, local authority social workers, and the Official Solicitor and his staff. It has been suggested that the functions they perform could be better organised, perhaps being centralised or even attached to the court. There is also the question of the overall level at which they are provided. Such reorganisation and redeployment of resources would be a major undertaking and the issue needs to be examined in detail before a decision is reached. That matter is also to be included in the rolling programme, where it can be examined in the context of the other changes under consideration.
I have referred to the rolling programme several times and I want to elaborate on it. It is a rolling programme to review family law and procedure and by now the House will want to know how it is to be carried forward. To give it reality, Ministers have agreed that the officials in all the relevant Departments will come together in an interdepartmental working party under the following terms of reference:
The Working Party shall oversee a programme of work directed at improving all aspects of family law and business. In particular it shall

(a) consider the arrangements for the implementation and operation of the new scheme for children's cases under the Children Bill;

(b) draw together the management information requirement for operating and evaluating the effectiveness of the new scheme; and
(c) assess and monitor the resource consequences of- the arrangements."

It will meet regularly and its first task, in addition to overseeing the implementation of this Bill, will be to decide on the detail of its work.
The programme will cover the areas of the substantive law I have already mentioned—domestic violence and rights to occupy the family home, financial provision and adoption. It will consider the linked issues of conciliation and divorce law reform, as well as the arrangements for providing support services such as guardians ad litem, welfare officers and the role of the Official Solicitor in family cases.
I hope that the House will see that the Bill makes formidable progress towards achieving a single and properly supported specialist family jurisdiction and in many aspects goes as far as is possible given its scope and progress in related areas, such as reform of the substantive law. I also hope that I have shown that there is little, if anything, in principle, as the debate will highlight in a moment——

Mr. Vaz: I am grateful to the Solicitor-General for giving way again and for setting out the criteria for the rolling programme. We are almost there in terms of an agreement. What is the timetable for the working party to consider establishing a unified family court system? Will it be one year or two? The Solicitor-General's list did not answer that. Will it be established at the start of the review or at the end? Will it happen before this Bill comes into effect?

The Solicitor-General: It is important to emphasise that this is a rolling programme. The programme will not start and stop. Many aspects are already under consideration. The Law Commission work is already well under way and it reports next year. The implementation of the provisions in the Bill will commence as soon as it reaches the statute book and much thought about its implementation has already begun. The programme will make progress in the immediate years ahead. To try to put an overall timetable on it would be foolish, but I emphasise that the programme is rolling and it will continue to roll.
6.30 pm
I hope that I have shown that there is very little, if anything, in principle between what those who seek a family court want and what could be achievable through the Bill and the programme to which the Government are committed. I suspect that successive Governments have been impeded in making progress in the family court issue over the years by the tendency to see the problem in institutional rather than functional terms and, therefore, to see the answer in setting up—at a stroke—some new gleaming steel and glass institution with different coloured robes called a family court without recognising all the steps necessary that would be involved and, most especially, the necessary reforms to the substantive law.
Our approach examines the problem in terms of functions and its component parts and then moves step by step to reform the many matters that will make up progress to a rationalised and improving system of law and procedures dealing with family disputes and breakdowns.I believe that that is the right way to approach the matter and the Bill makes a real advance.

Mr. Tom Clarke: I commend new clause 1 to the House with confidence because it represents the will of the House given any test that we have had so far of the views of hon. Members on both sides of the House. On Second Reading, apart from the Ministers who spoke, all hon. Members who referred to family courts supported the principle very firmly indeed. In Standing Committee we had a comprehensive discussion and hon. Members—apart from the Ministers—clearly and firmly supported the principle of family courts.
The hon. Members for Chislehurst (Mr. Sims) and for Stockton, South (Mr. Devlin) spoke particularly effectively about family courts, and I am sure that they will do so again if they catch your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I remind the House of the views expressed by the hon. Member for Stockton, South who said, with a great deal of support from hon. Members on both sides:
The Government will never have a better opportunity than they have now to introduce the long overdue system of family courts."—[Official Report, Standing Committee B, 8 June 1989, c. 423.]
The hon. Gentleman was right then and if he repeats those views he will be right tonight.
The Solicitor-General will be aware that I do not speak through any personal malice when I state that, notwithstanding his commitment to a working party which could have been announced earlier on Second Reading or in Standing Committee, the hon. and learned Gentleman gives me the impression that his proposal has much more to do with persuading Conservative Members not to support new clause I than it has with establishing the principle of family courts. I am sorry to have to tell the Solicitor-General this, but his proposal represents a pathetic little mouse of an offer in terms of realising family courts. It is a tragically lost opportunity.

Mr. Vaz: Does my hon. Friend share my disappointment about the fact that the Solicitor-General has announced this working party and the rolling programme, but he has not given an effective starting or finishing date? The programme has no timetable, so it is not much of a programme.

Mr. Clarke: I agree with my hon. Friend. The House will be aware that when my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, East (Mr. Vaz) specifically asked the Solicitor-General whether he had a timetable in mind, he received a negative reply.
In the Government's new clause 18 there is no indication of the criteria that will be applied to decide where cases should begin their journey through the courts or the mechanisms which might be put in place to ensure their effective transfer. If some hon. Members mistakenly believe that the Solicitor-General is offering us something that is new, we should attach more importance to what the Solicitor-General said earlier when he said that the proposal was the best use of existing resources. All the advice that we have received is that the existing resources cannot begin to solve the problems and the objective of family courts could not be achieved within the limitation of existing resources.
Far from establishing family courts or offering hope for their realisation, the proposal might be an impediment to their creation. It is not simply a matter of the emperor having no clothes; if this proposal is the best that the

Government can do for family courts, it seems that we have not yet had sight of the emperor. Even the promises about the Law Commission do not offer us that prospect.
Hon. Members will be aware of the history of this issue. Much time has been wasted in trying to achieve a form of family courts and many people will be extremely disappointed with the Government's statement tonight. We all recognise the input made by our former colleague, Mrs. Renée Short. She chaired the Select Committee on Social Services which reported in 1984 declaring that it was very enthusiastic about the prospect of establishing family courts. However, just as important, that Select Committee deplored the introduction of such a measure by dribs and drabs. My heavens, if the Government are making any kind of offer tonight, I am afraid that it represents dribs and drabs as against the very clear commitment made in new clause 1 that the measure would be introduced within 18 months.
The report produced by the Select Committee under the chairmanship of Mrs. Renée Short was influenced by the Scottish system which had been in operation for several years. Scottish Members will not pretend that we accept that the children's panels in Scotland represent everything that we want to achieve; they do not. The remarkable aspect of their activities is that, after 17 years, they are beginning to consider how they can develop on what has already been achieved. It is staggering that after all this time, and despite the Scottish experience identified by Renée Short, there is no element of informal hearings or family courts elsewhere in Britain. The Solicitor-General outlined the difficulties of adapting English law to the informal system that we support but, if it was not beyond the wit of the Scottish legal system to adapt and introduce a version of family courts and children's panels, surely the English and Welsh legal systems are not so hidebound that they could not achieve the same objective if there were the will.
Prior to the introduction of children's panels in Scotland I sat as a magistrate in the juvenile court. The major change represented by children's panels in Scotland should not be underestimated. I recall children of seven and eight years of age being paraded before great formal courts for having gone into a superstore and lifted a tin of luncheon meat when they thought no one was looking. The fear of being before such a court and its aura were appalling. As one who experienced and deplored that system and saw a dramatic change when family courts in the shape of children's panels were introduced, I have no doubts about the advantages of the new system, and I believe that the experience of those involved supports that submission.
We do not have to look to other parts of the United Kingdom as we discuss an English and Welsh Bill. Both Conservative and Opposition Members stated clearly their enthusiasm for the established success of family courts in Canada, New Zealand, the United States of America and Australia. We welcome informality, and accept that such courts already demonstrate that the welfare of the child is paramount. Above all, we welcome the non-adversarial nature of family courts and the genuine conciliation that is possible, as opposed to reconciliation—important though that may be.
Where children are involved as witnesses, people are brought together in an informal setting and made to feel that they have a vested interest in the success of the agreement reached. That historical success should not be


underestimated. Too often today professional lawyers see themselves as winners or losers. They seek a clear decision one way or the other and, sadly, when a child is involved, the prize to be won or lost is the welfare or future of that child. In view of the evidence that we have heard today, surely that is unacceptable.
Yet again, the Solicitor-General asks us to wait. This time he told us that a Commission will be set up and in due course—at a date unknown, unless he clarifies it later in the debate—will produce a report. With great respect—

The Solicitor-General: It seems that the hon. Gentleman has misunderstood. The Law Commission has been working on the matter for more than a year and is due to report next year.

Mr. Clarke: I was referring specifically to the proposal for a working party. The Solicitor-General referred several times to a rolling programme. He did not give the impression that action would be taken urgently.
We have had the advantage of the recommendations of the Finer report for 15 years. Is that not enough time? How much longer are people—especially children and families—expected to wait? We have heard far too many excuses from the Lord Chancellor's Department, I accept, on whose behalf, the Solicitor-General is expected to speak. Five years ago we were told that there was uncertainty about costs. Three years ago we were advised to wait for the civil justice review—yet another review. Now we are asked to see how the legislation works out. Why?
6.45 pm
There is tremendous support for the concept of the family court. Baroness Faithfull, who follows our discussions with great interest, put up a noble fight. She is supported by the Family Courts Campaign, which is also to be highly commended. If their collective efforts as well as those of Barnardo's British Agencies' for Adoption and Fostering, British Association of Social Workers, Children's Legal Centre, Children's Society, Family Rights Group, National Children's Bureau, National Children's Homes, and a host of other informed bodies, has met with so little success, we are entitled to conclude that the influence of the Government's barristers is out of all proportion to their numbers and wisdom.
The Solicitor-General referred to the view of the president of the Family Division. There is a degree of vested interest, which does not suggest that the views of consumers have been taken on board. The Government's response to the call for family courts is woefully inadequate, and nothing that the Solicitor-General said changes that. It reveals a wilful misunderstanding of the nature of the path that the Government are being urged to tread.
Lord Denning said:
While our substantive law has changed beyond all recognition … our procedural law remains embedded in the past … a hotch-potch of courts and procedures that have never been brought up to date.
Yet the Government's new clause 18 simply renames the domestic panel of the magistrates court and the business transacted there. It does nothing more than seek to establish concurrent jurisdiction for the five courts that deal with family matters and perhaps leave a marker for rules and regulations to facilitate transferring cases between the courts. The same criticism is true of Government amendment No. 353.
The Solicitor-General may feel that we are treating his commitment with some scepticism, but the Government's position reminds me of St. Augustine's prayer:
Oh Lord, make me chaste, but not yet.
We have heard "not yet" for too long. The Opposition's new clause offers an alternative, unified system that would be served by adequate conciliation services and seeks to develop expertise among the judiciary, administrators and professionals. Above all, it would be organised to gain public confidence.
It is not without significance that the Society of County Secretaries has claimed:
With a family court in being, we cannot see that the Cleveland situation could have developed.
The case for family courts is overwhelming and before we return the Bill to another place we should seize the opportunity that it offers in the interests of millions of our children. They are everybody's children. It is not simply a case of dismissing children who might appear before present courts or future family courts as being naughty or difficult —somebody else's children. They are the children of Great Britain. They are entitled to a sympathetic ear and, in many cases, entitled to make their contribution to solving the problems that are being discussed. We are considering their futures.
Not to deal with this matter in a positive way would be to betray the honest bipartisan approach that has characterised the passage of the Bill in both Houses. It would also represent a betrayal of the intelligent and thoughtful work of the Committee and of the other place. It would be a betrayal of the professionals who are active in this matter, and a betrayal of the expectations of the House and of the citizens whose interests we seek to promote. In that spirit I commend new clause I to the House and look forward to its unanimous approval.

Mrs. Elizabeth Peacock: I and many other people in this country have studied family courts for many years. They will play an important part in future family welfare. Each year, there are about 670,000 petitions and applications on what may be termed family issues. That means that more than 2 million people come into contact with some aspects of family law each year. That contact is almost inevitably confused and confusing, because proceedings can take place simultaneously several courts. My hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General referred to that point in his opening remarks. For example, a wife who is married to a violent man may bring proceedings in the magistrates court for an exclusion order and, at the same time, petition for divorce in the county court. The local authority may already have taken care proceedings in the juvenile court and may have made the woman's children wards of the High Court. That demonstrates how complicated such issues are.
The variety of jurisdictions can only lead to unreasonable delay, and lawyers incur unreasonable costs during such delay. It is vital for a family court to encompass many jurisdictions and gather them together in a coherent body. Perhaps the Government should change their priorities. My hon. and learned Friend is wrong to want to perfect the substantive law before setting about reforming the procedure. I listened carfully to what my hon. and learned Friend said about that matter. However, a lawyer spends more time and incurs more cost in manipulating procedures, often on his client's instructions, than in considering the substantive law. In an adversarial system, the procedure provides a lawyer with most of his


armoury. If we remove procedural problems before we deal with substantive legal problems we may obtain questionable legal results. That could be a drawback, but at least a result will be reached and all parties will know where they stand.
The Government have set out their intentions, and we must work realistically around them to enable future reform to take place. The important question that we should ask my hon. and learned Friend is how long we must wait for the working party and for its recommenda-tions to be implemented. Cost is always a vital factor in reform, particularly in relation to family law proceedings. I am not one of those who consider that a family court would lead to a cost saving—it most certainly would not —nor do I believe that its introduction could be achieved at a relatively small cost. It will require a large amount of money to do the job properly.
Perhaps a new court system will be required—preferably a three-tiered system. A vital appointment in that three-tier arrangement would be a family court registrar, who would be the entry point for all family cases. He or she would allocate business to a basic working tier or to an upper tier that deals with appeals or first instance cases of exceptional importance. A body of judicial officers would also be needed to man the new court system. They would all need to be fully trained in aspects of law, adjudication, conciliation and so on.
There must be a mix of judges, family professionals and magistrates. The latter group would be of great importance, as the great majority of family court officers will have been magistrates. Magistrates have experience of adjudication and the community, which will be necessary in the new system that I propose.
I disagree with those who argue for the exclusion of magistrates because of their lack of understanding of the real world. That accusation could have been made many years ago, but it certainly does not apply to magistrates today. Although I have sat as a magistrate, I am not doing so at the moment, so I am not thinking about my own contribution. However, I certainly have experience. Since being appointed in 1975, I have had experience with the juvenile bench, domestic court proceedings and adoption proceedings. Perhaps just a little of what I learnt during those years brings me to my present-day conclusions.
New, separate buildings to house the family court would be required. That is essential to give the new system an identity of its own, which is what we all want, and to give the parties involved a clear appreciation of its new role. There must also be some provision for conciliation in a family court, and the bench must perform a more inquisitorial role than at present. I recognise that there is danger in both approaches. Parties could be regarded as clients rather than as parties to a legal dispute. However, although the court must perform a legal function, the introduction of comprehensive in-court conciliation may help to lessen some of the tensions that arise in family matters. Over many years we have paid insufficient attention to conciliation and, in some cases, reconciliation.
In-court conciliation began in 1971. Although it has become more of a buzz word in recent years, it is not particularly new. It has some faults, the greatest of which is that parties may regard it as part and parcel of the adversarial process. Also, parties may feel under pressure

to reach agreement. In New Zealand, where the court performs an inquisitorial role, parties who refuse to attend conciliation are encouraged to think again. Perhaps that is not such a bad idea in our present society.
However, such drawbacks as I have recognised are preferable to the indecision that results from out-of-court conciliation, because agreements are not legally binding and are often made on incomplete facts due to lack of financial information. In-court conciliation must be a vital element in any family court system. It would be nonsensical to set up a new system without it.
We could have an extremely long debate on family courts, as they are an important part of this legislation. Hon. Members discuss legislation affecting children and families perhaps once every decade. We must ensure that, when we legislate for the welfare of children in this decade, we get it right. We have a great responsibility to make sure that the legislation will ensure good provision for future family life and children in particular.

Mr. Robert Hughes: When I intervened in the Solicitor-General's speech to ask whether family courts would deal with the issue of so-called "transracial" adoptions, he helpfully advised me that the Law Commission was looking at the whole issue of adoption. If I heard him aright, I think that he said that the report was expected next year. I do not know whether that time scale is the optimum one for receiving such a report, but in my view we must move much faster and further than we are at present.
7 pm
I am gravely concerned at some trends in fostering and adoption practice. The first priority must always be the needs of the children; their needs must be paramount. I understand and accept that many adoptive parents—perhaps the majority—wish to adopt a child in their own image, as the saying goes. However, that is not necessarily always the case.
I know of a couple who have successfully adopted a child of mixed parentage. A few years ago they saw an advert in either The Observer or The Guardian seeking a foster home, with a view to adoption, for a girl of mixed race who was then in a children's home in the care of the local authority. I believe that the couple did nothing at the time, believing erroneously that the child would soon be placed with a satisfactory couple and be well looked after. However, a year later virtually the same advert appeared in whichever newspaper it was. The child was still in care —still living in a children's home, with apparently no prospect of fostering or adoption. The couple wrote to the local authority concerned, expressing their interest and explaining their experience and background.
They were astonished and astounded to receive a reply stating that they could not be considered because they were white and the authority's policy was to place such children with black families. The reaction of that family was unprintable and, in recounting their story to the House, I would be out of order if I attempted to repeat that reaction.
As far as is known the girl is still in the care of the local authority and still in a children's home. I believe that that is intolerable, that it is not good social work practice, and that it is certainly not in the interests of the child. I do not accept—indeed, I entirely reject—the theory that such practice helps to foster a non-racial society. I do not accept


that the race of a father or mother irrevocably classes a child in the narrow way that social work practice mistakenly assumes in such an arbitrary fashion.
Anyone who has knowledge of adoption knows and understands that there are difficulties when a child is adopted. At some time adoptive children may—and will —suffer an identity crisis and encounter real difficulties when they discover that their father and mother are not their natural parents. So-called "transracial" adopted children do not undergo more severe crises than adopted children who might be adopted in, as is sometimes said, the image of the parents.
The problem at the moment is that the social workers involved—I acknowledge that are concerned—go to extremes to try to justify their policies. I accept that they are sincere, but I believe that they are disgracefully mistaken. Some of the ways in which they seek to denounce those who, like myself, argue in favour of the adoption of mixed-race children by parents of any colour —white or black—are intolerable and disgraceful and do not help in the serious debates that we should be having.
Every family may have times of trauma when bringing up children. Anyone who has had natural children knows that that happens in ordinary families. The problems of adopted children can be dealt with just as easily and just as readily by concerned parents, irrespective of whether they are adoptive or whether they are the "right" racial mix, according to the social workers. The only factors to be taken into account in this matter are the needs of the child. If the race classification argument that is sometimes forced down people's throats in the public debate on this came from South Africa, the people who oppose "transracial" adoptions would throw up their hands in horror and cry that this is an apartheid society. If we believe—as I do—in a truly non-racial society in this country, it is grotesque that any social work practice should seek to classify children by race and so determine social work policy.
The needs of the children should always be paramount and the children should always be put first. An abstract theory should never take precedence over the real needs of real children and their relevance to today's society and real world.
I hope that the Minister who replies to the debate will make it perfectly clear that the Government will press ahead rapidly with a proper code of social work practice. I hope that that will be one of their first priorities when drawing up the details of the ways in which the family courts will operate. I hope that that will feature as one of the first details when they flesh out the bones of what is now an inadequately drafted new clause.

Mr. Devlin: First, I thank the hon. Member for Monklands, West (Mr. Clarke) for his kind remarks, supporting what I said in Committee. It is interesting to note that new clause 1, tabled by the hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends, has the exact text of the all-party amendment that I tabled in Committee with the support of five other hon. Members, from all three parties. I notice that some of those hon. Members are present.
At the same time, I commend new clause 30 to the House. It gives a much more detailed treatment of the topic and has found its way miraculously into new schedule 9A. It has received 37 signatures, including from most of the hon. Members who have signed new clause 1.
The reason why I am in some difficulty in supporting the hon. Member for Monklands, West and his colleagues tonight is twofold. First, the subject matter of the amendment is redundant, having been covered as far as possible by the new clause moved by the Government. Secondly, those parts of the intention of the new clause that are not covered by Government amendments are beyond the scope of the Bill, with one notable exception. Therefore, I am slightly surprised to see that what was a probing amendment in Committee has now returned as new clause 1. It must have been tabled before Her Majesty's Opposition had considered the Government's further proposals.
It was a great honour and privilege to carry this provision as a banner for the Family Court Campaign in Committee. My hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Kent (Mr. Rowe), the hon. Members for Leicester, East (Mr. Vaz), for Middlesbrough (Mr. Bell), for Southport (Mr. Fearn) and for Ynys Môn (Mr. Jones) joined me in tabling that amendment in Committee. We were further supported by effective interventions from my hon. Friend the Member for Chislehurst (Mr. Sims), the hon. Members for Eccles (Miss Lestor), for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mrs. Golding), for Wakefield (Mr. Hinchliffe), my hon. Friends the Members for Salisbury (Mr. Key), and for Batley and Spen (Mrs. Peacock) and from the hon. Member for Monklands, West. In other words, 13 out of 18 hon. Members serving on the Committee supported the amendment. I remind the House that the other five were the two Ministers, their Parliamentary Private Secretaries and the Government Whip.
In an effort to persuade us to withdraw the amendment, my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General announced that the Bill was the beginning of a rolling programme of reform. Many of us therefore look forward to some announcements tonight that will tell us that in the Queen's Speech further reforms will be put before us. Furthermore, my hon. and learned Friend argued that fuller Government proposals would be presented on Report. I believe that they are now included in new clauses 18, 23 and 28.
The reason why the establishment of a family court is long overdue is not only that such an improvement was suggested 15 years ago in the Finer report but that since then the full statistical horror of cases involving children has been magnified. Since June, when we last discussed this matter, Relate—formerly the marriage guidance council —has published last year's figures. They show that 149,000 children were caught up in divorces last year. Nearly 1,000 per week were under-five. Divorce costs the country about £35 million per day in fees, court costs and social security payments. Last year 151,000 marriages ended in divorce. Whilst that process is extremely painful for the adults involved, it is often the children who suffer most, regressing whilst parents go through the difficulty of getting their own lives back together. Each year, of the 30,000 cases of physically, mentally or sexually abused children, a good section of the abuse is perpetrated by the mother's boyfriend, the stepfather or even stepbrothers. Duplication, alternation and confusion abound in our court system, yet millions of people have a pressing need for the reform of procedure proposed by the Opposition.
The Finer report, published all those years ago, proposed a unified family court to eradicate the hotchpotch of conflicting legislation and different jurisdictions. The new court was to adopt an inquisitorial


rather than an adversarial approach. It was to be based on six principles—that there should be impartial adjudication according to law, a unified system of family law, the provision of the best possible conciliation facilities, a team of professionally trained social workers, that there should be a close relationship with social security law and that the whole thing should be organised in such a way as to gain public confidence.
In 1979 further proposals were made by the Law Society, in 1982 by the Justices Clerks Society, in 1984 by the Association of District Registrars and County Courts. In 1984 the Select Committee on Social Services went further and said:
The introduction of a family court system could offer the possibility of a significantly better deal for children and parents.
The hon. Member for Monklands, West has not only stolen my amendment, but he has stolen my speech as he mentioned that the Cleveland affair might have been prevented by a family court system. I will not repeat that point nor the list of organisations supporting the Family Courts Campaign because they are far too extensive to mention. Looking back over the past 15 years it is clear that a strong case was made right from the start. The Government sought to avoid the need for action with a variety of ruses and excuses. First, they spoke about cost, then they said that what was asked for was too vague. They also said that there was no precedent. Now they say that they are already planning such a court system, but, tonight, they say that it is beyond the scope of the Bill.
At last in this Bill we have made some essential headway towards our new system of justice for families. Since the Whips are wandering around bullying people I shall quickly examine the Minister's proposals which he has said
go further and are drafted more carefully than the amendments."—[Official Report, Standing Committee B,8 June 1989; c. 451.]
I note that my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull (Mr. Taylor) is approaching, but I shall not give way to him. I can assure the Opposition that I have not had my knuckles broken nor have I been offered a holiday in the Bahamas to avoid making this speech.
New clause 18 sets up family proceedings courts and family proceedings panels. They would be the newly reconstituted magistrates court part of the family court. The rest is left to the Lord Chancellor to make orders with respect to what that court can do.
The next new clause that the Government rely on is new clause 23, which is pregnant with good potential, but one that may not be carried into execution. The procedure can be altered, parties can be redesignated and the whole new classes of evidence can be demanded. A registrar can deal with initial applications, just as we suggested, and ex parte proceedings rules can also be made. New clause 28 goes further with respect to procedure to be adopted. I appeal to the Solicitor-General to use the clauses as imaginatively as possible to ensure the effect of what the Family Courts Campaign is calling for is carried out.
Altogether the Government have done an excellent job with the clauses to meet many of the demands of the family courts campaign—or as many as they think are possible at the moment. Rab Butler once reminded the House that
Politics is the art of the possible.

The Government, however, could do a great deal more and they could go a great deal further, but perhaps not in this Bill. New clause 30, which is supported by many hon. Members, must show them the way forward.
However, I shall measure the Government's proposals so far against the original six recommendations of the Finer committee so that I can draw attention to the obvious gap that I see. There is no doubt that the Government proposals will continue to provide an impartial adjudication according to law. Those proposals, as well as the Bill in general, which I remind the House, deals with children only, moves us much closer to a unified system of family law with new amendments. Trained social workers working with the courts find their place in the Bill. Public confidence will undoubtedly be enhanced by the greater powers given to parents, grandparents and, of course, children.
7.15 pm
The gap—here it is—is in the provision of the conciliation service alongside the new procedure. During the summer recess I attempted to find out from the Attorney-General, the Lord Chancellor and even from the Prime Minister what the future of conciliation services will be. The answer, if one can call it that from the usual Civil Service stonewalling, is that with the report of the Newcastle study project under review and with, in any case, the Law Commission re-examining and reporting on the law of divorce next year, there is no answer just yet. Unfortunately, as I said in my earlier intervention, in the meantime our excellent conciliation service in many parts of the country—I mention Cleveland specifically—will go to the wall for lack of funding. However, conciliation is a fundamental of any family court system which the Government may later attempt to establish. In the meantime, it is also a successful tool in the resolution of disputes.
Let me recap the findings of the New Zealand conciliation service—19 per cent. of those who went to the conciliation service resumed the marriage, 39 per cent. reached full understanding, 16 per cent. went back for guidance and 26 per cent. only reached no agreement. The Relate figures show that, in English terms, 200 children a week under the age of five could be saved from the pain of parental divorce if there was a properly funded conciliation service in this country.
Even if I am in an optimistic mood today, it seems that the Government are moving slowly down the road to proper conciliation services just as they are progressing to a family court. The excuses, however, are the same. On 8 June in Committee at column 465 the Solicitor-General argued about the cost of the service and in the next paragraph he deployed the vagueness argument. In column 466 he argued that there was no precedent. In a letter since received from the Prime Minister and from the Lord Chancellor I hear that we are already planning something. So long as the Solicitor-General or the Attorney-General argue that such conciliation services are beyond the scope of the Bill we should look forward to some serious and far-reaching reforms to be introduced in the next Queen's Speech.
What has my hon. and learned Friend offered us tonight? He has offered to gather together all the officials from all the relevant Departments into one splendiferous committee, which will consider all the aspects of family law. It will consider the implementation of the Children


Bill and evaluate the efficiency of the Bill and look at the resource implications of change. It will consider conciliation and the law relating to divorce. It will also consider the support services. Has anyone in the House any idea how many civil servants will be involved in that exercise? It will have to run into hundreds. Has anyone any idea how long it takes hundreds of civil servants to make up their minds about anything? It will take absolutely years. We are talking about another 15-year rolling programme before we get the matter back before the House. I ask the Solicitor-General whether that rolling programme will roll out in the life of the Government. Unless the Solicitor-General can come up with a more satisfactory timescale, I may have to go back to supporting the Opposition in their amendment.
What is on offer now after 15 years is that the civil servants have won. If the choice tonight is between the will of the House and the will of a huge committee of civil servants from all the different Departments discussing until kingdom come what the future law of the family will be, I shall support the will of the House.

Mrs. Rosie Barnes: I shall speak briefly in favour of a policy of speedy implementation of family courts. A less adversarial judicial system for family matters has been advocated for many years. While I welcome the minor shift in the Government's mood in this direction, I, along with many others, feel that this is an invaluable opportunity, perhaps the only opportunity for a decade or more, for the Government to take it much further and commit themselves wholeheartedly to the full establishment of family courts.
The Bill unifies the law relating to children. As the White Paper, "The Law on Child Care and Family Services" of January 1987 stated:
it would not be sensible to make decisions on most of the Child Care Review's recommendations concerning jurisdiction in advance of a decision on the family court issue".
The Bill, which has consolidated much of the law relating to children, provides the right opportunity to make a decision on family courts.
One of the most important elements of this issue that has been much debated tonight is conciliation, which has been extremely effective in other countries. Not only is it highly desirable in itself, but it can lead to massive savings in legal aid. Earlier this year the Lord Chancellor's advisory committee on legal aid reported that a family court could make savings of up of £14 million in legal aid. Although I accept that to introduce family courts would have considerable cost implications in other spheres, this element must not be ignored.
Both branches of the legal profession and all those working in the area of family breakdown have long been convinced that family courts are the only economic, effective and appropriate way of dealing with family law matters. It is difficult to understand the Government's reluctance to embrace this measure wholeheartedly. We have skirted around it for far too long and should move rapidly towards a commitment in this direction. I look forward to hearing what sort of time scale is proposed for this long, rolling, decision-making process about which many of us are cynical.

Mr. Roger Sims: My interest in the cause of family courts is long standing and is on record. In our discussions in Committee I referred to the fact that the appearance of the Finer report, with its advocacy of family

courts, coincided with my election to the House in 1974, and that soon afterwards I convened a conference on the issue. I hasten to assure the House that I have no intention of repeating my Committee speech here. In response to pleas over the years from me and others, the Government have consistently taken the line that they must first get the law right and then they can alter the structure of the court.
Let us at least give the Government some credit for not waiting until they have got the law right or until the Bill is enacted but have decided to start the process now. They have decided to adopt an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary approach or, to use my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General's expression, a rolling programme. Certainly, my hon. and learned Friend has announced some important steps this evening. I should like to have heard a lot more, but we have to be realistic and we cannot ignore the fact that a family court would have to cover a number of issues that are not the subject of the Bill and could not feasibly be added to it.
Certainly, I have no criticism of Opposition Front Bench spokesmen seeking to raise this issue again, despite the fact that we discussed it fully in Committee. Apart from anything else, it has given my hon. and learned Friend the opportunity to expand on the remarks that he made to the Committee, and his contribution was most helpful. However, it would be a pity if the Opposition were to divide the House on this matter, which I understand they are considering. Apart from incommoding a number of hon. Members on both sides of the House, it would undermine the bipartisan approach to the Bill which has been a feature of our proceedings and to which the lion. Member for Monklands, West (Mr. Clarke) referred.
My hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General referred to the interdepartmental working party and what it is to do. I am sure that he will understand that, while we realise that it cannot specify a timetable, there is a suspicion that a working party is a vehicle for inaction rather than action. I hope that before the end of this debate he will assure us that this rolling programme will roll and not simply creak.
Many of us would like to see many more suggestions included within the proposals. However, what my hon. and learned Friend has suggested this evening is certainly more realistic than the over-ambitious measures un-derstandably advocated by the Opposition Front Bench. My hon. and learned Friend has explained why he has not incorporated conciliation services into the new pattern which he has outlined. However, I endorse what my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton, South (Mr. Devlin) said about the value of such services which have been running for a number of years.
In my area of Bromley we have one of the pioneers of the conciliation services. There are now 50 services affiliated to the National Family Conciliation Council. A feature of those services is that they have all been set up on a local basis, all been a product of local initiatives and every one of them is now struggling for funds.
I am aware that the Newcastle project report is under consideration but my hon. and learned Friend will remember that the report states:
conciliation generates important social benefits and rationalisation of it is a priority need.
I hope that the rolling programme will consider this matter as one of urgency. The danger is that, meanwhile, the conciliation services might wither, which would be disastrous.
I plead with my hon. and learned Friend for adequate interim funding. He does not have to commit himself as to what form the conciliation services will take in the final structure of the family court, but it is important that they should be preserved in their present form. I urge him to support them as much as he can.

Mr. Ieuan Wyn Jones (Ynys Môn): Hitherto the Government have been reluctant to give us a firm view on the establishment of a family court. In Committee we were able to recap the way in which successive Governments, but mainly this Government, have sidelined the issue, principally because it would cost money to set it up. In the past 15 years there have been a report, two consultation papers and an interdepartmental committee.
I recall a former Cabinet Minister telling an after dinner audience that when he was in trouble on a policy matter he would go to Cabinet to demand that it set up an interdepartmental committee. Therefore, it hardly inspires confidence when the Solicitor-General tells us that there is to be yet another interdepartmental working party.
However, let us not be churlish, because pressure from the family courts campaign and other groups has paid off in some respects. The Government have had no alternative but to respond in view of the growing and increasingly well-argued case for the family court.
Let us examine some of the Government initiatives which were conveniently set out in their response to the report by the Social Services Select Committee. First, they say that the Children Bill creates concurrent jurisdiction in the High Court, the county court and the magistrates court, which will hear proceedings under this Bill and in cases of adoption. The Lord Chancellor, we are told, will have power to provide for the allocation of cases within the hierarchy of the courts, and the Government hope to arrange for judges and registrars with expertise in this field to be responsible for the conduct of such cases.
We have also heard that, with regard to magistrates courts, a family proceedings court is to be established and magistrates are to have special training. There will be more reliance on the use of written documents—I welcome that approach—and magistrates will be expected to have read them before the hearing and to give reasons for their decisions. In other words, the court is to have a more active role in the conduct of cases.
7.30 pm
Procedure in the courts is to be streamlined, and cases involving disputes that may have started in different courts will be merged so that they can be dealt with together. All these measures are to be welcomed, although a note of caution must be entered, in that the Government say that most care and supervision-related cases will be suitable for hearing by the family proceedings court—that is, by lay magistrates. One cannot escape the conclusion that that is done for reasons of cost—it is much cheaper to administer justice through the lay magistracy. The view that I have always held is that family courts should be a unified court with lay magistrates sitting either with a judge or, in some cases, a registrar.
Although there are powers to transfer cases between courts, some delays are inevitable as some administrative procedures will have to be carried out by at least two sets of court officials. However, all the Government's

initiatives will be flawed until they address the central issue —the removal of the present adversarial system of family proceedings and the introduction of a properly funded counselling, conciliation and mediation service.
All the evidence that we have so far supports the view that the only way to remove the courtroom pain and anguish of family disputes is the introduction of an inquisitorial system backed by conciliation. I mentioned courtroom pain and anguish advisedly. We know that we cannot remove all the pain and anguish involved in these cases, but that is no excuse for allowing the courts to be used as a vehicle for venting the anger, frustration, bitterness and—often—guilt which are associated with these matters. Court proceedings are also seen by many as occasions for winning and losing, a view perpetuated by our present system. No palliatives given to the family courts campaign can ever be successful until this problem is tackled.
We must also consider the facilities that are available in many magistrates courts. They are often appalling. Many courts have no facilities for conducting private interviews, which are held in corridors and passageways. The waiting rooms in many of our courts are cold, forbidding places where witnesses have nothing to do but glare at each other. Is that the way in which we should treat people who are already under considerable stress? Is that the way in which to resolve these difficult issues? A congenial setting is more conducive to better understanding all round. That is why the family court system in New Zealand places so much stress on the setting in which cases are heard. Basics such as the positioning of tables and chairs and how court officials, including judges, are dressed are considered important.
During the recess I met a representative of the embryonic North Wales family conciliation service, a group set up about three years ago in the hope that it would be able to offer conciliation services to all the courts in north Wales. Yet three years later it does not have a penny with which to begin to put that system into operation. Recently the group asked me for my support to persuade the Welsh Office to give it finance.
To be fair, in their response to the Social Services Committee the Government conceded that we have a patchwork of systems in England and Wales which is nothing like the system that we need—a universal, properly funded system. I want to ask the Solicitor-General when the university of Newcastle report will be published. When will we be told whether we shall have a properly funded conciliation service? Conciliation services offer couples opportunities to meet in a structured setting so that they can begin to resolve conflicts and work jointly with children to agree decisions. That is important, because conciliation aims to find a way of reducing the pain, anger, confusion and sadness experienced by children caught up in the process of their parents' separation and divorce.
We must never forget that parents need support when reaching and maintaining responsible decisions about custody and access. Because their parents lack support at the time of separation, children are not properly informed of decisions that will affect them. That leaves many children helpless, confused and lonely. Children want to be consulted and involved in decisions that will dramatically affect their lives. They want basic, practical information.
They want to know where they will live, whether they will stay at the same school, whether they can still see their grandparents and where their absent parents will be living.
For these and other reasons, a conciliation service would play an invaluable role. Experience of the family court system in New Zealand is that there has been a dramatic reduction in the number of custody cases that proceed to the traditional blood-letting of a court hearing. There has been a dramatic acceptance of the need to change traditional approaches and procedures on the part of judges, administrators and the legal profession.
I believe that the campaign for a family court has come a long way, but not far enough. I confess that I did not come to this debate expecting that the Government would come forward with a system to establish family courts, because I knew that they would repeat what was said in Committee. But it is important for the House to have had the opportunity once again to debate this issue. As surely as night follows day there will inevitably be a family court in England and Wales. The House has an opportunity to place an important milestone along the way to the establishment of that system, and I hope that we will divide tonight so that we can properly gauge the support in England and Wales for its establishment.

Mr. Rowe: My hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General left me in no doubt about the Government's intentions in the matter of a family court. I have no doubt that the Government clearly see many of the absurdities in the present system and are anxious to end them. I welcome the commitment to a unified jurisdiction so that we can at least consider all matters relating to one family in one place at one time. That is probably as far as it is reasonable to expect the Government to go in this Bill.
I share a number of hon. Members' concerns about this rolling programme. I take issue with my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton, South (Mr. Devlin). I do not see a huge army of civil servants. I see three or four, some of whom have probably been up to their necks with the Bill hitherto, being switched, probably quite gladly, to the next great issue. The more that they come under pressure from outside, the harder it will he for them to work speedily. I hope that the Government will make sure that there are enough civil servants to do this important job expeditiously.
I received one nasty tremor during the Solicitor-General's speech when he quoted other people. He said that he thought that they had in their minds a wholly new structure, a new steel and glass building, he said, staffed by people with robes of a different colour. I hope that he completely distances himself from that attitude not so much because of the separate system but because of the robes of a different colour. The last thing we want is a reshuffle of existing wigs and gowns into a new pattern of formality and authority. We need a wholly new direction based on non-adversarial procedure.
The need is to support the family and the child. Most people who have got into matrimonial difficulties desperately want either to resolve them or, if they cannot, to leave one another amicably and equitably. Adversarial proceedings make that harder not just in court but outside it. It is similar to the insurance company's injunction that one should not even be polite to the driver with whom one has just had an accident in case one gives the impression that one was at fault. Such an attitude is disastrous for the

children and destructive for the family. I suspect, although I could never prove it, that it has a knock-on effect because if one of the spouses remarries the bitterness of the divisions may make it much harder to establish a good future relationship.
The third objective must be to get agreed solutions where possible. That will reduce the likelihood of a spouse losing access to the child in later years or a wife—it is usually the wife—not getting maintenance. Formality simply does not help.
When it comes, the family court should be bold, as it was bold in Scotland. Kilbrandon made this great radical leap of differentiating between questions of fact and questions of treatment, especially in criminal cases. It would be a serious error if the family court left juvenile crime to one side. How otherwise are we to reduce our appalling record of incarcerating young people, the worst record of incarceration in western Europe? How can we support the idea of family responsibility if at an incredibly early age we start treating the child who has committed an offence as some kind of criminal standing on his own? I realise that there are risks and I understand that in Scotland at this very time some of the children's panels are anxious lest some of their agreed treatment procedures are oppressive, but they are not questioned because there has grown up a culture of not questioning. Perhaps some should be taken to the sheriff for examination on a voluntary basis to make sure that that is not the case. However, that is a minor matter. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Chislehurst (Mr. Sims) that we have to support the existing family conciliation services while the rolling programme wanders on.
Every so often in India there is a great ceremony at which an enormous goddess called Juggernaut is taken out of her temple, put on rollers and taken through the streets. Many devotees allow themselves to be crushed to death under the rollers. I cannot believe that it is the Government's intention with their rolling programme to crush to death the existing family conciliation services by starving them of money while they wait for the Newcastle report to be properly evaluated.

Mr. Hinchliffe: We have heard some excellent speeches. The speech of the hon. Member for Mid-Kent (Mr. Rowe) was commendable and raised some important issues. I should like to concentrate on what could be described as practical grass-roots issues rather than the complex legal procedures raised by the Solicitor-General and some hon. Members.
7.45 pm
In Committee our proceedings were dominated by hon. Members who were either magistrates or lawyers. I am aware that I am competing with at least four Opposition lawyers who are trying to catch your eye, Madam Deputy Speaker. I speak as a non-lawyer, but as someone who has had extensive and on occasions bitter experience, especially in the juvenile courts, of social work practice. On the basis of that experience, may I say that the existing system of the administration of child care law is a discredited shambles long overdue for reform. It would be shameful if we were to allow the opportunity presented by the Bill to pass without a clear change in the procedures that are long out-dated for the work that they are expected to do.
It is a matter of great regret that the Government have not proposed anything positive. I suspect that what the Minister said today is not much different from what he said in Committee. I am disappointed by that because I think that some Conservative Members, some of whom are not in the Chamber, firmly believe in the principle of the family court system and recognise the major problems.
We all accept that in many ways the Bill is a great step forward. It answers the question about the principle of the welfare of the child and affords protection for children and young persons. It advances in law the rights of children and the rights of parents and carers and other relatives in respect of children. However, the Bill leaves the administration of these important changes in a court system that is clearly a hangover from the past.
In Committee I spoke about my concerns on the practical issues, some of which have been referred to. They certainly concern me and many users of the courts. We should not forget that not many hon. Members have had the experience of being before a juvenile court and having to defend themselves. Not many have had the experience of seeing their children before such courts. Many hon. Members have had experience of being professionals in court, but they have not seen the other side. That is the side that we should consider when we contemplate legislation.
I am worried about the system as it stands and the one that we will have in being to administer the new legislation. First, there is the matter of formality which has already been mentioned. The system that I met as a young social worker was markedly different from my perception. I had been led to believe that the juvenile court was informal and assisted children to bring forward their views and express themselves. My experience of the juvenile court is completely to the contrary. It is a highly formal system and terrifying for young children. I can recall seeing tearful children being made to stand up straight by magistrates who were offended because the child was so embarrassed that he was looking at the floor when speaking. We must aim at a system that assists children in frightening circumstances to express themselves, and that must be done in a caring and effective way rather than in a daunting way.
In Committee I mentioned the matter of sensitivity in dealing with children and families. Some hon. Members have spoken about the adversarial system. In Committee I spoke about giving evidence in a serious case of sexual assault on two young children. I was asked to give detailed evidence about the assaults in front of the two children. I objected, but I was forced by the magistrate to give evidence. That is not on, and it is not the kind of system we should have in a civilised country. Vulnerable young children should not be treated in that way. Formality must be tackled as a matter of urgency.
The other issue that caused some offence to one or two hon. Members who were magistrates was that many people who administer justice, particularly in magistrates courts and juvenile courts, have no insight whatever into the lives of the people with whom they are dealing. They do not come from areas where children have the problems that lead them to end up in juvenile courts.
I know that the hon. Member for Batley and Spen (Mrs. Peacock) was deeply offended when in Committee I referred to flowery hatted magistrates, and she continues

to assure me that she does not possess a flowery hat even though she is a magistrate. However, she took the point that magistrates come from certain parts of the community and tend not to be a reflection of the people brought before the courts. We must challenge that and then tackle it. Many benches are unrepresentative of local communities and have no insight into the problems that cause people to end up in juvenile courts.
The hon. Members for Mid-Kent and for Ynys Môn (Mr. Jones) referred to the physical conditions of many courts. People have to wait in appalling conditions to make a daunting and frightening appearance in court, often with the people whom they are opposing.
The pressure and the demands on the court system have a bearing on the way people are treated. Although the Government are not introducing the necessary reforms, I hope that they have given some thought to the pressures that the Bill will place on the court system. I can see that huge increases in the workload will result from the emergency protection orders, and the appeals that will result from the Bill.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Monklands, West (Mr. Clarke) said, we must look at the Scottish system. Through the auspices of my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Doran), I was fortunate enough to make a visit to see the Scottish children's panel in operation. That was an education, because it was a completely different from a court hearing in the juvenile court system in England and Wales. It was like a breath of fresh air, because it was informal and sensitive and allowed the child, in a non-threatening situation, to express his views. It was non-adversarial and it offered a lot at which we should look. Our colleagues from Scotland should not be afraid to boast about what they have. They are asking how they can improve on that and we are a long way behind them. We should look to Scotland for a lead, particularly on a family court system.
The central issue is that we need a court system for children that, like the Scots system, has at its heart not the convenience of lawyers, magistrates, police and social workers but the central principle that underlies the Bill —the welfare of the child. We are long way from that principle with the system as it stands. New clause 1 sets out the principles that should underpin the legal system dealing with children, young persons and families. It also sets out the principles that would underpin the operation of the family court system that we envisage, identifies the welfare of the child, and avoids unnecessary formality, which inhibits and confuses most children. It also reduces delay and inconvenience to the public, which often occurs as a result of the way that cases are handled, reducing the harm to children and families that comes from the system. The court system's purpose is to help young children, but when they are involved in it, they suffer. Another vital principle is the introduction of conciliation into our method of resolving disputes. That seems an obvious thing to do.
I urge the Government to rethink their position. I am unhappy that new clause 23 and the Bill do not include the central principle that all Labour Members, and many Conservative Members, believe should be included in the court system to administer the Bill. It may be another 10 years before we get the chance to debate a similar Bill. It is crucial that we do not sit back and set up committees on


rolling programmes. Instead we should get down to business, bring about the procedures for these reforms, and include them in the Bill.

Mr. Fearn: My party has campaigned for many years for the introduction of a family court. I remember standing up in Southport district council in 1974 to speak on the Finer report and to support family courts. This is far from being a new subject, but we are still debating it.
We are all aware of how the present system of numerous courts dealing with family matters causes confusion and distress for families. In many cases, the children suffer most. Therefore, it is right to attempt to clarify the Government's position on the family court. Under the Bill, the interests of the child are paramount, and that lies at the heart of all the calls for a family court. By providing for the introduction of concurrent jurisdictions, the Bill may go some way to improving the legal and administrative tangle in which families are so often caught. However, because of so much reliance on secondary legislation, that cannot be guaranteed and the results may be worse.
The Bill does not go far enough. The adversarial nature of the British legal system—there must be a winner and a loser—is often at the root of the problem. Many cases dealing with some element of family life do not need a formalised court hearing. What is required is the ability to arrive at the truth in a fair, comprehensible and civilised manner, which would lead all the parties, including the children, to believe that they had had a fair hearing that would allow a proper assessment of what was in the child's best interests. A family court is the only way to achieve that.
A separate family court that would also cover young offenders would help to reduce delay in cases involving children. It would prevent cases from being allocated to an inappropriate level of court, and would prevent bottlenecks from arising because of other cases fighting for priority. In some areas, the courts are already severely overburdened, with devastating consequences.
A family court system with proper and adequate auxiliary services, such as conciliation, mediation, probation and welfare services, would prevent family problems from being dealt with on a piecemeal basis, would allow the whole picture to be considered and would allow for many cases to be resolved before coming to court. It would also enable the judiciary and other members of the legal profession to build up expertise in all sorts of family problems.
On the whole, there is much common ground between all parties and among the public. It is generally accepted that the best people to resolve problems concerning the needs of children are the parties involved. However, occasionally the state must intervene to protect the welfare of children. That must be done within a coherent framework of services and, whenever possible, with the agreement of those involved. That could be achieved by creating a properly resourced and serviced family system. The system that the Solicitor-General has set out is not a family court.
The arguments in favour of such a system are well known to all hon. Members. Although I welcome the Government's moves towards the family proceedings court, and understand to some extent their desire for gradual reform, I believe that family courts are an important factor in safeguarding and promoting the

welfare of children and their families. Delay is not justified, but delay is what we are getting tonight. It may be 15 years before the rolling programme brings forth the priorities that we need. The time is now right to make that commitment and set the reform in motion.

Mr. Vaz: In Committee, the Solicitor-General coined the memorable phrase "an all-singing, all-dancing, family court". When he started his speech, and busied himself around the Dispatch Box looking for his notes, I thought that he was giving us an example of what the all-singing, all-dancing court would look like.
The scenario put forward by the hon. Member for Mid-Kent (Mr. Rowe) of the Solicitor-General standing on rollers being pushed down the hill as devotees sing around him as a metaphor for the rolling programme is an interesting spectacle. If the Solicitor-General has listened to the speeches tonight, as I am sure that he has, he will have found himself in a minority of one. I suppose that, as he is in the Government of a Prime Minister who decides that a vote of 48 to one at the Commonwealth conference is a victory, he will apply the same criteria and say that he has won the debate on his arguments.
My hon. Friend the Member for Monklands, West (Mr. Clarke) quoted St. Augustine and talked about chastity. The Solicitor-General is like a reluctant legal virgin, unwilling to take the final step that is necessary to bring him close to us on ideas on the family courts. He introduced the extraordinary phrase in Committee about the rolling programme, and I pressed him as to what that was. It is a remarkable programme with no real beginning and no real end. There is no timetable, just loose criteria based on the points that the Solicitor-General mentioned earlier.
8 pm
The Bill has, for the most part, achieved a large degree of consensus. The Standing Committee divided on only a few occasions, and I suspect that there will be few Divisions on Report. Nevertheless, this is one of those occasions. Before I was elected to the House I was a senior solicitor for a London borough. I must tell my hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield (Mr. Hinchliffe)—and it is a confession to appease him—that I have never been a private solicitor taking private fees; I have always worked in the public service for various local authorities. As someone involved in child-care law, I saw this Bill as a great, historic opportunity to achieve a unified family court system—but we are being bought off. I hope that some Conservative Members will join us in the Lobby when we divide on this matter, especially the hon. Members for Mid-Kent (Mr. Rowe), for Stockton, South (Mr. Devlin) and for Batley and Spen (Mrs. Peacock), who all spoke eloquently about the need for family courts. We shall have to wait to discover whether they will vote with us or whether the holiday in Bermuda offered to the hon. Member for Stockton, South has been accepted.
It is 100 years since family law has been considered as carefully as it has been during the passage of the Bill. We are all aware of the historic nature of our work. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield that the opportunity to act may not arise for a decade, although I think that it will be even longer than that. Unfortunately, these issues are too low down the political agenda for Governments to include them in their programmes. Despite the eloquence of my hon. Friend the Member for


Monklands, West and the fervour with which he will no doubt carry out his tasks as Minister of State in the next Labour Government, he will have to fight very hard to get these matters debated early in the programme of that Government.
The Solicitor-General, as a lawyer, must know that it is necessary to have a timetable. It is always good to end something that has been started. It is a reasonable suggestion and I hope that he will be teased into commenting on it when he replies to the debate. He said that, as yet, the substantive law is not quite right, but when it is that will be the time for a change in court structure. As many hon. Members have already said, the Bill will become law shortly—including, I hope, Opposition amendments. Its passage is almost a foregone conclusion —if saying that does not usurp the authority of the House —and there will be in place a substantive and radical piece of law that will repeal six statutes and amend a further 30.
It is only reasonable to consider the question of structure, and surely it is best to do so at the same time as considering the substance. I think that that is the sensible way to proceed, but unfortunately the Solicitor-General does not agree with me. We accept all that he said about the need for special training for magistrates and for those who will assist in the processing of cases. We agree that the new proposals in clause 67 will provide the opportunity to switch jurisdictions between courts. The hon. and learned Gentleman claims to have the support of the president of the Family Division, who has said that we now have a family court in all but name. If that is the only problem, I urge him to take that little step forward.
The hon. and learned Gentleman said that we cannot change procedures because certain courts have petitions while others have summonses, yet he is proposing to do just that by changing the way that evidence will be made available to the domestic courts. He mentioned the introduction of affidavit evidence and of magistrates considering evidence well in advance. That is a substantial change in procedure, and if he is prepared to go that far, he should go just that little step further.
I listened carefully to my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Doran), although I did not think it the appropriate time to raise the matters that he did. I accept that he was entitled to do so, but I disagreed with everything that he said about transracial adoption. If we are to consider questions of creed and linguistics, we must also consider the question of race. However, that is a larger argument which is not really relevant to a discussion about family courts. My hon. Friend and I must discuss the matter later, when I shall try to convince him of my view and he can try to convince me of his. My experience as a solicitor at the juvenile court in Islington was of enormous pressures being placed on children. That led me to believe that the only solution would be a unified family court and conciliation system. Children in court settings have to face the terrible experience of hardship and bitterness. Time and again I would turn up at the courts, there would be an adjournment and the children would have to wait almost all day before the hearing for interim orders, full-care orders or supervision orders. They would then have to return to the court 28 days later.
I acknowlege that the Government have recognised the problem and I supported the Solicitor-General when he

moved amendment No. 37, which sought to reduce delays. We supported the idea of a timetable for cases that will be made possible by the rules of court, which is important, but the best way to solve the problems of delay is to have a family court system with properly trained magistrates and clerks who understand the nature of what is at stake.
I and the hon. Member for Stockton, South—it sounds like a mutual admiration society, but this is probably the only legislation on which we will agree during our time in Parliament—rue the fact that wardship jurisdiction will be abolished by the Bill. I have an affection for wardship because I believe that it allows for a better system of justice. I should have liked to have a family court system along the lines of the system in the High Court, with experienced judges of the Family Division having affidavit evidence placed before them.

Mr. Devlin: I understand that while I was out of the Chamber the hon. Gentleman expressed the concern that I might have disappeared to Bermuda. I assure him that I had only gone to pick up the ticket. He mentioned our mutual admiration society, and indeed I rushed back from the other end of the building as soon as I saw his name on the monitor. I agree that wardship should have been retained. It proved to be an invaluable part of the proceedings in Cleveland. Had children not been put in wardship during that unfortunate crisis, we would probably never have had the matter sorted out. As I said in Committee, I regret the Government's view that wardship should be phased out.

Mr. Vaz: I am glad that the hon. Gentleman returned to the Chamber rather than going to Bermuda. I hope that he will join the Opposition in the Lobby and support new clause 1.
I agree with the comments of some hon. Members about the way in which the courts operate. The juvenile and domestic courts in Leicester are prime examples of the problems and the pressures on families. There is only a small room in which more than 70 people, including children, have to wait for their cases to be called, and only one court is available. No refreshments are available, there are no telephone facilities and there is no appointments system. All that adds to the burden on families.
If the Solicitor-General were to say tonight that the reason that he could not introduce the measure was because it would cost more, I should refer him to the points made by so many people and especially to the report of the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy and to the document "The Price is Right", named after a popular quiz show, which suggested that there would be savings of more than £10 million. If he is afraid that the Chancellor will say that he has not enough money to pay for the new system, I suggest that he hand the Chancellor a copy of that document, which will show the tremendous savings to be made if the system is introduced.
We need to bring the many aspects of children's legislation into a single system. Wardship, adoption, divorce, custody, access, maintenance, domestic violence, guardianship, affiliation and care orders are all aspects of law and social policy that affect children directly. If the Solicitor-General does not accede to the demands of new clause 1—if he continues to maintain that the change of name that he proposes in Government amendment No. 353 meets the requirements laid down by hon. Members,


the family courts campaign and other outside organisations—I feel that he should reconsider the Government's proposals. Merely changing the name will not solve the problem. If he does not reconsider, the hon. and learned Gentleman will go down as the first Solicitor-General in history who has introduced such a radical measure and then sabotaged it because he has not the courage, or perhaps the political muscle, to go a step further and introduce a new system that will ensure that the Bill—many parts of which we support—constitutes an effective body of law.

Mr. Doran: Many powerful speeches have been made on both sides of the House in favour of the family court system, and I do not intend to repeat points that have already been made. I should like, however, to speak from the perspective of one who has specialised in family and child care law for many years, and also from the Scottish perspective.
I was pleased to hear the compliments that have been paid to the children's hearing system, in which I worked for some 12 years as a solicitor employed both in private practice and by a local authority. I am mystified by the fact that, after all our years of experience of the Scottish system —which got under way in 1971—a similar system has still not been introduced in England and Wales. After reviewing the literature, I have concluded that the only reason why it has not is that the magistrates are far too powerful a lobby to be overcome, and that they want to keep the jurisdiction for themselves. What the Government do not perceive is the damage being done to families and children in the process.
I listened carefully to what the Solicitor-General had to say, and I should like now to deal in particular with two points that he made. He said that those of us who see the need for a family court consider the problem institutional rather than functional. I consider that rather an insult: it suggests that we ignore the reality of the present system as it affects those who must appear in court, both children and adults. It also assumes that we are talking in a vacuum, which we are not. We have experience both of the damage done to families and children by the present system, and of the Scottish system. But I do not want merely to praise the Scottish system; I want to put on the record something of what it means in practice.
The Scottish system is informal in that the legal process is separate from the actual hearing and disposal of a case. Every local authority area is required to have a children's panel, consisting of people chosen from and intended to reflect the community, lending an element of democracy to the procedure: lay people are exercising the juvenile justice and child care systems.
Every children's panel is split up into children's hearings, which hear individual cases. The hearings comprise three members, one of whom must be female and one of whom is elected as chair. My hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield (Mr. Hinchliffe) described his experience of attending a children's hearing in Edinburgh, and I understand why he felt that that was a breath of fresh air. Such an informal set-up, with parents and children sitting around a table with the members of the hearing and everyone not only allowed the opportunity to state his point of view but encouraged to do so, would come as almost a cultural shock to someone who had grown up in the English system—or, as did my hon. Friend the Member for Monklands, West (Mr. Clarke) with the old

Scottish juvenile justice system. Decisions are not imposed on people; they discuss the disposal by the hearing, and are involved in decision making. That, I think, is crucial.
8.15 pm
It is also important to emphasise, as did the hon. Member for Mid-Kent (Mr. Rowe), the importance of the Kilbrandon report. Let me here record the sad death of Lord Kilbrandon a few weeks ago, and the debt owed to him by the Scottish legal profession—and, I am sure, the social workers—for his legacy of the children's hearing system. As long ago as 1964, the Kilbrandon committee saw the necessity of bringing together children who were in need of care and treatment because they had been neglected or abused by parents, and those in need of such care and treatment because they had offended. The two should not be distinguished, and following the report they were dealt with in exactly the same way. That was a fundamental reform in Scots law, and it is the essence of the children's system. The English system seems incapable of similar action: it still forces children to appear before a court. This may be a newly contrived court with a different name in an attempt at subtlety, but the old formality will remain, as will magistrates with no real training or experience of the problems faced by families.
The Solicitor-General—still basing his remarks on the view that Opposition Members see the problem as institutional—spoke of the difficulties that he has faced in considering the concept of a family court. It seems to me that he himself saw the problems in an institutional context: he confused the need for procedural reform with the need for legal reforms in many other spheres—divorce, for instance, and matrimonial violence.
Surely it would not be very difficult to establish what should be the jurisdiction of a family court: to establish the rules for such a court, and to change the law in other areas later. I see no need or justification for saying that the whole idea of a family law must wait on the stocks until we have reformed divorce law. What must be reformed are the rules of court relating to divorce. If it seems appropriate to make what I would describe as the cosmetic changes announced by the Solicitor-General today and in Committee, it surely would not be difficult to establish a family court. Let us by all means make other essential changes later.
I have wrestled with the difficulty that faces me, as a Scots lawyer with experience of the children's hearing system—containing, as it does, informality and a lay element—when it is clearly intended to retain the formal court system to deal with children's cases. I feel that a hybrid system is needed; certainly I do not wish to see the end of the important lay element in the Scottish system.
A few years ago I worked on the idea of a family tribunal, similar to the industrial and employment tribunals. In my view, we must retain the legal element simply because of the many important legal questions that come before the courts. None of the speakers today, apart from the Solicitor-General, has suggested that the present system which operates in England and Wales should be retained. They realise the need for informality, to remove the barriers and to encourage the proper sensitive solution of cases rather than throwing them to the mercies of the adversarial system. A hybrid sytem with the best of both systems which retained the legal element but introduced a


lay element should be explored. The Bill does not do that, but it goes some way towards recognising the need for radical change.
I catalogued my experience in child and family law in Scotland before going on to the meat of what I had to say. I have another relevant experience to bring to today's debate, and that is as a child witness before a court in Scotland. At the age of eight I was the victim of an assault and was required to appear in the sheriff court at Edinburgh. I have never forgotten the terror that I felt as a young child standing in the witness box and being required to answer questions from the bench and from the solicitor who defended the woman who had assaulted me and from the prosecutor. It is a terror which I have seen since in children I have taken to court to meet the judge when, for example, there has been a dispute over custody and the presence of the children has been required by the judge because they were old enough to express a view. It is a terror which every child who appears before the juvenile courts in England must face today. I want to see it stopped, and that is why I will support new clause 1.

Mr. Stuart Bell: I am grateful for the opportunity to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Doran). In his short speech, he brought to the House his own experience as a child, and reflected on the trauma that he felt and that he saw other children experience when they had to appear in court.
I shall begin my speech by speaking directly to the Solicitor-General. After listening to my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, East (Mr. Vaz), I felt that the Solicitor-General is a much-maligned man, having to suffer many of the slings and arrows of Opposition fortune. I should like to congratulate him on keeping the promises that he made in Committee. He made a series of commitments to family courts and he has fulfilled them in schedule 9 and new clause 18. I am grateful to him for keeping his promises. Politicians are not supposed to keep promises. The Solicitor-General is a politician as well as being a Law Officer and he kept his promise.
My hon. Friend the Member for Monklands, West (Mr. Clarke) made a vigorous speech enunciating his opposition to what the Government were doing and making the strong policy commitment that the Labour party has to a family court. He called the Bill a "lost opportunity". He said that the Solicitor-General had produced a "small little mouse" by way of a family court. I accept that we are unifying the jurisdictions of the High Court, the county court and the magistrates court. That is a welcome step, but I believe that the Solicitor-General has builded a small and modest house.
I should point out to the Solicitor-General that it is always a risky business to make one major reform, such as the creation of a family court, dependent upon other reforms. As the hon. Member for Chislehurst (Mr. Sims) will understand, it has taken so long to bring forward the Children Bill because a whole series of investigations and Commissions were looking at children's rights. We had the Law Commission and other reviews and each Lord Chancellor waited for the outcome of the next review before the Children Bill was produced.
I shall make a great effort not to mention Cleveland. I will leave that to my hon. Friend the Member for Monklands, West, but a steer had to be given to the variety

of Commissions before the Children Bill was produced. If we have to wait for the Law Commission's proposals on divorce and adoption, we may have to wait a long time. We shall also have to wait for the working party to which the Solicitor-General referred, and which is a novel arrangement, to produce its conclusions. It is not as if we do not have a divorce law. We have divorce law and proceedings in relation to conciliation, we have adoption laws and laws dealing with access and matrimonial violence. Why do we have to wait until the Law Commission's report on all those matters before we take the bold step of creating family courts? That is why I and my colleagues support new clause 1 which is in our names and, as the hon. Member for Stockton, South (Mr. Devlin) said, was in his name and that of the hon. Member for Batley and Spen (Mrs. Peacock) in Committee.
The debate has referred to the Finer committee on which we had a great discussion in Committee. When the Solicitor-General referred to the new working party that he was setting up, he did not take up one of the recommendations of the Finer committee which was that there should be a close relationship with social security law. Perhaps the Solicitor-General should look again at that recommendation by the Finer committee and add it to the working party discussions. We do not want to overburden the working party, but we want a family court that reflects the considerations of the Finer committee.
Finally, I should like to refer to what the hon. Member for Chislehurst said. He said that the Committee had a great consensus and was essentially a non-political committee. We made many references to resources, which have been mentioned again tonight. If the Opposition were in government we would put more resources into child care than the present Government are doing.
It is clear that we shall be dividing the House on the issue. The hon. Member for Stockton, South said that my hon. Friend the Member for Monklands, West had referred to his speech in Committee which was a felicitous speech. I appeal to the hon. Members for Stockton, South, for Chislehurst, for Batley and Spen and for Mid-Kent (Mr. Rowe). If they wish to show clearly their own personal commitment to a family court they should join us in the Lobby and vote for our new clause.

The Solicitor-General: First, I am grateful to the hon. Member for Middlesbrough (Mr. Bell) for his opening remarks, although I must disagree with his closing remarks. The Government have fulfilled their engagements given in Committee. Although it is in his absence, let me draw on the words of the hon. Member for Leicester, East (Mr. Vaz). The Government have put in place a radical and substantial piece of law. When we enact the Bill, it should be recognised on both sides of the House that that is exactly what we have done.
One of the difficulties is that discussion on family courts tends to be long on rhetoric and short on thought. Quite frankly, I must say that very firmly about the speech of the hon. Member for Monklands, West (Mr. Clarke). The speeches that suggest that hon. Members should support in the Lobby the Opposition clause instead of the Government's clause are, frankly, misguided.
The first point to recognise, and the hon. Member for Middlesbrough will recall this as he at least has researched these matters, is that it was Finer himself who recognised that a family court would have to apply a single unified body of substantive law. I have constantly reiterated the


fact that we are creating in the Bill a single unified body of substantive law in relation to this aspect of children's law, and to that extent we can and shall create a unified jurisdiction and those aspects of what might be described as a family court.

Mr. Vaz: When?

The Solicitor-General: I will answer the hon. Gentleman. I have had the oportunity to look at the Labour party's own clause—new clause 1—which would be brought into force in not more than 18 months, and then there are the allotted rules of court to be made. Within that time scale—about two years —the House can expect the provisions of the Children Bill to be up and running and in effect. I did not give a time scale for the further rolling programme because that programme goes into wider aspects of family law where we have to do exactly what Finer said and create a single unified body of substantive law.
By the time that two years is up we can expect to be well down the road. We will have had two or three reports from the Law Commission. We will have considered with constructive care the Newcastle university reports on conciliation. The hon. Member for Ynys Môn (Mr. Jones), who has paid a good deal of attention to the debate, asked when the Newcastle report will be published. That is an example of the amount of thought that has been given to this Bill. The report was published last spring, and I am rather surprised that he has not read it.
Labour's new clause 1 contains perfectly reasonable hopes, which we will very largely fulfil by our substantive clauses, but they are no more than hopes.
The hon. Member for Monklands, West referred to other jurisdictions. He mentioned Australia as being in the forefront, but he should be aware of the major difficulties that Australia has had with its family courts—perhaps New Zealand would be a better model.
The hon. Member for Monklands, West referred to the family and conciliation. It is interesting that new clause 1 applies those aspects only to part II, when they are quite clearly equally applicable to part I.
The truth of the matter was brought out by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton, South (Mr. Devlin), when he said that, in new clause 1, the Labour party intends to divide the House upon something that is no more than the clause that he put down for probing purposes in Committee. That illustrates the barrenness of the Opposition's stance.

Mr. Tom Clarke: The Labour party made it quite clear from the beginning that it was no disgrace to look for consensus on an issue where we were assured that consensus existed. New clause 1 reflects the all-party view expressed in Committee. The difference between the Labour party and the Government—and I now know what it feels like to be savaged by a dead mouse—is that we are honouring the commitments that we gave.

The Solicitor-General: I am grateful to the hon. Member for Monklands, West for that intervention, which says little more than his earlier speech.
The Bill produces major changes in substantive law on children, in jurisdiction and in court structure to enable the

family court concept to come into effect in care and family proceedings. I commend the Government's new clause and amendments warmly to the House.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 354, in page 149, line 18, column 3, at beginning insert—



'Section 1(4)(a).



Section 5(2)(d).'.

No. 355, in page 151, line 9, at end insert—


'1972 c. 18.
The Maintenance Orders (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1972.
 Section 41.'.

No. 250, in page 151, line 10, leave out 'paragraph' arid insert 'paragraphs 4 and'.

No. 249, in page 151, column 3, leave out lines 14 arid 15 and insert—



Sections 42 to 44.



In section 52(1), the definition of "custody".



In Schedule 2, paragraph 11.'.

No. 446, in page 151, line 16, at end insert—


'1973 c. 45.
The Domicile and matrimonial proceedings Act 1973.
In Schedule 1, in para-graph 11(1) the defini-tions of "custody" arid "education" and in paragraph 11(3) the word "four".'.'

No. 451, in page 151, line 43, column 3, at end insert—



'In section 28(5), the words "or the organisation".'.

No. 452, in page 151, line 54, after 'safety' insert
 ', in the definition of "local authority" the words from "and" to the end'

No. 437, in page 151, leave out line 59 and insert
'11, 19, 21 and 22.'

No. 251, in page 152, line 16, leave out 'paragraph' and insert 'paragraphs 10 and'.

No. 252, in page 152, column 3, leave out lines 18 to 20 and insert—



'Sections 9 to 15.



In section 19, in subsec-tion (1) the words "following powers, that is to say" and sub-paragraph (ii), subsections (2) and (4), in subsection (7) the words "and one interim custody order" and in subsection (9) the words "or 21".



In section 20, subsection (4) and in subsection (9) the words "subject to the provisions of section (11)8 of this Act".



Section 21.







In section 24, the words "or 21" in both places where they occur.



In section 25, in subsec-tion (1) paragraph (b) and the word "or" immediately preceding it and in subsection (2) paragraphs (c) and (d).



Section 29(4).



Sections 33 and 34.



Sections 36 and 53.



Sections 64 to 72.



Sections 73(1) and 74(1) and (3).



In section 88(1), the definition of "actual custody".



In Schedule 2, para-graphs 22, 23, 27, 29, 31, 36, 41 to 43, 46 to 50.'

No. 453, in page 152, line 25, column 3, at end insert—



'In section 65(1), in the definition of "local authority", the words from "and" to the end and, in the definition of "specified order", the words "Northern Ireland or".'.

No. 447, in page 152, line 34, column 3, at beginning insert—



'In section 65(1), para-graphs (e) and (g) and the paragraph (m) in-serted in section 65 by paragraph 82 of Schedule 2 to the Family Law Reform Act 1987.



In section 81(8), in the definition of "guar-dian" the words "by deed or will" and in the definition of "sums adjudged to be paid by a conviction" the words from "as ap-plied" to the end.



In section 143(2), paragraph (i).'.

No. 253, in page 152, line 34, column 3, leave out `paragraph 78' and insert 'paragraphs 78, 83, 91, 92, 110, 116, 117, 138, 157, 158, 165, 166 and 199 to 201'.

No. 438, in page 152, line 40, column 3, at end insert—



'In Schedule 14, Para-graphs 45 and 46.

No. 448, in page 152,line 43, column 3,at end insert—



'In section 28(1), the words "(including an order under section 38 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956)".'.

No. 254, in page 152, line 45, leave out 'and 35' and insert
';35, 44, 50 and 51'.

No. 439, in page 152, line 58, leave out

'10 to 14, 20, 21'

and insert
'9 to 14, 20, to 24, 27, 28, 34, 37'.

No.440, in page 153, line 3, leave out from '48' to end of line 5.

No.454, in page 153, line 7, column 3, at beginning insert—



"In section 118(1) in the definition of parent or guardian, paragraph (b) and the word "and" immediately preceding it.'

No. 255, in page 153, line 7, leave out 'and 16' and insert',16 and 17'.

No. 256, in page 153, line 7, at end insert—


'1984 c.23.
The Registered Homes Act 1984.
In Schedule 1, in paragraph 5, sub-paragraph (a) and paragraphs 6, 7 and 8'.

No. 357, in page 153, line 7, at end insert—


`1984 c.37.
The Child Abduction  Act 1984.
In section 3, the word "and" immediately preceding paragraph (c).




In the Schedule, in paragraph 1(2) the words "or voluntary organisation" and paragraph 3(1)(e).


' '1984 c.42.
The Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984
In Schedule 1, paragraphs 19 and 23.'.

No. 358, in page 153, line 7, at end insert—


'1984 c. 56.
The Foster Children (Scotland) Act 1984.
In section 1, the words "for a period of more than 6 days" and the words from "The period" to the end.




In section 7(1), the word "or" at the end of paragraph (e).




In Schedule 2, paragraphs 1 to 3 and 8.'.

No. 441, in page 153, line 7, at end insert—


'1984 c. 28.
The County Courts Act 1984.
In Schedule 2, paragraph 56.'.

No. 238, in page 153, line 8, column 3, at beginning insert—



'Section 39(5).



In section 37(15), the words "and is not excluded from this Part of this Act by section 52 below".



Section 52.'.

No. 257, in page 153, line 11, leave out Paragraph 19(a)'and 22'.

No.449, in page 153,line 15, column 3, at beginning insert—





'Section 9(c).



Section 20(2)(b) and (c).'

No. 450, in page 153, line 15, column 3, at end insert—



'and (5).



In Schedule 3, paragraph 1(2).'

No. 442, in page 153, line 23, at end insert—


'1986 c. 45.
The Insolvency Act 1986.
In section 281 (5)(b), the words "in domestic proceedings".


1986 c. 50.
The Social Security Act 1986.
In  Schedule 10, paragraph 51.


1986 c. 55.
The Family Law Act 1986.
In section 1(2), in paragraph (a) the words "(a) or" and paragraph (b).




Section 3(4) to (6).




Section 4.




Section 35(1).




In section 42(6), in para-graph (b) the words "section 42(6) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 or", in para-graph (c) the words "section 42(7) of that Act or", and in paragraph (d) the words "section 19(6) of the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates' Courts Act 1978 or".




In Schedule 1, para-graphs 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 20 and 23.'.

No. 433, in page 153, line 25, column 3, leave out lines 25 to 27 and insert—



'Section 4 to 7.



Sections 9 to 16.'

No. 444, in page 153, line 28, leave out 'paragraph 11' and insert
'paragraphs 11, 14, 51, 67, 68, 94 and 95. In Schedule 3, paragraphs 11 and 12'.

No. 239, in page 153, line 28, at end insert—

Page 153, line 28, at end insert—


'1988 c. 34.
The Legal Aid Act 1988.
Section 3(4)(c).




Section 27.




Section 28.




In section 30, subsections (1) and (2).




In Part I of Schedule 2, paragraph 2(a) and (e)'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

New Clause 1

Family Courts

'(1) Within each county court and magistrates court there shall be created a family division which, together with the Family Division of the High Court, shall operate as a Family Court.

(2) The Lord Chancellor shall by rules of court specify the procedures to be followed in order to—

(a) identify the welfare of the child;
(b) avoid unnecessary formality;
(c) reduce delay and inconvenience to the public in resolution of family disputes;
(d) reduce the harm to children and families resulting from the court process and

(e) introduce conciliatory methods of dispute resolution.

(3) There shall be a welfare and conciliation service attached to the Family Court and it shall include—

(a) guardians ad litem and reporting officers;
(b) a family conciliation service in respect of children subject to proceedings under part two.
(c) social workers appointed to report to the court in proceedings under part two.

(4) This section shall come into force on such day as the Secretary of State may appoint, being not later than eighteen months after the Children Act receives Royal Assent.'.—[Mr. Tom Clarke.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—

The House divided: Ayes 180, Noes 222.

Division No. 332]
[8.34 pm


AYES


Abbott, Ms Diane
Fisher, Mark


Adams, Allen (Paisley N)
Flannery, Martin


Allen, Graham
Flynn, Paul


Alton, David
Foot, Rt Hon Michael


Anderson, Donald
Foster, Derek


Armstrong, Hilary
Foulkes, George


Ashley, Rt Hon Jack
Fyfe, Maria


Ashton, Joe
Galloway, George


Banks, Tony (Newham NW)
Garrett, John (Norwich South)


Barnes, Harry (Derbyshire NE)
Garrett, Ted (Wallsend)


Barnes, Mrs Rosie (Greenwich)
George, Bruce


Barron, Kevin
Gilbert, Rt Hon Dr John


Battle, John
Godman, Dr Norman A.


Beckett, Margaret
Golding, Mrs Llin


Bell, Stuart
Gordon, Mildred


Benn, Rt Hon Tony
Gould, Bryan


Bennett, A. F. (D'nt'n &amp; R'dish)
Grant, Bernie (Tottenham)


Bermingham, Gerald
Griffiths, Nigel (Edinburgh S)


Bidwell, Sydney
Griffiths, Win (Bridgend)


Blair, Tony
Hardy, Peter


Blunkett, David
Harman, Ms Harriet


Boyes, Roland
Hattersley, Rt Hon Roy


Bradley, Keith
Healey, Rt Hon Denis


Bray, Dr Jeremy
Heffer, Eric S.


Brown, Gordon (D'mline E)
Hinchliffe, David


Brown, Nicholas (Newcastle E)
Hogg, N. (C'nauld &amp; Kilsyth)


Buckley, George J.
Home Robertson, John


Campbell, Ron (Blyth Valley)
Howarth, George (Knowsley N)


Campbell-Savours, D. N.
Howells, Geraint


Carlile, Alex (Mont'g)
Howells, Dr. Kim (Pontypridd)


Clark, Dr David (S Shields)
Hughes, John (Coventry NE)


Clarke, Tom (Monklands W)
Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)


Clay, Bob
Hughes, Sean (Knowsley S)


Clelland, David
Illsley, Eric


Clwyd, Mrs Ann
Ingram, Adam


Cohen, Harry
Jones, Barry (Alyn &amp; Deeside)


Cook, Frank (Stockton N)
Jones, Ieuan (Ynys Môn)


Cook, Robin (Livingston)
Kirkwood, Archy


Corbett, Robin
Lambie, David


Corbyn, Jeremy
Lamond, James


Crowther, Stan
Leadbitter, Ted


Cryer, Bob
Leighton, Ron


Cummings, John
Lestor, Joan (Eccles)


Cunliffe, Lawrence
Lewis, Terry


Darling, Alistair
Litherland, Robert


Davies, Rt Hon Denzil (Llanelli)
Lloyd, Tony (Stratford)


Davies, Ron (Caerphilly)
Lofthozuse, Geoffrey


Davis, Terry (B'ham Hodge H'I)
Loyden, Eddie


Dewar, Donald
McAllion, John


Dixon, Don
McAvoy, Thomas


Dobson, Frank
McCartney, Ian


Doran, Frank
Macdonald, Calum A.


Dunwoody, Hon Mrs Gwyneth
McKelvey, William


Eadie, Alexander
McLeish, Henry


Eastham, Ken
McNamara, Kevin


Evans, John (St Helens N)
Madden, Max


Ewing, Harry (Falkirk E)
Mahon, Mrs Alice


Fearn, Ronald
Marek, Dr John


Field, Frank (Birkenhead)
Martlew, Eric


Fields, Terry (L'pool B G'n)
Maxton, John






Meacher, Michael
Sheerman, Barry


Meale, Alan
Sheldon, Rt Hon Robert


Michael, Alun
Shore, Rt Hon Peter


Michie, Bill (Sheffield Heeley)
Skinner, Dennis


Moonie, Dr Lewis
Smith, Andrew (Oxford E)


Morgan, Rhodri
Smith, C. (Isl'ton &amp; F'bury)


Morley, Elliot
Smith, J. P. (Vale of Glam)


Morris, Rt Hon A. (W'shawe)
Soley, Clive


Mowlam, Marjorie
Spearing, Nigel


Mullin, Chris
Steel, Rt Hon David


Nellist, Dave
Steinberg, Gerry


Oakes, Rt Hon Gordon
Strang, Gavin


Orme, Rt Hon Stanley
Taylor, Mrs Ann (Dewsbury)


Parry, Robert
Taylor, Rt Hon J. D. (S'ford)


Patchett, Terry
Thompson, Jack (Wansbeck)


Pendry, Tom
Turner, Dennis


Pike, Peter L.
Vaz, Keith


Powell, Ray (Ogmore)
Wall, Pat


Prescott, John
Wallace, James


Primarolo, Dawn
Wareing, Robert N.


Quin, Ms Joyce
Watson, Mike (Glasgow, C)


Radice, Giles
Welsh, Michael (Doncaster N)


Randall, Stuart
Williams, Rt Hon Alan


Reid, Dr John
Wilson, Brian


Robertson, George
Winnick, David


Rogers, Allan
Wise, Mrs Audrey


Rooker, Jeff
Worthington, Tony


Ross, Ernie (Dundee W)
Young, David (Bolton SE)


Rowlands, Ted



Ruddock, Joan
Tellers for the Ayes:


Salmond, Alex
Mr. Frank Haynes and


Sedgemore, Brian
Mr.Martyn Jones.




NOES


Aitken, Jonathan
Clark, Dr Michael (Rochford)


Alexander, Richard
Clark, Sir W. (Croydon S)


Alison, Rt Hon Michael
Colvin, Michael


Amess, David
Conway, Derek


Amos, Alan
Coombs, Simon (Swindon)


Arbuthnot, James
Cope, Rt Hon John


Ashby, David
Cormack, Patrick


Atkins, Robert
Couchman, James


Baker, Nicholas (Dorset N)
Cran, James


Baldry, Tony
Critchley, Julian


Banks, Robert (Harrogate)
Currie, Mrs Edwina


Batiste, Spencer
Davies, Q. (Stamf'd &amp; Spald'g)


Beaumont-Dark, Anthony
Davis, David (Boothferry)


Bellingham, Henry
Day, Stephen


Bendall, Vivian
Devlin, Tim


Bennett, Nicholas (Pembroke)
Dorrell, Stephen


Benyon, W.
Douglas-Hamilton, Lord James


Bevan, David Gilroy
Dover, Den


Biffen, Rt Hon John
Dunn, Bob


Blackburn, Dr John G.
Durant, Tony


Blaker, Rt Hon Sir Peter
Eggar, Tim


Body, Sir Richard
Evans, David (Welwyn Hatf'd)


Bonsor, Sir Nicholas
Evennett, David


Boscawen, Hon Robert
Favell, Tony


Boswell, Tim
Fenner, Dame Peggy


Bowden, A (Brighton K'pto'n)
Field, Barry (Isle of Wight)


Bowden, Gerald (Dulwich)
Fishburn, John Dudley


Bowis, John
Fookes, Dame Janet


Boyson, Rt Hon Dr Sir Rhodes
Forman, Nigel


Braine, Rt Hon Sir Bernard
Forth, Eric


Brazier, Julian
Freeman, Roger


Brown, Michael (Brigg &amp; Cl't's)
French, Douglas


Bruce, Ian (Dorset South)
Gale, Roger


Buck, Sir Antony
Gardiner, George


Budgen, Nicholas
Garel-Jones, Tristan


Burns, Simon
Glyn, Dr Alan


Burt, Alistair
Goodlad, Alastair


Butcher, John
Gorman, Mrs Teresa


Butler, Chris
Gow, Ian


Butterfill, John
Grant, Sir Anthony (CambsSW)


Carlisle, Kenneth (Lincoln)
Greenway, Harry (Ealing N)


Carrington, Matthew
Greenway, John (Ryedale)


Carttiss, Michael
Gregory, Conal


Chalker, Rt Hon Mrs Lynda
Griffiths, Peter (Portsmouth N)


Channon, Rt Hon Paul
Grist, Ian


Chapman, Sydney
Ground, Patrick





Grylls, Michael
Moss, Malcolm


Hague, William
Moynihan, Hon Colin


Hamilton, Neil (Tatton)
Mudd, David


Hampson, Dr Keith
Neale, Gerrard


Hanley, Jeremy
Nelson, Anthony


Hannam, John
Neubert, Michael


Hargreaves, Ken (Hyndburn)
Newton, Rt Hon Tony


Harris, David
Nicholson, David (Taunton)


Haselhurst, Alan
Nicholson, Emma (Devon West)


Hayes, Jerry
Norris, Steve


Hayhoe, Rt Hon Sir Barney
Onslow, Rt Hon Cranley


Hayward, Robert
Oppenheim, Phillip


Heathcoat-Amory, David
Page, Richard


Heddle, John
Paice, James


Higgins, Rt Hon Terence L.
Patnick, Irvine


Hind, Kenneth
Patten, Rt Hon Chris (Bath)


Hogg, Hon Douglas (Gr'th'm)
Peacock, Mrs Elizabeth


Hordern, Sir Peter
Porter, Barry (Wirral S)


Howard, Michael
Porter, David (Waveney)


Howarth, Alan (Strat'd-on-A)
Portillo, Michael


Howarth, G. (Cannock &amp; B'wd)
Powell, William (Corby)


Howell, Rt Hon David (G'dford)
Price, Sir David


Howell, Ralph (North Norfolk)
Raison, Rt Hon Timothy


Hughes, Robert G. (Harrow W)
Renton, Tim


Hunt, David (Wirral W)
Riddick, Graham


Hunter, Andrew
Ridley, Rt Hon Nicholas


Irvine, Michael
Ridsdale, Sir Julian


Jack, Michael
Roberts, Wyn (Conwy)


Jackson, Robert
Rossi, Sir Hugh


Janman, Tim
Rost, Peter


Jessel, Toby
Rowe, Andrew


Johnson Smith, Sir Geoffrey
Sainsbury, Hon Tim


Kellett-Bowman, Dame Elaine
Shaw, Sir Giles (Pudsey)


Key, Robert
Shaw, Sir Michael (Scarb')


King, Rt Hon Tom (Bridgwater)
Shephard, Mrs G. (Norfolk SW)


Kirkhope, Timothy
Shepherd, Richard (Aldridge)


Knapman, Roger
Shersby, Michael


Knight, Greg (Derby North)
Sims, Roger


Knight, Dame Jill (Edgbaston)
Smith, Tim (Beaconsfield)


Knowles, Michael
Soames, Hon Nicholas


Knox, David
Speed, Keith


Latham, Michael
Speller, Tony


Lennox-Boyd, Hon Mark
Spicer, Sir Jim (Dorset W)


Lilley, Peter
Spicer, Michael (S Worcs)


Lloyd, Sir Ian (Havant)
Squire, Robin


Lloyd, Peter (Fareham)
Stanbrook, Ivor


Lord, Michael
Stern, Michael


Lyell, Sir Nicholas
Stevens, Lewis


MacKay, Andrew (E Berkshire)
Stewart, Andy (Sherwood)


Maclean, David
Stewart, Rt Hon Ian (Herts N)


McLoughlin, Patrick
Stokes, Sir John


McNair-Wilson, Sir Michael
Stradling Thomas, Sir John


McNair-Wilson, Sir Patrick
Summerson, Hugo


Malins, Humfrey
Taylor, Ian (Esher)


Mans, Keith
Taylor, John M (Solihull)


Maples, John
Thurnham, Peter


Marland, Paul
Townend, John (Bridlington)


Marshall, Michael (Arundel)
Townsend, Cyril D. (B'heath)


Martin, David (Portsmouth S)
Waddington, Rt Hon David


Maude, Hon Francis
Waller, Gary


Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin
Widdecombe, Ann


Mayhew, Rt Hon Sir Patrick
Wiggin, Jerry


Mellor, David
Yeo, Tim


Meyer, Sir Anthony



Mills, Iain
Tellers for the Noes:


Mitchell, Sir David
Mr. Michael Fallon and


Morrison, Sir Charles
Mr. Tom Sackville.

Question accordingly negatived.

New Clause 23

RULES OF COURT

' .—(1) An authority having power to make rules of court may make such provision for giving effect to—

(a) this Act;
(b) the provisions of any statutory instrument made under this Act; or


(c) any amendment made by this Act in any other enactment,

as appears to that authority to be necessary or expedient.

(2) The rules may, in particular, make provision—

(a) with respect to the procedure to be followed in any relevant proceedings (including the manner in which any application is to be made or other proceedings commenced);
(b) as to the persons entitled to participate in any relevant proceedings, whether as parties to the proceedings or by being given the opportunity to make representations to the court;
(c) with respect to the documents and information to be furnished, and notices to be given, in connection with any relevant proceedings;
(d) applying (with or without modification) enactments which govern the procedure to be followed with respect to proceedings brought on a complaint made to a magistrates' court to relevant proceedings in such a court brought otherwise than on a complaint;
(e) with respect to preliminary hearings;
(f) for the service outside the United Kingdom, in such circumstances and in such manner as may be prescribed, of any notice of proceedings in a magistrates' court;
(g) for the exercise by magistrates' courts, in such circumstances as may be prescribed, of such powers as may be prescribed (even though a working party to the proceedings in question is outside England and Wales);
(h) enabling the court, in such circumstances as may be prescribed, to proceed on any application even though the respondent has not been given notice of the proceedings;
(i) authorising a single justice to discharge the functions of a magistrates' court with respect to such relevant proceedings as may be prescribed;
(j) authorising a magistrates' court to order any of the parties to such relevant proceedings as may be prescribed, in such circumstances as may be prescribed, to pay the whole or part of the costs of all or any of the other parties.

(3) In subsection (2)—

"notice of proceedings" means a summons or such other notice of proceedings as is required; and "given", in relation to a summons, means "served";

"prescribed" means prescribed by the rules; and

"relevant proceedings" means any application made, or proceedings brought, under any of the provisions mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsection (1) and any part of such proceedings.

(4) This section and any other power in this Act to make rules of court are not to be taken as in any way limiting any other power of the authority in question to make rules of court.

(5) When making any rules under this section an authority shall be subject to the same requirements as to consultation (if any) as apply when the authority makes rules under its general rule making power.'.—[The Solicitor-General.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Madam Deputy Speaker (Miss Betty Boothroyd): With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 380 and 307.

The Solicitor-General: The effect of new clause 23 is to enable rules of court to be made to govern practice and procedure and therefore to put flesh on to the bones of what we have been discussing in principle for dealing with cases involving children when the Bill comes into force. New clause 23 supersedes clause 83 of the Bill and amendment No. 380 makes clear that the separate rule-making power in clause 46(1) does not affect the new clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 20

APPEALS

' .—(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court against—

(a) the making by a magistrates' court of any order under this Act; or
(b) any refusal by a magistrates' court to make such an order.

(2) Where a magistrates' court has power, in relation to any proceedings under this Act, to decline jurisdiction because it considers that the case can more conveniently be dealt with by another court, no appeal shall lie against an', exercise by that magistrates' court of that power.

(3) Subsection (1) does not apply in relation to an interim order for periodical payments made under Schedule 1.

(4) On an appeal under this section, the High Court may make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to its determination of the appeal.

(5) Where an order is made under subsection (4) the High Court may also make such incidental or consequential orders as appear to it to be just.

(6) Where an appeal from a magistrates's court relates to an order for the making of periodical payments, the High Court may order that its determination of the appeal shall have effect from such date as it thinks fit to specify in the order.

(7) The date so specified must not be earlier than the earliest date allowed in accordance with rules of court made for the purposes of this section.

(8) Where, on an appeal under this section in respect of an order requiring a person to make periodical payments, the High Court reduces the amount of those payments or discharges the order—

(a) it may order the person entitled to the payments to pay to the person making them such sum in respect of payments already made as the High Court thinks fit; and
(b) if any arrears are due under the order for periodical payments, it may remit payment of the whole, or part, of those arrears.

(9) Any order of the High Court made on an appeal under this section (other than one directing that an application be re-heard by a magistrates' court) shall, for the purposes—

(a) of the enforcement of the order; and
(b) of any power to vary, revive or discharge orders,

be treated as if it were an order of the magistrates' court from which the appeal was brought and not an order of the High Court.

(10) The Lord Chancellor may by order make provision as to the circumstances in which appeals may be made against decisions taken by courts on questions arising in connection with the transfer, or proposed transfer, of proceedings by virtue of any order under paragraph 2 of Schedule (Jurisdiction).

(11) Except to the extent provided for in any order made under subsection (10), no appeal may be made against any decision of a kind mentioned in that subsection.'.—[The Solicitor-General.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Madam Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 63 and 300.

The Solicitor-General: New clause 20 relates to appeals and is couched mainly in terms of appeals from magistrates' courts. Subsection (1) of the new clause provides that appeals from magistrates' courts shall be to the High Court. That makes two important changes. At present appeals on the facts in care proceedings go from the magistrates court to the Crown courts. By changing the forum of the appeal, we will emphasise the civil nature of applications for care orders. Furthermore, an appeal on


the facts is not currently available to local authorities. The new clause will change that, putting all parties on an even footing with regard to appeals. Subsections (4) to (8) set out the powers of the High Court when hearing an appeal. Clearly, it must have power to make an order which reflects its conclusions after hearing the appeal, together with any consequential orders made necessary by its determination. Subsections (4) and (5) give the High Court those powers.
Subsection (9) makes clear that an order of the High Court made on appeal shall have the effect of an order made by the court appealed from. The obvious exception to that is an order for rehearing. The proposed new clause places limitations upon rights of appeal which are to be found in subsections (2), (3), (10) and (11).
Amendment No. 300 prohibits appeals from the making or refusal of an emergency order and any directions consequential upon such an order. Hon. Members will recall that the child and anyone who has parental responsibility for him or with whom he lives will be able to challenge emergency protection orders 72 hours after they have been made under clause 39(8) and (9). That will adequately safeguard the position of the child and those close to him. Given the short duration and emergency nature of the orders, no other provision is necessary. Indeed, a formal appeals procedure, with the added delay that that would necessarily involve, would be singularly inappropriate. The clauses are essential to the Bill which must deal with the question of appeals particularly from magistrates.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 12

PROVISION OF ACCOMMODATION FOR CHILDREN IN POLICE PROTECTION OR DETENTION OR ON REMAND, ETC.

' .—(1) Every local authority shall make provision for the reception and accommodation of children who are removed or kept away from home under Part V.

(2) Every local authority shall receive, and provide accommodation for, children—

(a) in police protection whom they are requested to receive under section 40(3)(e);
(b) whom they are requested to receive under section 38(6) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984;
(c) who are—

(i) on remand under section 23(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969; or
(ii) the subject of a supervision order imposing a residence requirement under section 12AA of that Act,

and with respect to whom they are the designated authority.

(3) Where a child has been—

(a) removed under Part V; or
(b) detained under section 38 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984,

and he is not being provided with accommodation by a local authority or in a hospital vested in the Secretary of State, any reasonable expenses of accommodating him shall be recoverable from the local authority in whose area he is ordinarily resident.'—[Mr. Mellor.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 13

CHILD ASSESSMENT ORDERS

' .—(1) On the application of a local authority or authorised person for an order to be made under this section with respect to a child, the court may make the order if, but only if, it is satisfied that—

(a) the applicant has reasonable cause to suspect that the child is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm;
(b) an assessment of the state of the child's health or development, or of the way in which he has been treated, is required to enable the applicant to determine whether or not the child is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm; and
(c) it is unlikely that such an assessment will be made, or be satisfactory, in the absence of an order under this section.

(2) In this Act "a child assessment order" means an order under this section.

(3) A court may treat an application under this section as an application for an emergency protection order.

(4) No court shall make a child assessment order if it is satisfied—

(a) that there are grounds for making an emergency protection order with respect to the child; and
(b) that it ought to make such an order rather than a child assessment order.

(5) A child assessment order shall—

(a) specify the date by which the assessment is to begin; and
(b) have effect for such period, not exceeding 14 days beginning with that date, as may be specified in the Order.

(6) Where a child assessment order is in force with respect to a child it shall be the duty of any person who is in a position to produce the child—

(a) to produce him to such person as may be named in the order, and
(b) to comply with such directions relating to the assessment of the child as the court thinks fit to specify in the order.

(7) A child assessment order authorises any person carrying out the assessment, or any part of the assessment, to do so in accordance with the terms of the order.

(8) Regardless of subsection (7), if the child is of sufficient understanding to make an informed decision he may refuse to submit to a medical or psychiatric examination or other assessment.

(9) The child may only be kept away from home—

(a) in accordance with directions specified in the order;
(b) if it necessary for the purposes of the assessment; and
(c) for such period or periods as may be specified in the order.

(10) Where the child is to be kept away from home, the order shall contain such directions as the court thinks fit with regard to the contact that he must be allowed to have with other persons while away from home.

(11) Any person making an application for a child assessment order shall take such steps as are reasonably practicable to ensure that notice of the application is given to—

(a) the child's parents;
(b) any person who is not a parent of his but who has parental responsibility for him;
(c) any other person with whom the child is living;
(d) any person in whose favour a contact order is in force with respect to the child;
(e) any person who is allowed to have contact with the child by virtue of an order under section 31; and
(f) the child,

before the hearing of the application.

(12) Rules of court may make provision as to the circumstances in which—

(a) any of the persons mentioned in subsection (11); or
(b)such other person as may be specified in the rules,

may apply to the court for a child assessment order to be varied or discharged.

(13) In this section "authorised person" means a person who is an authorised person for the purposes of section 28.'. —[Mr. Mellor.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Madam Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government new clause 5, amendment No. 1, in clause 36, page 34, line 8 at end insert—
'(aa) in the case of an application made by, or on behalf of a local authority, the court is satisfied that there has been an unreasonable failure to comply with a statutory notice served under section Child production notice.'.
Government amendment No. 116, amendment No. 2, in clause 41, page 39, line 47, after 'order' insert
'or notice under section (Child production notice).'.
Government amendments Nos. 376, 396 and 159.

Mr. Mellor: This group of amendments brings us back to the heart of the Bill or at least to what the many members of the public who have been following our proceedings will consider to be the heart. It is certainly the heart of the Bill when we consider the care with which hon. Members on both sides of the House have approached these issues throughout the Bill's passage.
As I explained in Standing Committee, the difficulty is to know whether the emergency protection order is adequate or whether we require an additional order—a child assessment order—to run in parallel with it. Further refinements of the emergency protection order will be proposed tonight to provide for the circumstances within which a failure to produce a child is coupled with a genuine and immediate fear for the child—leading to the granting of an emergency protection order. There are other circumstances in which there might be serious cause for concern about the welfare of a child. There may be a repeated failure to produce a child and perhaps it cannot be asserted that the matter is quite so urgent that there is an immediate need to intervene to take the child away. It is at the heart of our concerns that the emergency protection order is used only in those very serious circumstances, so the issue is whether there should be a lesser order requiring the production of a child and one which allows for the assessment of the child.
I listened with great care to what was said in Standing Committee. I want to thank all the hon. Members who took part in our debate in Committee. I am also grateful for the tentative discussions involving certain Members which have taken place subsequently—as late as this week. I want also to thank various groups concerned with this issue which have contributed to our discussions. It has been a significant development in this debate that the Association of Directors of Social Services and the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children have discussed the issue and are committed jointly to the need for a child assessment order.
New clause 13 represents the best attempt that the Government can make to take on board the various views and produce an easy-to-use, readily explicable proposi-tion, which has the proper safeguards that one would expect when any intrusion into the rights of parents over their children is considered. I do not believe that the child assessment order, as we have it, is an unnecessary intrusion. By reducing the period from 28 days to seven days, we have shown a marked concern that the order

should not be excessive. I know that there is concern that the child should not be removed from the parents for that period.
The period for which a child is removed is entirely dependent on the court; it is not something that the local authority will determine. For the most part, the assessment will take place without a requirement to take the child away, save for the period of an afternoon or two afternoons for an assessment to be made. However, there may be rare occasions when an overnight stay is required. Just because the duration of the order could be seven days, no one should presume that the seven-day period is likely.
The court is likely to he prepared to give an order only when it is clear that all reasonable attempts have been made to secure voluntary co-operation. Rules of court will require the applicant to explain what steps he has taken to secure an assessment of the child. Court proceedings will be on notice and a guardian ad litem will usually be appointed to represent the child and help the court to decide at a full hearing whether an assessment order is needed.
9 pm
New clause 13(8) provides specifically that
if the child is of sufficient understanding to make an informed decision he may refuse to submit to a medical or psychiatric examination or other assessment.
That point was impressed on me by my hon. Friend the Member for Billericay (Mrs. Gorman). I thought carefully about her comments and was driven to agree that there is an irresistible logic to that argument, having regard to other developments in the law and in the statutes. Not only is such a provision incorporated in new clause 13, but there will be similar amendments in respect of subsequent emergency protection orders and interim orders in the Bill.
Applications for a child assessment order will be heard inter partes, not ex parte, as for most EPO applications. The parents, the child and certain other persons will be given notice of the application, which is of considerable importance.
In some circumstances, the court may take the view that those making the application have underestimated the gravity of the case. It will then be open to the court, if it so wills, to make an emergency protection order instead of a child assessment order. Emergencies and non-emergencies are not self-defining categories—so if, having heard the evidence, the court believes that an emergency protection order is needed, it can so move.

Mr. Vaz: How can the Minister justify a period of seven days for an assessment when his own Department's guidelines suggest that an assessment will take three months?

Mr. Mellor: Because a three-month order would be regarded as manifestly excessive. We have made serious and genuine attempts, which I believe have been appreciated by right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House, to deal wherever possible with sensible propositions. There is genuine anxiety lest child assessment orders be used as an oppressive instrument. After careful consideration, I reached the conclusion that a sensible assessment could be made within seven days in almost every case. If necessary, further action could then be taken.

Mr. Vaz: indicated dissent.

Mr. Mellor: The hon. Gentleman screws up his face, but I fear that he would do so about any element of the provision. I am sorry about that, because it would be good if everyone could agree, but a powerful group has now been marshalled behind the child assessment order. As I said on Second Reading, it has always been difficult for the House to consider this subject, particularly in the light of several celebrated cases in which people who abused a child repeatedly failed to produce the child and the social workers failed to intervene until it was too late.
We should make it as easy as possible for the right decision to be made. The social worker might conclude that, notwithstanding the failure to produce the child, there is no evidence that an emergency protection order is needed. I believe that the existence on the statute book of the child assessment order will make it much easier, in circumstances of genuine concern and of a failure to produce the child for assessment—when there is a real reason for that application being made—to ensure that the child is protected. One must always remember that in such circumstances the child should always be given the benefit of the doubt. This has not been one of the easiest decisions to make in the Bill—it has been genuinely difficult. It is right that we have hesitated until the last moment and considered all the voices. I commend the child assessment order to the House.

Mr. Hinchliffe: The Minister said that the assessment process could be carried out in one or two afternoons. What sort of assessment does he have in mind?

Mr. Mellor: I am not saying that that is typical of the way in which the process will be undertaken. If the fear is that the child has been subject to serious physical abuse, a single medical examination should be able to establish that fact. By the same token, if there is sexual abuse, one or two medical examinations would satisfy that point. I appreciate that, when one is dealing with more difficult emotional traumas, it is more difficult to make an assessment. Those are the circumstances that were envisaged when it was said that assessment could take longer. It is absolutely clear that one could not ask for a three-month order. I do not seek to do that. A seven-day order is an appropriate way of recognising that there is a need for the order, but it must be tightly circumscribed. On that basis, I commend new clause 13 to the House.

Mr. Bell: I am grateful for the Minister's comments and for his clarification of new clause 13. We have moved from the concept in the 1970s, which was elaborated in the pages of The Times at that time. It stated:
from birth till death it is now the privilege of the parental state to take major decisions—objective, unemotional. The state weighs up what is best for the child.
I am glad to say that we have moved from the concept that the state knows what is better for the future of a child. It is not right for the state to interpose itself in the role of parents. Over many years Parliament and Ministers of every ilk have seen parental power ebbing away. That has led us to this Bill and to the assessment order.
The Minister was right to say that in Committee we regarded the assessment order as a new power or weapon in the armoury of social services. We discovered that the more we looked at the emergency protection order the more we had also to look at the cases of Jasmine Beckford and Kimberley Carlile and find some way of covering a situation that was potentially dangerous to a child but yet

did not have the aspect of danger. Over the past few days and weeks I have found myself arguing that this order is proper. It is remarkable that I was criticised for being critical of social workers. I now defend social workers. They should have this weapon in their armoury.
I am grateful to the Minister for pointing out that the court will state the time for which a child should be taken from its parents—it will not be incorporated in the statute. In Committee the Minister gave a categoric assurance that an assessment order will be made by a proper court rather than by a magistrate sitting at home in his pyjamas. Proceedings will be inter partes, and notice will be given to parents, who will be able to have their own lawyers present if necessary. My concern about the seven days' notice was that a seven-day assessment order might immediately be converted into an interim court order.

Mr. Mellor: indicated dissent.

Mr. Bell: I am glad to see the Minister indicate from a sedentary position that that will not be the case. I would certainly welcome any enlightenment on that point. It will eventually be a matter for magistrates, but we would not wish to see any short cut to an interim care order.

Mr. Mellor: I am glad that the hon. Gentleman raised that point. Looking back at some of the points that I made earlier, with advantage I could have said that in a certain case in which there is obviously continued cause for concern but no time to do a proper assessment within the seven days it will be possible to apply for such an order. I would regard that as very exceptional. The existence of the child assessment order will make it less likely that an authority would apply ab initio for an interim care order that is, of course, of longer duration—eight weeks, I think I am right in saying.

Mr. Bell: I am grateful for that clarification.
New clause 13(8) states:
Regardless of subsection (7), if the child is of sufficient understanding to make an informed decision he may refuse to submit to a medical or psychiatric examination or other assessment.
I am not about to refer to Cleveland—I am certainly resisting every temptation to do so.
In one case a 14-year-old boy was taken in for an examination. He did not want to be examined and said that there was no reason why he should be. He did not want doctors poking around. He was embarrassed and humiliated by the whole experience. The child assessment order and the provisions tabled by the hon. Member for Billericay (Mrs. Gorman) will assist people in that situation. People who have nothing to hide who do not wish to go through such an examination will not be obliged to go through with it. It is of great interest and significance to our parliamentary procedures that Back Benchers such as the hon. Member for Billericay—and, indeed, the Minister of State—can take on board the points made in Committee and then come to the House to change legislation. I am grateful for that. From my personal experience, I know that that provision is a useful addendum to the new clause.
I was especially interested when I read the report of the Association of Directors of Social Services. I am aware that in the beginning the association was hostile to an assessment order in addition to the emergency protection


order. However, the association has considered the position carefully and has come forward with a document referring to
a multi-disciplinary assessment in non-emergency situations".
We hear much of the difficulties and burdens on social workers and the Bill, and especially the new clause, seek to get away from the idea of single responsibility. I do not want any social worker to have the enormous responsibility of deciding whether a child should be taken from his or her home. I do not want social workers, on scanty evidence or information, to have the entire responsibility for a Kimberley Carlile or Jasmine Beckford case. If the assessment order leads to
a multi-disciplinary assessment in non-emergency situations",
I support and favour it.
The hon. Member for Chislehurst (Mr. Sims) may well seek to speak in this debate—I see that he has his notes ready.
I was also impressed by an article written by Jim Harding, the NSPCC child care director who was a member of the Kimberley Carlile inquiry. He has stated that the benefits of having a child assessment order are fourfold. He listed those benefits with great care, stating:
Firstly, parental responsibility is retained by the parents".
The move to retaining parental responsibility throughout the period of assessment is to be welcomed. It is a moving away from the concept of a "parental state". He then stated:
Secondly, the child can be seen by the family doctor in a familiar environment.
My hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Doran) has already referred to an experience that he had when he was eight years old and to other experiences encountered later as a solicitor when taking children into court. He explained how the hostile environment can affect those children, and how it affected him as a child and left him traumatised for many years. As a result of the assessment order, as Mr. Harding of the NSPCC has said:
the child can be seen by the family doctor in a familiar environment.
We must all be looking not to traumatise and alienate those children who may be subject to an assessment.
The assessment is not necessarily limited to child sexual abuse. It can involve all kinds of abuse and neglect. Mr. Harding also stated:
Thirdly, parents are much more likely to co-operate willingly with this type of order and the social work relationship with the family will not be damaged.
I support that coherent and cogent point.
Finally, Mr. Harding stated:
Lastly…the child can be protected in serious, but not emergency, situations.
The assessment order therefore has the support of the NSPCC and the Association of Directors of Social Services. Similar points have been put to me by other single issue pressure groups. The original 14-day period has also been subject to some criticism because of fear that it may be linked to a 14-day taking away of the child. I welcome the fact that that will not be the case. Other points have been made about the wideness of the power, saying that it might be wider than the powers of the emergency protection order. I am satisfied that, on balance, in the circumstances, we need this order.
The order adds to the armoury of the social services, but is a welcome adjustment. It seeks to protect children who may be at risk and of whom we have no knowledge.

It may abolish the idea that, with hindsight, we could have known better. This provision will prevent such situations from arising. In a sense, we are acting with hindsight in protecting children, whoever they may be and in whatever situation. We are giving them some extra protection which I am sure they will feel is most welcome.

Mr. Sims: The new clause has the full support of the NSPCC, and I welcome it for myself and on its behalf. I take this opportunity to express my thanks for the personal contribution of my hon. and learned Friend the Minister and his officials in resolving the problems that were presented by differing professional views on how this dilemma should be solved.
Social workers have faced a dilemma. Often they have feared that all is not well in a home. They were denied access to a child, but had insufficient information to apply for an order to allow them to go to the house and, probably, take that child away. It is understandable that magistrates may have been reluctant to give such powers unless ample evidence was produced.
The new clause provides additional powers for social workers for which I have pleaded for some time in the House and outside. I am pleased by the new clause, which is a reasonable compromise between the differing professional views on how the matter should be handled. Naturally I have particular interest in the NSPCC. It is admirable that that society and the Association of Directors of Social Services, which orginally held differing views, were able to work together and to produce the particular formula.
As the Minister has said, it will obviously be easier for social workers faced with the dilemma I have outlined to apply for a child assessment order rather than an emergency protection order. Another aspect that has not been considered is that cases are often brought to the attention of the NSPCC or local authority social workers by friends, neighbours or relatives who are concerned about what is happening in a particular household. There may not be anything definite that they can put their fingers on, but a variety of incidents or simply not seeing a child around the place may cause concern. Up to now, however, anyone in that position knew that if they reported the matter to the appropriate authorities that might result in the child being taken from the home. It is understandable that people were therefore reluctant to give that information. Now that they know that the result of reporting their concern to the NSPCC or the social worker will be that arrangements will be made for the child to be assessed, at relative leisure, it is far more likely that such cases will come to light. Surely that must be good.
We cannot be sure that as a result of the new clause there will be no more cases such as Maria Colwell, Doreen Mason or the sad procession of such cases in between. The new power for social workers, however, must at least make such cases less likely. For that, we should all be grateful.

Mr. Vaz: The Minister is absolutely right when he says that we are dealing with the heart of the Bill. He is absolutely right when he says that the emergency orders and the non-emergency orders that social workers will need to take out to deal with concerns expressed about children lie at the heart of the Bill. I am afraid, however,


that the Minister's introduction of the child assessment order has resulted in a hole appearing in the heart of the Bill.
I remind the Minister of his words on Second Reading when he told the House of the need to be clear about the law and said:
Of course, of itself, legislation cannot stop such tragedies, but we hope that a clear legal framework will help to make more likely clear-eyed judgments by key people involved in child welfare, whether they are in social services departments, health authorities, the police, education or the courts."—[Official Report, 27 April 1989; Vol. 151 c. 1108.]
There was a direct plea by the Minister for support for his Bill, which at that stage did not include a child assessment order, and that Parliament should be absolutely certain that because of the background of the legislation—the Kimberley Carlile and Doreen Mason cases, the events of Cleveland and the concerns of the Social Services committees and other organisations—this Bill, which we all hail as an historic Bill and which will codify the law of child care, should be clear. We did not want anybody to be under any misapprehension about any of the clauses. We wanted social workers, who deal with major problems and decisions at grass roots, to be clear about what Parliament intended.
We discussed at length in Committee the emergency protection order which is to be the subject of a further debate tonight. It is right that the House should know the background to the child assessment order. It was during the debate on the emergency protection order that the Committee was adjourned and the Minister, in the spirit in which he has approached this consensus Bill, agreed to allow both Opposition and Conservative Members to meet officials of his Department to discuss the circumstances surrounding the possibility of the introduction of a child assessment notice.
The Minister told the Committee that agreement had been reached between the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children and the Association of Directors of Social Services which enabled him to come before the Committee and say clearly that at last there was a framework for a non-emergency order. So it was that we adjourned the Committee to discuss the matter with his officials.
One of the first things that the officials said to Opposition Members was that they knew that the Department of Health's own guidelines suggested that where a child was to be assessed the proper period for assessment should be three months. At that stage it was proposed that there should be a 28-day non-emergency child assessment order. At that stage, hon. Members from both sides of the House revealed that they were unhappy with this. They wondered how it was possible to have a non-emergency order which was longer than the emergency protection order. Whatever the Minister says, and although he is absolutely right when he says that the legal responsibility and parental rights rest with the parents under a child assessment order, it can still be up to the court to remove the child from the home for that period.
During the summer recess the Minister wrote to hon. Members to tell them that the period had been reduced to 14 days. Last week two meetings were held with the Minister and his officials to discuss the matter. I do not

raise these points to criticise the Minister. I am delighted that he allowed us to meet his officials. Although he said that two organisations—the ADSS and the NSPCC—are in favour of the proposals, many organisations are against them. They are the organisations that have to deal with the legislation at grass roots level: British Agencies for Adoption and Fostering, British Association of Social Workers, Children's Legal Centre, National Children's Bureau, Association of Metropolitan Authorities and the Family Rights Group. These respected organisations say clearly that this is the wrong course for the Minister and Parliament to take.
We met the Minister to discuss this issue in the cathedral room of the Department of Health. He was open in the discussions, and I raised with him my first concern that this non-emergency order of 14 days was going to be longer than the emergency order of eight days. I asked him what further periods of reduction he would consider and the time limit of seven days was mentioned. It was mentioned because it was one day shorter than the emergency protection order. The Minister may have felt that if the period was shortened we would support the principle of the child assessment order.
A day later we met officials in the Versailles room of the Department of Health. We discussed with them our concerns and raised again our worry that the child assessment order proposals would cause greater harm to children because it would place social workers in a confusing position.
I and all Opposition Members accept that the state needs to intervene only in exceptional circumstances and that the background of Cleveland showed that the place of safety order, with its 28-day limit, was wholly inappropriate. It lasted too long and many social workers used the place of safety order in the first instance without considering alternatives.
However, the Minister's suggestion of an order that will allow the court to remove the child from the parental home for seven days for assessment falls down because it is impossible to obtain an assessment of this sort in seven days. I am not arguing for a longer period of three months; I believe that this order will cause massive confusion. Faced with the prospect of taking out an emergency order, social workers will fall back on the new child assessment order because they believe that it will make them the subject of fewer attacks than they have suffered over the Cleveland case and others.
I should like to place on record my faith in social workers and social services departments. Not every social worker is perfect, but we cannot support the sorts of attacks on their characters and professionalism that we have heard recently.
There is no evidence, no research and no inquiry to support the Minister's view that there should be a child assessment order. The order will mean that for seven days the whole family could be involved in an assessment. That in turn could mean that children and parents against whom no evidence has been found could be made to attend an assessment centre and undergo therapy with psychiatrists or psychologists.
If the Minister wants an order that will provide him with this assessment he should look to the interim care order or the interim supervision order as better means of proceeding in cases of this sort. We understand the need that the Minister feels to demonstrate that the Government want to find a halfway house between the


emergency order and no order at all. That is why the Opposition's new clause 5 suggests the child production notice. We believe that it will meet the worries of Conservative Members and of those outside this Chamber who will have to administer the new law.
The child production notice will allow a social services department, and social workers through the department, to serve a notice on parents requiring them to produce a child before a doctor or a health visitor in cases in which child abuse is feared. If the parents decide that they do not want to comply with the notice and if they refuse access to the social services department, it is open to the department to apply for an emergency protection order if it is concerned that the family may move away or that it is being denied information. That option is always open to it.
New clause 5 makes it clear that, in the notice served on parents, they should be told that if they refuse access to a child the department may take out an emergency protection order. That covers the amendment that the Minister proposes to make to clause 38, which will allow the social services department to seek an emergency protection order on the ground of refusal of access. This sort of notice served in clear terms will give parents and others the idea that the social services department is worried.
This notice can also fit into the proposals on child assessment. That should be an essential first step. During the recess the Minister wrote to hon. Members and said that the idea of a notice was attractive and would be included in the rules of court. We offer him the notice as an alternative to a course of action that will lead to confusion.
I have experience of these matters. I am concerned because at the crucial time when the social worker has to make a decision and seeks legal advice from the borough solicitor or other legal advisers, those advisers should he clear about the steps that ought to be taken. The assessment order will not do that.
9.30 pm
We are legislating for a new code of practice for child care law and it is not right for us to proceed in such a way. I accept what the Minister says: that he has made efforts to find a suitable conclusion to all the inquiries that he has undertaken. However, we should not proceed knowing that it is unlikely that the legislation will not be amended for many years. We should not proceed in such a hurry over such a serious matter. People outside who follow the proceedings will wonder at the bingo-style operation of some of the negotiations. What started with 28 days goes down to 14 and down to seven. If Report were next week by that time it could have gone down to three days. All this will involve parents and children being involved before the courts.
I agree on many issues with my hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough (Mr. Bell). He wants to avoid trauma for the child. However, taking out a child assessment order and going before the court, because it is an on-notice application, will cause great trauma. Taking the child away from the home and subjecting him to examinations by psychiatrists and psychologists and using two-way mirrors during discussions with other family members during therapy sessions will also cause great trauma.
The bingo-style approach is not appropriate for child care matters. We must be very careful about what we do

and even at this late stage I urge the Minister not to go down the road that he has chosen. I believe that there will be an increase in child abuse if we approve this child assessment order simply because social workers will prefer not to go for the emergency order but will opt for the on-notice order.

Mr. Bell: Will my hon. Friend give way?

Mr. Vaz: No. I am approaching the end of my speech.
Social workers will rightly condemn the House and the members of the Committee for not acceding to a reasonable request, and the judgment of history will be harsh.

Mrs. Teresa Gorman: I thank the Minister for taking on board the fact that children, even young children, should be allowed to decide whether to undergo psychiatric and physical examinations. The hon. Member for Middlesbrough (Mr. Bell) said that he did not want to raise again the matter of Cleveland, but it was an important aspect of what went on in Cleveland that young children were subjected to physical examinations without any opportunity to protest. Sometimes those examinations were more of an abuse than that for which the children had been taken into care in the first place. The Minister has adopted an important point. I compliment the children's legal centre which has worked closely with those of us who were on the Committee in order to construct these necessary points and have them put into the Bill.
I should like the Minister to assure us that children who are taken in under assessment orders will not be compelled to undergo psychiatric or any other kind of examination. The hon. Member for Leicester, East (Mr. Vaz) has said that children taken in under such orders may well be subject to psychiatric investigations. I want the Minister's assurance that such investigations will not be carried out against the child's will if the child is capable of making the decision. I believe that even quite young children are capable of making such decisions.
The import of the point that my hon. Friend the Minister took on board when he agreed that young children should not be forced, against their will, to undergo these examinations is that earlier legislation was based on the concept of children as chattels or the property of parents, and property about which magistrates could make orders, almost as if the child had no will of his own and no opinion in the matter. That was a crucial criticism of earlier legislation. It is paramount that this new legislation embodies the principle that, although they may he small physically, the rights of children should be no less than those of adults. A prisoner may not be subjected to forcible examination of this kind against his will. People in rape cases, prostitutes and all sorts of people who are taken in may not be subjected to examination against their will. This Bill will apply those rights to children, and that is an enormous advance.

Mr. Hinchliffe: The hon. Member for Chislehurst (Mr. Sims) said that he thought that the issue had been resolved. The Minister has said that the Association of Directors of Social Services and the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children had agreed on the form of words for the assessment order. However, I do not believe that the issue is anywhere near resolved and I am worried by what is on offer in the Bill.
I agree with those who said that in Committee we were reasonable with each other and tried for a consensus. I pay tribute to the Minister for his efforts. It is not in his nature, as it is not in mine, to be quite so reasonable. I also pay tribute to his civil servants, who went out of their way to be helpful to us Back-Bench Members. However, I shall now put the boot in and make some important points that need to be made.
This weekend, I looked at some of the comments made in Committee. I noticed one hon. Member—I shall not say who it was—reading his entire speech from the Committee Hansard. In Committee, I made a point by which I still stand. It is that I am attracted by some form of assessment order, but I have distinct reservations about the 28 days that was originally proposed in Committee. I spelt out a more simple form of assessment, along the lines of a straightforward medical assessment that could take place within a couple of hours or even less, in the company of the parents. What I had in mind was what my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, East (Mr. Vaz) has put forward as his child production notice.
We have been discussing this order for some time. When we first spoke of the matter in Committee, the period was 28 days. It implied a full assessment that would involve, as could happen within 28 days, social, psychological, psychiatric, educational and medical assessment and possibly other aspects that could be included, as is the norm when the child is fully assessed, before he is placed on a care order, when he has been through the courts and been made the subject of an order.
While the order recognised a gap in the law, it went completely overboard, and the Minister accepted that and withdrew the 28-day period. It went beyond what was required, and no one was prepared to support it in Committee. The Minister expressed concern and said that he had a relatively open mind, and I commend him for it. He asked for a steer from the Committee and said:
it is too long a period and … perhaps we are really thinking of an assessment that can be transformed into another form of order if there is a real basis for anxiety."—[Official Report, Standing Committee B: 25 May 1989, c. 317.]
The Minister has moved along the lines that he predicted, but I wish that he had looked at it in more detail and taken on board some of the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, East, and which I will raise because of my anxiety about what will happen if the order goes through as is suggested.
Many of us said in Committee that there should be some form of child production notice, along the lines of a brief, straightforward statutory notice that would not involve going through the rigmarole of the courts system, with huge clumps of procedure, would not have implications that would impinge on the rights of parents and children, and would not mean their being dragged through proceedings. They would be asked to go along to a doctor or health visitor to have that child assessed simply in a way that would be acceptable to many parents if the alternative were to be taken through the courts.
I have a number of objections to the child assessment order. It clearly duplicates what is available in existing law, which already provides for assessments for children on a place of safety order. I accept that currently that is a 28-day order, but I know that for police place-of-safety orders there is a shorter time scale. I am talking about full

assessment, not brief medical assessments—although, more often than not, they might be all that is required. There are assessments with interim care orders, and there are informal assessments, where no order is required, while a child is in voluntary care or, with the parents' consent, when the child is in his own home. Whether educational, medical, psychological or whatever, those assessments take place.
While it may be impracticable within an eight-day emergency protection order to undertake the thorough assessment processes possible on full place-of-safety orders, it would be possible to obtain assessments of certain aspects of a child's case under the provisions already contained in the Bill, and without the necessity for a child assessment order. If just a simple medical assessment is not appropriate, but certain evidence is required, that can be obtained under the emergency protection order within the eight-day period. Under clause 39(4)(b), the emergency protection order empowers a court to require medical or psychiatric examination of a child. Therefore, any such assessment can take place during the time that the child is detained.
The Minister has reduced the time scale for the child assessment order from 28 days to 14 days, and he is now proposing that it be further reduced to seven days. He has been reasonable and has attempted to achieve consensus, but he is expecting the impossible if he wants the child assessment order to encompass a full and comprehensive assessment. He has defeated the object of the originally intended assessment because it is impractical within the time scale allowed by the amendment. It is not possible to expect social, psychological, psychiatric, medical, educational and other assessments to be carried out in any detail within the amendments time scale. Therefore, the objections raised to the 28-day period have led to the order being reduced to a complete misnomer because such a full assessment cannot happen in the proposed time scale.
On the issue of civil liberties, I want to raise the question of the implications of the principle of what is essentially an evidence-seeking order. There are lawyers and others in this Chamber who have a great deal more experience of the law than I have. I wish to know whether such an order has a place in British justice. The child assessment order allows for the removal of the child from home for seven days on much less serious grounds than those for an emergency protection order which allows detention for eight days. I find it worrying that children can be removed from home and detained for an equivalent period for assessment purposes.
I recall our debates about the implications of the 1969 Act and the questions that arose about civil liberties in the way that children were treated on the basis that they were in need of care. Questions were raised because people were given harsher sentences because they were deemed in need of care than they would have been if they had been deemed criminals. I am worried about the implications for civil liberties of an evidence-seeking order, especially when taken in conjunction with an emergency protection order.
I was interested to note that the British Association of Social Workers has indicated its opposition to the measure. I fear that the child assessment order will cause immense confusion among social workers, because it will not facilitate the use of many existing models of assessment; it will not be possible to make a proper assessment of the kind envisaged in the amendment with a seven-day time scale. While we must recognise that the


order will be made on the direction of the court, we must also recognise that it will usually be made because a social worker has recommended it in the report that he has given the court. If the social workers are confused, the courts will inevitably be confused as well.
9.45 pm
The distinction between the child assessment and emergency protection orders is very unclear, particularly as it will he possible to obtain an assessment within the period of the emergency protection order. The new clause does not make it clear in what circumstances either course would be chosen.
My concern about many parts of the Bill is underpinned by doubt about whether the Government have given any thought to the resourcing implications. If the child assessment order takes off—and is understood —what facilities will enable us to meet demands which, I suspect, will far exceed the supply of assessment processes? Assessment is a complicated process and, if done properly, an expensive one. The impracticality of the seven-day time scale leaves the whole matter open to question, as does the issue of available resources for domiciliary, day and residential assessment.
The training of social workers is a matter which we shall probably not have a chance to address in detail, but will they be trained sufficiently to understand when they should use which order? I have been a practising social worker for 20 years and am fairly highly qualified, but I am not sure how I would apply the legislation. Goodness knows how someone who has just come into the job would manage.
The reduction in the time scale has completely undermined the assessment purpose of the order. All that the Government can reasonably do, in my view, is drop the order and bring in something along the lines of the child production notice. Gaining access to a child is crucial—we all accept that, although we have different ways of resolving the issue—but we need a measure that is far less cumbersome and more easily understood, and that will enable social workers to obtain what they want at that stage. They will want a medical assessment showing knowledge on the part of a doctor of a child's physical state—whether it has been assaulted, for instance, and whether it has bruises. Skeletal service may be involved, as may other medical matters; the question of sexual assault may arise.
My hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, East knows my reasons for disliking the term "child production", which has numerous connotations of which he is aware from our personal discussions; nor do I believe that an assessment notice would be appropriate. Assessment now seems to be the order of the day, and one of our difficulties is that people have not fully understood what is meant by assessment.
My understanding of assessment ranges from a full comprehensive assessment to the simple medical assessment that the Minister mentioned when I asked him what could be achieved in one afternoon. That is what is needed, as such an assessment enables a social worker to make an initial diagnosis and decide what to do next. It might be that the child ends up under an emergency protection order, and it might be that a more comprehensive assessment could be undertaken during that eight-day period, during a subsequent interim care order or at the

start of the care order, but I do not think that it should be done on the lines of the assessment order proposed by the Minister.
In doing his best to be reasonable and conciliatory the Minister has made assessment orders effectively inoperable. He has disappeared into his own reasonableness, which is most unfortunate because he has tried, as members of the Committee have tried. I appeal to the Minister to take on board our objections and concerns. They are sincere and there is no party political malice. We want to get the Act right. I have been involved in social work for a long time and I am concerned that what is on offer here will cause immense confusion and will not resolve the problems that we want resolved.

Mr. Tom Clarke: I am delighted to follow the tone of the speech by my hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield (Mr. Hinchliffe) and the many logical points that he made. I was particularly pleased with his comments about the Minister of State. I think it was the late Harry Cowans who said to me when I arrived in this place, "When they put you on a Committee, you will usually find two Ministers. One of them will be Mr. Nice and the other will be Mr. Nasty." On the basis of a few off-the-cuff remarks, I would not dream of saying that the Solicitor-General would qualify as Mr. Nasty, but on the evidence so far the Minister for Health has well and truly established himself as the Mr. Nice of the Committee. That is what my hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield was saying.
The comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, East (Mr. Vaz) were extremely important. He addressed new clause 5, which the Opposition would have found very logical in practice. There are also a number of questions which the Minister would want to answer. Perhaps the distinction between assessment orders and emergency protection orders is not as clear as we would wish, and perhaps they should be clarified, if not in this debate, perhaps later.
As I said, many of the remarks by my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, East were attractive, but does that give us the right to challenge new clause 13? In my view, it does not because, as my hon. Friends acknowledge, this was one of the most difficult issues that the Minister and the Committee had to address. We appreciate the fact that the Minister involved the voluntary organisations and professional bodies before reaching a conclusion. I have to acknowledge that, most unusually, he also involved the Opposition.
I am not saying that we find that the assessment orders as outlined in new clause 13 represent absolute perfection, but if, on one hand, the NSPCC and the ADSS support the Minister and, on the other hand, a number of distinguished organisations, including the Family Rights Group, disagree, we are entitled to make one demand of the Minister to which he will feel he should respond.
In all of our discussions, including the discussions last week, which my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, East mentioned, nobody—including the Ministers' officials and advisers—was arrogant enough to say that he was absolutely certain that we had got it right, especially on the assessment orders. Nobody could predict whether social workers would rush to use the assessment order, or whether only a few would seek application to see how the order worked.
However, we are entitled to ask the Minister for the closest possible monitoring of how the order will work and


how new clause 13 will work in practice. We ask for that monitoring; and we have another request. It is important that the monitoring should take place in the spirit of our exchanges this evening. I feel that Parliament would want an early opportunity to find out what that monitoring would mean and how it would work in practice. Only with that experience of an extremely delicate matter—and we acknowledge its delicacy—would the House be absolutely confident in reaching its final conclusion.

Mr. Mellor: I am grateful to the House for this debate. Even those who have felt unable to agree with new clause 13 have, nevertheless, been at pains to point out their recognition of the strenuous efforts made to try to resolve the matter to the satisfaction of all and I am grateful for that. I am especially grateful for the courtesy of the hon. Member for Monklands, West (Mr. Clarke) and I was most touched by his remarks.
The hon. Member for Leicester, East (Mr. Vaz) knows only too well that we considered carefully his child production notice and I am grateful to him not only for his having given us the benefit of his experience, which I recognise to be considerable, in stating with great clarity why he did not like our proposal, but for going to a great deal of trouble to put forward a proposal that he considered worthy of consideration. I want to assure him that we considered the matter carefully, as he knows from discussions with my officials.
There are several reasons why I felt unable to agree to the child production notice. First, it would involve an action that we have aspired to remove from the law on children, which is the ability of a local authority, or any other body, to take substantial control of the situation by administrative action, rather than by court order. All of us wanted to give the court control over these issues. Obtaining a child production notice, serving it and placing a requirement on parents on the judgment and say-so of the local authority alone would be going back on our action at an earlier stage of the Bill to remove the right of local authorities to take by administrative action any form of parental control over the child.
Secondly, I could not put out of my mind the fact that new clause 5 provides only for production of the child. Taken literally, that could mean merely showing the child briefly and fully clothed to a doctor or nurse, but refusing any further contact, examination or assessment and that would seem to fall short of what is required.
I appreciate that one is between Scylla and Charybdis. The Scylla is that we are being too draconian and the Charybdis is that we are passing into law an order that will be ineffective. I take some comfort from the fact that both the hon. Member for Leicester, East and his hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield (Mr. Hinchliffe), who opposed the new clause 13, were in favour of a production order that, as they envisaged it, would allow for one medical examination. If that could be effective, I cannot help but feel that a seven-day order could be effective. If that seems too draconian, I must point out that seven days would be unlikely to be seven consecutive days in which a child was taken away from parents, so it would be far less draconian than the alternative to which the hon. Gentlemen were driven back in their arguments, which is the eight-week interim care order. That has the effect of taking over parental control of the child. I was grateful to the hon.

Member for Middlesbrough (Mr. Bell) because he proved, as he often proves with his commonsense views on this issue, that it was worth pursuing this idea. I do not believe that the hon. Member for Middlesbrough would have spoken in favour of the order if we had not made the changes that we have. While we may not have been able to take everyone with us on the issue, we have progressed a good way along the road.
My hon. Friend the Member for Billericay (Mrs. Gorman) should be aware that, under subsection (8) of the new clause, any child with full understanding may refuse a medical examination——

It being Ten o'clock, the debate stood adjourned.

Ordered,
That, at this day's sitting, the Children Bill [Lords] may be proceeded with, though opposed, until any hour.—[Mr. Fallon.]

Question again proposed, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Mellor: As I was saying, subsection (8) effectively provides what my hon. Friend the Member for Billericay asked for. In relation to my hon. Friend's additional point about a child of whatever age protesting and not wanting to be subjected to an examination, even if it were deemed that it was not a child with full understanding of the process, I do not believe that any medical practitioner would carry out a medical examination if a child resisted it. I believe that that would be in line with what we know about medical ethics.
While I appreciate that there cannot, alas, be full agreement, I suspect that there was a more substantial measure of agreement in this debate than many might have thought possible when we introduced the proposal. I believe that that agreement has vindicated our approach. I will consider the comments made by the hon. Member for Monklands, West about monitoring. I will discuss with the Association of Directors of Social Services ways in which we can keep tabs on what is happening with a view to having an early look at the effectiveness or otherwise of the proposal. I will write to the hon. Gentleman about that.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

Mr. Vaz: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. When will the House have an opportunity to vote on new clause 5?

Mr. Speaker: I do not think that it would be appropriate to vote on new clause 5 because new clause 13 has been agreed to. In any event, it would not fall for a vote until quite late on when we reach it on the Amendment Paper—probably, in terms of our progress, not until tomorrow.

Mr. Vaz: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. Are your saying that we can vote on new clause 5 after new clause 4?

Mr. Speaker: No. On the contrary. It would not be appropriate in view of the fact that new clause 13 has been agreed to.

New Clause 14

REFUGES FOR CHILDREN AT RISK

`—(1) Where it is proposed to use a voluntary home or registered children's home to provide a refuge for children who appear to be at risk of harm, the Secretary of State may issue a certificate under this section with respect to that home.

(2) Where a local authority or voluntary organisation arrange for a foster parent to provide such a refuge, the Secretary of State may issue a certificate under this section with respect to that foster parent.

(3) In subsection (2) "foster parent" means a person who is, or who from time to time is, a local authority foster parent or a foster parent with whom children are placed by a voluntary organisation.

(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations—

(a) make provision as to the manner in which certificates may be issued;
(b) impose requirements which must be complied with while any certificate is in force; and
(c) provide for the withdrawal of certificates in prescribed circumstances.

(5) Where a certificate is in force with respect to a home, none of the provisions mentioned in subsection (7) shall apply in relation to any person providing a refuge for any child in that home.

(6) Where a certificate is in force with respect to a foster parent, none of those provisions shall apply in relation to the provision by him of a refuge for any child in accordance with arrangements made by the local authority or voluntary organisations.

(7) The provisions are—

(a) section 43;
(b) section 71 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 (harbouring children who have absconded from residential establishments etc.), so far as it applies in relation to anything done in England and Wales;
(c) section 32(3) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (compelling, persuading, inciting or assisting any person to be absent from detention etc), so far as it applies in relation to anything done in England and Wales;
(d) section 2 of the Child Abduction Act 1984.'—[Mr. Mellor.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Speaker: With this it will he convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 114 and 117.

Mr. Mellor: New clause 14 will bring great pleasure to many hon. Members who were concerned about the provision of refuges for run-away youngsters, about which the Children's Society was concerned. Those concerns were raised by several hon. Members in correspondence and in the House. They were raised also in Standing Committee on behalf of the Children's Society by my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridgeshire, South-East (Mr. Paice), whom I am glad to see present today in the Chamber. Those concerns related to whether the existence of a refuge might be construed by the courts as an inducement to young people to stay away from home, thus placing in jeopardy organisations providing that valuable service.
I am glad to say that the revised new clause meets those concerns. It provides that organisations and persons providing refuges may be issued with a certificate by the Secretary of State and that where a certificate is in force those running the refuge, whether in children's homes or as foster parents, cannot be prosecuted for offences involving, for example, harbouring.
Regulations under the new clause will impose rigorous requirements on those running refuges and those acting for the Secretary of State will examine those seeking certificates with great care. Bona fide organisations will have no difficulty in complying with those requirements. I am quite sure that I speak for the whole House in expressing pleasure that we have been able to bring forward this new clause to meet the legitimate concerns of the Children's Society and others.

Mr. Tom Clarke: I welcome the new clause and the Minister's remarks. Hon. Members almost certainly receive more correspondence on this issue than on any other. The Children's Society has already acknowledged the progress that has been made. Perhaps the spirit of the Bill is reflected in what the House is about to agree. We have always argued that the interests of the child should be paramount. A child who, for whatever reason, has left home has the right to have two or three days in which to think out his or her situation in a calm manner without the Children's Society, for example, being threatened with action for harbouring. That represents progress. I am sure that Opposition Members welcome what the Minister has said.

Mr. James Paice: I appreciate the way in which my hon. and learned Friend has resolved the difficulties in this issue. When the Bill left the other place, there was great concern about the ambiguity of the Lord Chancellor's remarks on Third Reading and about whether the Government intended simply to deal with children who had run away from care or those who had run away from home. My hon. and learned Friend will be aware of the several exchanges that have taken place between us and with the Children's Society in endeavouring to make sure that we have a clear form of words.
The problem was that there was debate between lawyers on whether the initially proposed amendments fitted the Bill. I am delighted that my hon. and learned Friend has been able to meet the various requirements put forward by the Children's Society. About 10,000 children are believed to be missing in London each year. Obviously, it is important that the work of the Children's Society, safe houses and refuges should be allowed to continue unhindered. I welcome the clause because it finally makes sure that the Children's Society is acting within the law rather than outside it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 15

PROVISION OF ACCOMMODATION BY VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS

.—(1) Where a voluntary organisation provide accommodation for a child, they shall do so by—

(a) placing him (subject to subsection (2)) with—

(i) a family;
(ii) a relative of his; or
(iii) any other suitable person,

on such terms as to payment by the organisation and otherwise as the organisation may determine;

(b) maintaining him in a voluntary home;
(c) maintaining him in a community home;
(d) maintaining him in a registered children's home;


(e) maintaining him in a home provided by the Secretary of State under section 74(5) on such terms as the Secretary of State may from time to time determine; or
(f) making such other arrangements (subject to subsection (3)) as seem appropriate to them.

(2) The Secretary of State may make regulations as to the placing of children with foster parents by voluntary organisations and the regulations may, in particular, make provision which (with any necessary modifications) is similar to the provision that may be made under section 20(2)(a).

(3) The Secretary of State may make regulations as to the arrangements which may be made under subsection (1)(f) and the regulations may in particular make provision which (with any necessary modifications) is similar to the provision that may be made under under section 20(2)(f).

(4) The Secretary of State may make regulations requiring any voluntary organisation who are providing accommodation for a child—

(a) to review his case; and
(b) to consider any representations (including any complaint) made to them by any person falling within a prescribed class of person,

in accordance with the provisions of the regulations.

(5) Regulations under subsection (4) may in particular make provision which (with any necessary modifications) is similar to the provision that may be made under section 23.

(6) Regulations under subsections (2) to (4) may provide that any person who, without reasonable excuse, contravenes or fails to comply with a regulation shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale.'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 16

APPLICATION TO CHANNEL ISLANDS

'. Her Majesty may by Order in Council direct that any of the provisions of this Act shall extend to any of the Channel Islands with such exceptions and modifications as may be specified in the Order.'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Harold Walker): With this it will be convenient to take Government amendment No. 311.

Mr. Mellor: This new clause is a general provision which empowers Her Majesty, by Order in Council, to extend provisions in the Bill to the Channel Islands.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 17

LEGAL AID

'.—(1) The Legal Aid Act 1988 is amended as mentioned in subsections (2) to (4).

(2) In section 15 (availability of, and payment for, representation under provisions relating to civil legal aid), for the words "and (3)" in subsection (1) there shall be substituted "to (3B)"; and the following subsections shall be inserted after subsection (3)—

"(3A) Representation under this Part shall not be available—

(a) to any local authority; or
(b) to any other body which falls within a prescribed description,

for the purposes of any proceedings under the Children Act 1989.

(3B) Regardless of subsection (2) or (3), representation under this Part must be granted where a child who is brought

before a court under section 22 of the 1989 Act (use of accommodation for restricting liberty) is not, but wishes to be, legally represented before the court.

(3) In section 19(5) (scope of provisions about criminal legal aid), at the end of the definition of "criminal proceedings" there shall be added "and also includes proceedings under section 15 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (variation and discharge of supervision orders) and section 16(8) of that Act (appeals in such proceedings)".

(4) Sections 27, 28 and 30(1) and (2) (provisions about legal aid in care, and other, proceedings in relation to children) shall cease to have effect.

(5) The Lord Chancellor may by order make such further amendments in the Legal Aid Act 1988 as he considers necessary or expedient in consequence of any provision made by or under this Act.'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 18

JURISDICTION OF COURTS

'.—(1) The name "domestic proceedings", given to certain proceedings in magistrates' courts, is hereby changed to "family proceedings" and the names "domestic court" and "domestic court panel" are hereby changed to "family proceedings court" and "family panel", respectively.

(2) Proceedings under this Act shall be treated as family proceedings in relation to magistrates' courts.

(3) Subsection (2) is subject to the provisions of section 65(1) and (2) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 (proceedings which may be treated as not being family proceedings), as amended by this Act.

(4) A magistrates' court shall not be competent to entertain any application, or make any order, involving the administration or application of—

(a) any property belonging to or held in trust for a child; or
(b) the income of any such property.

(5) The powers of a magistrates' court under section 63(2) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 to suspend or rescind orders shall not apply in relation to any order made under this Act.

(6) Part I of Schedule (Jurisdiction) makes provision, including provision for the Lord Chancellor to make orders, with respect to the jurisdiction of courts and justices of the peace in relation to—

(a) proceedings under this Act; and
(b) proceedings under certain other enactments.

(7) For the purposes of this Act "the court" means the High Court, a county court or a magistrates' court.

(8) Subsection (7) is subject to the provision made by or under Part I of Schedule (Jurisdiction) and to any express provision as to the jurisdiction of any court made by any other provision of this Act.

(9) The Lord Chancellor may by order make provision for the principal registry of the Family Division of the High Court to be treated as if it were a county court for such purposes of this Act, or of any provision made under this Act, as may be specified in the order.

(10) Any order under subsection (9) may make such provision as the Lord Chancellor thinks expedient for the purpose of applying (with or without modifications) provisions which apply in relation to the procedure in county courts to the principal registry when it acts as if it were a county court.

(11) Part II of Schedule (Jurisdiction) makes amendments consequential on this section;.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 19

WELFARE OF CHILDREN ACCOMMODATED IN INDEPENDENT SCHOOLS

'.—(1) It shall be the duty of—



(a) the proprietor of any independent school which provides accommodation for any child; and
(b) any person who is not the proprietor of such a school but who is responsible for conducting it,

to safeguard and promote the child's welfare.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in relation to a school which is a children's home or a residential care home.

(3) Where accommodation is provided for a child by an independent school within the area of a local authority, the authority shall take such steps as are reasonably practicable to enable them to determine whether the child's welfare is adequately safeguarded and promoted while he is accommodated by the school.

(4) Where a local authority are of the opinion that there has been a failure to comply with subsection (1) in relation to a child provided with accommodation by school within their area, they shall notify the Secretary of State.

(5) Any person authorised by a local authority may, for the purpose of enabling the authority to discharge their duty under this section, enter at any reasonable time an independent school within their area which provides accommodation for any child.

(6) Any person entering an independent school in exercise of the power conferred by subsection (5) may carry out such inspection of premises, children and records as is prescribed by regulations made by the Secretary of State for the purposes of this section.

(7) Any person exercising that power shall, if asked to do so, produce some duly authenticated document showing his authority to do so.

`—(1) It shall be the duty of—

(a) the proprietor of any independent school which provides accommodation for any child; and
(b) any person who is not the proprietor of such a school but who is responsible for conducting it,

to safeguard and promote the child's welfare and in doing so to have regard to such guidance as may be issued by the Secretary of State.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in relation to a school which is a children's home or a residential care home.

(3) Where accommodation is provided for a child by an independent school within the area of a local authority, the authority shall take such steps as are reasonably practicable to enable them to determine whether the child's welfare is adequately safeguarded and promoted while he is accommodated by the school and authority may recover from the proprietor of the school such fee as may be prescribed by regulations made by the Secretary of State for the purposes of this section.

(4) Where a local authority are of the opinion that there has been a failure to comply with subsection (1) in relation to a child provided with accommodation by school within their area, they shall notify the Secretary of State.

(5) Any person authorised by a local authority may, for the purpose of enabling the authority to discharge their duty under this section, enter at any reasonable time an independent school within their area which provides accommodation for any child.

(6) Any person entering an independent school in exercise of the power conferred by subsection (5) may carry out such inspection of premises, children and records as is prescribed by regulations made by the Secretary of State for the purposes of this section.

(7) Any person exercising that power shall, if asked to do so, produce some duly authenticated document showing his authority to do so.

(8) Any person authorised by the regulations to inspect records—

(a) shall be entitled at any reasonable time to have access to, and inspect and check the operation of, any computer and any associated apparatus or material which is or has been in use in connection with the records in question; and
(b) may require—

(i) the person by whom or on whose behalf the computer is or has been so used; or
(ii) any person having charge of, or otherwise, concerned with the operation of, the computer, apparatus or material, to afford him such assistance as he may reasonably require.

(9) Any person who intentionally obstructs another in the exercise of any power conferred by this section or the regulations shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.

(10) In this section "proprietor" has the same meaning as in the Education Act 1944.'.

Amendment (c), in line 12, at end insert—

(8) Any person authorised by the regulations to inspect records—s

(a) shall be entitled at any reasonable time to have access to, and inspect and check the operation of, any computer and any associated apparatus or material which is or has been in use in connection with the records in question; and
(b) may require—

(i) the person by whom or on whose behalf the computer is or has been so used; or
(ii) any person having charge of, or otherwise concerned with the operation of, the computer, apparatus or material, to afford him such assistance as he may reasonably require.

(9) Any person who intentionally obstructs another in the exercise of any power conferred by this section or the regulations shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.

(10) In this section "proprietor" has the same meaning as in the Education Act 1944.'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take new clause 33—Welfare of children accommodated in independent schools (No. 2)—
'(3A) A local authority may recover from the Secretary of State the cost of carrying out its duties under subsection (3) above.".


Government amendments Nos. 305, 393 and 308.

Mr. Mellor: These amendments arise from discussions in Committee, particularly those instigated by the hon. Member for Wakefield (Mr. Hinchliffe) and following a considerable amount of concern in the media about the welfare of children in independent boarding schools, particularly after the programme "That's Life" investigated some serious allegations of sexual abuse of children who were being accommodated at an independent boarding school. Since then, pursuant to undertakings that I gave in Committee, I have considered the matter carefully with Ministers at the Department of Education and Science. We have tabled the new clause and the consequential amendments in an endeavour to deal with some of the issues raised in that case.
There are three main elements to the new provisions proposed in new clause 19. First, a new duty is placed on the proprietor or any other person conducting an independent school that provides accommodation for any child to safeguard and promote the child's welfare. This provision applies to independent schools that are not categorised as children's homes or residential care homes. We dealt with such categories earlier. The House will remember that those provisions apply where there are fewer than 50 pupils.
Secondly, any local authority, within the area of which the accommodation is provided, must do what is reasonably practical to determine whether the child's welfare is adequately safeguarded and promoted while he is accommodated by the school. Those two elements broadly follow the welfare scheme for children in voluntary homes and children's homes, which is already included in parts VII and VIII.
The third element is that, where the local authority considers that the person or proprietor conducting the school is failing to discharge his welfare duty under subsection (1), the authority must notify the Secretary of State.
Amendment No. 244, to be taken later, will amend the Education Act 1944 so that failure to comply with this duty will be a ground on which notice of complaint action can be taken. This can lead in serious cases to the school being removed from the register of independent schools and having to close.
I am sure that the amendments and the new clause will commend themselves to the House because what concerned people as a result of the "That's Life" programme and the issues raised by it was that social services departments could intervene only when allegations of child abuse had been made. We know that most independent schools are conducted in ways that totally obviate any concerns for the welfare of the children, but although one acknowledges that straightaway, there are isolated examples that we cannot ignore. If, as I hope, the House passes the new clause, we will be providing a corresponding provision to the duties that already exist requiring Her Majesty's inspectorate of schools to be satisfied about a school's educational and other standards. In effect, we are allowing a social services department to satisfy itself about the social as opposed to the educational welfare of the children. Obviously, the circumstances of individual schools will determine the amount of time that a social services department feels that it must spend.
I hope that the new clause represents a move forward with which the whole House can be happy. I hope that the hon. Member for Wakefield feels that he has had fair value——

Mrs. Peacock: Will my hon. and learned Friend clarify one point? Did he say that new clause 19 relates to schools with fewer than 50 pupils?

Mr. Mellor: No, but I am glad to be able to clear that up. It applies to all independent schools. Such institutions with fewer than 50 pupils are, in effect, already deemed—by the provisions that we passed earlier—to be a children's home. As originally drafted, the Bill dealt with schools only in one particular category. The provision now applies to all independent schools. Obviously, while no one is suggesting that such problems arise in all independent schools—they do not—it is difficult to arrive at a definition that allows us to include those schools where problems might arise. The provision is a way of ensuring that there can be satisfaction about certain non-educational standards in the schools—what one might call "the standards of the regime". The provisions will not be burdensome or onerous on the many well-conducted independent schools throughout the country.

Mr. Rowe: Is my hon. and learned Friend aware of the radical nature of his proposal? There must be generations of parliamentarians of all parties, but especially from this party, who find the concept that they were at an institution with a duty to promote their welfare subversive to the point of astonishment.

Mr. Mellor: As a humble grammar school boy I know nothing of those things. I simply do my best with the circumstances in which I find myself. New clause 19 is the best I can do and I commend it to the House.

Ms. Armstrong: I welcome the clause. It mirrors in all respects the new clause in the name of my hon. Friends and myself. I do so, however, with a few peculiar feelings.
The House will be aware that much of the rest of my time is spent with the education team and that much of my time in Committee was spent on the Education Reform Bill. Then we argued strongly that the independent schools system should be seen as part of the nation's provision and regulated in that way in terms of educational provision and other matters.
10.15 pm
I was interested by the Minister's remarks because, on other parts of the Bill, I have argued strongly that one cannot deal with the education of children without taking note of their care whether in a residential home or in their family home. Those two requirements cannot be divorced. If a child is abused or neglected, that has a major effect on its educational opportunities and on its ability to gain the confidence from which learning springs.
The clause is welcome as it represents a recognition by the Government that the market mechanism cannot be trusted as the sole weapon to look after the welfare of children. During the proceedings on the Education Reform Bill, that market argument was used by the Government to exclude the independent sector from various aspects of the Bill.

Mr. Key: indicated dissent.

Ms. Armstrong: I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman does not remember that part of our proceedings. I remember, however, that that was the reason that the Minister of State gave for excluding independent schools.

Mr. Key: I had not intended to intervene, but the hon. Lady has taunted me. I do not recall that argument being used. The argument was that an independent school is an independent school and, therefore, one does not wish the Secretary of State to become involved with it other than within the framework of the law by which everyone else must abide. The Secretary of State is not directly responsible for education in the independent sector. That was the argument used in Committee.

Ms. Armstrong: I refer to Hansard, and I invite the hon. Gentleman to reread the reports of those debates, as I did this weekend.
The Government said that parents would move their children from a school if they were dissatisfied with that school. Therefore, they implied that the free market would make the decisions. Now, however, it is recognised that young people—in this instance, young boys—may find themselves unable to tell their parents what is going on for all sorts of reasons. Through the good offices of Esther Rantzen and "That's Life", those boys made clear in graphic and horrifying terms the practices that were going on in the school that they had been unable to stop.
The clause recognises that the state should have not only the power to intervene, but the duty to do so. What surprises and concerns me is that we have heard no word about this from any of the organisations that are connected with the independent schools. I am a little disappointed about that. I should have thought that after the revelations on "That's Life" those organisations would have pressed the House to take such powers so that those organisations could reassure people who were thinking of placing their child in such a school that the state had the power to intervene. Perhaps that is an indication that voluntary codes of control simply have not worked and have been insufficient to promote the welfare of children.
We welcome the Government's recognition of the role of local authorities in providing regulation and recognise that local authorities are the best organisations to do this. However, the new clause contradicts other aspects of the Bill. Amendment No. 27 seeks to remove the provision which allows local authorities to charge for the registration of child minders. I know that we shall come to this issue later in the debate, but I wish to raise the principle here.
I assume that the Government must have decided to accept our amendment because in bringing forward the new clause, which also introduces new powers of regulation and inspection for local authorities, they have not attached a fee similar to the one which they propose to charge to voluntary playgroups, child minders and so on. I hope that this is a recognition on the Government's part that regulation and inspection of this nature is a public responsibility and is important to all of us and that, therefore, there should not be an individual charge.
I would find it inconceivable for the Government to want to charge voluntary organisations such as playgroups for registration, but not to recognise the need for public schools—about which Government Members know more than me and which charge exorbitant or high fees—to be subject to a charge for their inspection by the local authorities. I am sure that the Minister will want to clear up this anomaly.
We tabled an amendment seeking to ensure that the Secretary of State would accept responsibility for this aspect of additional duty which will be costly to local authorities. We are adding duties to those which the local authorities already have and we have heard that some of them have insufficient resources to meet their new duties. It is important that we ensure that we do not place such a considerable additional duty on some authorities that they are forced to choose between different duties when deciding how to spend their social services budget. I am sure that the Minister knows what I am asking. I hope that he will say that it is a public responsibility to ensure good regulations and a good quality of care, but that he will ensure that local authorities have sufficient money for this purpose.
I was also interested to note that the Secretary of State for Education and Science has laid an order before the House which deals with the application of corpora] punishment in independent schools. The order makes it clear that in those schools where the social services are paying the fees of a student children should not have corporal punishment administered to them. In many ways that fits in with the clause. When a beating has taken place it is difficult to determine whether it has been for educational or care purposes. Today we are saying that for care purposes we shall regulate to ensure that that is not possible. I hope that the independent schools will take notice of that and ensure that children who are the subject of care orders or who are placed in independnt schools by local authorities are treated no differently from other children, and that all corporal punishment will be ended in these schools. I hope, furthermore, that the contradictions opened up by the statutory instrument and the new clause will be recognised and resolved.
I urge the Secretary of State to let us know what additional resources will go to local authorities which carry this out. We see this as a first step towards bringing the independent sector into the mainstream. Of course, the next Labour Government will be interested in the welfare of children in public schools—so much so that we are also interested in their education. We believe that they are part of the nation, and we will ensure that they are brought within the national curriculum.
We shall also ensure that local education authorities are given a power similar to that contained in the new clause so that social services departments can inspect public schools, and we will make sure that the inspection of education at, and the publication of information on, public schools match those being demanded of state schools.

Sir Michael McNair-Wilson: I can tell the hon. Member for Durham, North-West (Ms. Armstrong) that neither market forces nor state intervention is any safeguard against human wickedness, so the argument has no mileage in it. However, like her, I welcome the spirit and intent of new clause 19 because of the disturbing allegations which have been referred to and which, to some extent, apply to a school in my constituency. Other schools also give rise to concern.
This new clause partially makes up for the surprising omission from the Foster Children Act 1980 of any duty on a local authority to safeguard the welfare of young people at independent schools. Now the duty is to be placed on the proprietor of, or the head teacher at, a boarding independent school
to safeguard and promote the child's welfare.
Perhaps that is the right way round, but I cannot help feeling that the words
to safeguard and promote the child's welfare
will be found to be open to many interpretations, and I hope that the regulations referred to in the new clause will lay down clear standards that can be followed by independent schools and include a requirement for regular visits from the social services department.
What if a proprietor or head teacher for reasons of his own, however, says that a visit on a particular day is inconvenient, or refuses to allow entry to the premises without prior notice? Does that constitute obstruction under the new clause? I should be grateful for guidance on that from my hon. and learned Friend.
Let us assume for a moment that a social worker from the social services department of a local authority has decided to visit a particular school and that his visit has been agreed by the head teacher or proprietor. May we be assured that the regulations will empower him to interview all the staff and pupils individually or in unaccompanied groups? Will he be able to inspect bedrooms, washing facilities and kitchens and investigate pastoral care, medical care, the contact children are allowed with their parents and the areas available for free time?
Then there are the welfare problems to which we all think this new clause refers. They must include sexual abuse, possibly committed by members of the staff on the children for whom they are responsible. It is extremely unlikely that a pupil who has been abused and who is interviewed in the presence of, or in close proximity to, his abuser will say what happened.
Therefore, it seems that total privacy is a first essential if the social worker is to discover anything of value during the short visit that he or she may make to a school. I am not sure at what stage a social worker can ask for a medical examination and whether the social worker will be empowered to remove a pupil from a school, perhaps to a doctor's surgery, if he feels that that is the correct course of action.
Even in the most favourable atmosphere pupils may be reluctant to say what has happened to them because of the sense of guilt from which such children are known to suffer and because of the stigma that such matters carry. Plainly, social workers will have to be very carefully trained in order to pick up the warning signals.
10.30 pm
I wonder whether some teachers in independent schools might be able to join the courses organised by the Community Education Development centre in Coventry. I know that that centre has been running courses for many years to acquaint teachers in state schools with the same warning signs. The clause states that where a local authority is of the opinion that there has been a failure by an independent school to carry out its duty to safeguard and promote the child's welfare it shall notify the Secretary of State. What then happens and what sort of time frame is considered? Will action by the Secretary of State be immediate? Will it be within a given time, perhaps 48 hours, and what will it consist of?
If there are strong grounds for believing that there has been sexual abuse, plainly an investigation will have to be set in train. If the head teacher or principal was involved, who would have power to suspend them while the inquiry was going on? One might reasonably say that the governors would have that power, but there is no requirement for independent schools to have governors. Even if there were, there is no certainty that the governors, having been appointed by the principal, did not share his predilections.
Some independent schools accept the children of service families, and some of the schools about which allegations have been made are in precisely that position. If they receive an income from the Ministry of Defence in education grants or, for that matter, from Foreign Office grants because a family is overseas, a strong case could surely be made for the Ministry of Defence or the Foreign Office having a member on the governing body or in a supervisory role. Perhaps as in the state sector it would be suggested that one or two parent governors would be another safeguard.
New clause 19 seems to be a badly needed measure to enable social service departments to look after the welfare of children who up to now have been outside the responsibility of those departments.
I have no doubt that 99 per cent. of independent boarding schools already provide excellent pastoral care. However, the allegations that have been made are so serious that we cannot let them go by. The Bill gives us the opportunity to take action. I am aware that there is understandable reluctance by the Department of Education and Science to become involved in the running of independent schools. Perhaps to some extent I share the view of the hon. Member for Durham, North-West that there should be some loose structure provided by the Department for independent schools.
Her Majesty's inspectorate carries out inspections of independent schools in connection with the quality of teaching, the general facilities and the state of the buildings. Therefore, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that a social services inspectorate might go in with HMI inspectors when they make a visit. While the HMI inspectors are looking at standards of education, the social services inspectorate could consider welfare matters and, like the HMI, publish its findings. It would in no sense be an alternative to what is in the clause but it would reinforce the inquiries carried out by social services departments. That would be to bring in a third line of inquiry, much as local education authority inspectors are reinforced by the HMI in terms of education.
When the legislation receives Royal Assent, as I have no doubt that it will, how soon will it be implemented? It has


been pointed out to me that the Children's Homes Act 1982 still waits to be implemented. I should be sad if that were the fate of this Bill.

Mr. Rhodri Morgan: I do not want to belittle the deep seriousness with which the hon. Member for Newbury (Sir M. McNair-Wilson) has spoken, but he has underestimated the nature of the problem. He is still looking back to the romantic time of his old school days, with an ivy-covered quadrangle and an accommodation block run by a nice, friendly matron. The world of private education is not always like that. There is a demi monde of new-type private education that may provide accommodation, but in lodging houses in the town. The Bill does not oblige such schools to inform the local authority of how they are providing accommodation.
What is "providing accommodation"? Does it mean directly, by way of premises in the ownership of the school, or does it mean suggesting lodgings with one of a group of landladies? That is quite common. Does it cover the over-16s? Does it cover pupils who are aged between 16 and 18 and going to the new private sixth-form colleges that are proliferating? These frequently have foreign students who may live 10,000 miles away from home and their family. They have come with a desperate desire to get English A-levels and will frequently live in one of the suggested lodging houses. The local authority will not necessarily know about the lodging houses which come under the umbrella of the school and which could easily be interpreted as having been provided by the school under this clause.
I am not sure that local authorities will know where the accommodation is, so the idea of social services inspectors going in with the HMI to inspect the dorm while they inspect the school is not tenable. The accommodation may be provided in another local authority area. The clause does not go far enough to establish control over the new private schools run as businesses or as a straight commercial activity.

Mr. Key: I should like to help the hon. Member. He may be interested to know that at Harrow school, where I taught for some years, it was only in the 1930s that the school governors purchased boarding houses, which had previously been owned by the landladies and sometimes by the schoolmasters. Today, Harrow owns all the accommodation for its boys. There is a common pattern in the independent sector of the use of masters' accommodation and of landladies, which is part of the ancient school tradition. It is by no means a modern phenomenon and it does not pose a difficulty.

Mr. Morgan: The hon. Member has pinpointed the source of the difficulty. If there is no obligation on the school to issue a list of the accommodation that it is providing, or even to say whether it is providing accommodation, and is therefore covered by the clause, there is a problem, particularly for many foreign students who cannot consult their parents on such matters because they may not see them from the beginning to the end of the year, and are dependent on Britain's good reputation for looking after its schools. Their parents, 12,000 miles away, will think that they are safe because they have been sent to Britain and are in good hands. I wonder whether they are.

Mr. Hardy: Earlier this evening, hon. Members were gathered to say farewell to the esteemed Editor of the

Official Report, Mr. Morgan. I teased Mr. Morgan a little by referring to what happened when I said that a Tory Member resembled Dr. Squeers. I shall not identify that hon. Member because I am sure that he is readily recognisable to his colleagues. When Hansard came out, the word had been changed to "square". Dickens probably does not have quite the influence that he had on education.

Mr. Morgan: He is probably not on the national curriculum.

Mr. Hardy: He is unlikely to receive a high place on the curriculum. Dickens exposed the reality of the horror on schools in some parts of England and, I am ashamed to say, in some parts of Yorkshire, because Dotheboys Hall was a real school, with a different name, situated in my county. That was all before social services departments were set up. That was before the NSPCC, with which I am proud to be associated, was established. But, as the hon. Member for Newbury (Sir M. McNair-Wilson) said, evil is still with us, despite the new structures that have been put in place. For that reason, my hon. Friend the Member far Durham, North-West (Ms. Armstrong) was right to refer to the need for priority and resources.
Subsection (3) of the proposed new clause commences:
Where accommodation is provided for a child by an independent school within the area of a local authority, the authority shall take … steps
to care for the child. Some parts of the country may not contain any independent schools. I may not in my area have an independent school capable of providing residential accommodation—and I do not think there are any such schools in Rotherham—but there may be some in Doncaster.
What will be the position if a child from the Rotherham area who is known to Rotherham borough council attends an independent school near his home but not within that borough council area? Will the authority in which the school is situated assume responsibility for the child, even though that authority's social workers may not know anything about the case? The wording of that provision might cause problems. Surely, the authority that knows the case history of the child, perhaps co-operating with the authority in which the school is situated, should be responsible for maintaining supervision of the child.
Subsection (5) of the proposed new clause is also worrying. The hon. Member for Newbury thought the school would agree to a visit by an inspector. I am not so sure, and that is why I question the use of the word "reasonable" in that subsection. I suggest that
any person authorised by a local authority
to care for a child should be free to visit an independent school at any time. "Reasonable" seems to qualify that freedom, remembering that some people may wish to stretch the use of the word "reasonable" in an unreasonable way. As the hon. Member for Newbury said, there are latter-day Squeerses.
We read in today's newspapers reports about two areas of difficulty, one of them of an enormously serious character. Because, 150 years or more later, the problems of Dotheboys Hall are still with us, we must not qualify the freedom of those who are charged with supervision in this area and who come into contact with people who are responsible for children, remembering that many of those children may have had horrifying experiences in the years prior to their attending such schools.

Mr. Mellor: I am grateful to hon. Members for their comments and I shall, in view of the hour, reply to them briefly. I thank the hon. Member for Durham, North-West (Ms. Armstrong) for welcoming our proposals, which were drafted following a debate in Committee initiated by her hon. Friends. While we do not in new clause 19 agree in every particular with new clause 33, I hope that she will feel that it is sufficiently similar for her not to press new clause 33 and broadly to accept new clause 19. I am aware that the new clause will impose further duties on local authorities; those matters will fall to be considered when we deal with the allocation of resources.
As for fees, I must reserve what I have to say about the Pre-School Playgroups Association until we reach that point in the Bill. I will say, however, that although we seriously considered imposing fees, we did not do so because fees are apparently not charged for the registration of schools, and it would therefore have been difficult for us to impose them while being consistent. I assure the hon. Lady that the fact that we were dealing with independent schools was not the reason.
10.45 pm
I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury (Sir M. McNair-Wilson) for his contribution. I realise that the descent of disagreeable publicity on his neighbourhood must have been painful for him, and for his constituents. New clause 19 does indeed give a power of entry exercisable at reasonable times.
Let me point out to the hon. Member for Wentworth (Mr. Hardy) that, in the event of genuine fear that something dreadful was going on, an emergency protection order could be sought ex parte and the social services could intervene at any point. The "reasonable hour" provision is there because a representative of the social services will visit most independent schools, and it would clearly be unreasonable for him at half-past one in the morning to knock on the door of an establishment that no one had any reason to believe was other than perfectly respectable. Anything that amounted to an attempt to deny a power of entry would constitute obstruction—itself a criminal offence.
My hon. Friend rightly wanted to know what would happen next. If, following an investigation, an allegation of sexual abuse was made, the child protection machinery would roll into action and an emergency protection order could be sought. If it simply revealed deficiencies that fell short of serious risk to a particular child, but were nevertheless material, a report would be made to the Department of Education and Science, which would be expected to act in a way with which we are all familiar: inspectors would go to the school and examine the circumstances. I dare say that the speed of response would vary according to the seriousness of the allegations, but I would expect an appropriate response, and no doubt the Department would be criticised if it failed to provide one.
My hon. Friend put his finger on a point that was spotted earlier by the hon. Member for Coventry, South-East (Mr. Nellist). Both hon. Members—who do not often find themselves in alliance—rightly pointed out that we have incorporated in the Bill parts of a 1982 Act that has not yet been implemented. I assure them that we intend to implement all of the Bill by the autumn of 1991 at the latest. This thorough wash and brush-up of children's law is intended to retain those aspects of existing legislation that are necessary. They are not there simply to

be on the statute book; they are there to be activated, and we shall activate them with what I hope will be a sensible programme.
Let me say to the hon. Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. Morgan) that I believe that where a school provides board and lodging as part of the school—even if those establishments are outside the curtilage of the school—they will be caught by the legislation. It is true that we have not extended the Bill to children attending schools teaching English as a foreign langage, most of which provide short, non-residential courses. Some children boarding out for 28 days or more, however, would come within the scope of the private fostering provisions in part IX, which contains various powers and safeguards. Similarly, if care and accommodation are provided in a home, part VIII could be relevant. I do not believe that the Bill is toothless, although we shall re-examine it in the light of what the hon. Gentleman has said so as not to be caught out on any of the technicalities.

Mr. Morgan: Will the Bill apply to children until they finally leave school, and therefore after the minimum school leaving age of 16?

Mr. Mellor: I think that it will apply up to the age of 18. My advisers are nodding that I am correct. I am glad that I did not require too many Sir Humphreys to get that right.
Finally, the hon. Member for Wentworth raised a point about the authority in which the school is located. We are seeking to give local authorities the right to look at schools in the same way as they have the right to look at any place where a child was living within their area. If a child was already known to a local authority and in contact with the social services department, one would expect liaison, and there would be a role for the home local authority. Otherwise, where a child had simply gone from one area to another to go to school, he probably would not be known to either local authority social services department.
Social services departments that, rightly or wrongly, feel that they do not have the right to know what is happening in schools should have the right to satisfy themselves about conditions so that they are not merely responding to allegations of abuse, when, if they had been in some contact with the school before, the danger signals should have been spotted. The right should be triggered by the existence of the institution itself and not by the presence of any particular child.
I have enjoyed this short debate. I hope that it means that the House can collectively set its hand to new clause 19.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 21

ENFORCEMENT OF RESIDENCE ORDERS

' .—(1) Where—

(a) a residence order is in force with respect to a child in favour of any person; and
(b) any other person (including one in whose favour the order is also in force) is in breach of the arrangements settled by that order,

the person mentioned in paragraph (a) may, as soon as the requirement in subsection (2) is complied with, enforce the order under section 63(3) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 as if it were an order requiring the other person to produce the child to him.

(2) The requirement is that a copy of the residence order has been served on the other person.

(3) Subsection (1) is without prejudice to any other remedy open to the person in whose favour the residence order is in force.'.—[The Solicitor-General.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause gives a person with benefit of a residence order a means of enforcing that order in a magistrates court under section 63 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980. That means that a magistrates court may order a person acting in breach of the order to pay a sum not exceeding £50 for evey day during which he is in default or a maximum sum of £2,000 in total, or it may commit him to custody until he has remedied his default or for a period not exceeding two months. The person in breach must first be served with a copy of the order so there is no chance of him attracting penalties in ignorance.
I have referred to magistrates courts, but breaches of orders in higher courts could be dealt with as contempts. I commend the new clause to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 22

RIGHT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM TO HAVE ACCESS TO LOCAL AUTHORITY RECORDS

' .—(1) Where a person has been appointed as a guardian ad litem under this Act he shall have the right at all reasonable times to examine and take copies of—

(a) any records of, or held by, a local authority which were compiled in connection with the making, or proposed making, by any person of any application under this Act with respect to the child concerned; or
(b) any other records of, or held by, a local authority which were compiled in connection with any functions which stand referred to their social services committee under the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970, so far as those records relate to that child.

(2) Where a guardian ad litem takes a copy of any record which he is entitled to examine under this section, that copy or any part of it shall be admissable as evidence of any matter referred to in any—

(a) report which he makes to the court in the proceedings in question; or
(b) evidence which he gives in those proceedings.

(3) Subsection (2) has effect regardless of any enactment or rule of law which would otherwise prevent the record in question being admissible in evidence.'.—[The Solicitor-General.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
This new clause will allow a guardian ad litem appointed under this Bill access to local authority records relating to the child with whom the guardian is concerned. The clause will apply to records held by the local authority which were compiled for the purposes of making an application under the Bill, or in connection with any function which is referred to the local authority's social services committee. These functions are set out in the first schedule to the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970, and include the care, treatment and supervision of children and young people through the court process, and the supervision of a child subject to a court order in matrimonial proceedings.
If a guardian ad litem is to protect a child's interests when that child is subject to an application by a local authority, and if the guardian is to advise the court fully on that application, he must have access to the information held by the local authority when making decisions about that child's future. There are two reasons why this must be achieved by giving the guardian a specific right to inspect the local authority's records. First, we cannot rely upon procedural devices which will insist that local authorities give advance disclosure of their case, as that would make available only information upon which the local authority has chosen to rely. The guardian must also have access to information which the local authority does not rely on. In other words, the guardian must be entirely free to decide what information is relevant to his or her report.
Secondly, we cannot achieve the desired results by making local authorities open to everyone involved in a case because parts of the records are protected by privilege, which is necessary if the authorities themselves are to continue to perform their social work functions. For example, local authorities can protect their sources of information, which might otherwise be lost to them if that protection were removed. The contents of local authority records should not, therefore, be made generally available, but they should be made available to guardians ad litem. I have no doubt that hon. Members will appreciate the importance of the new clause and I commend it to the House.

Mr. Tom Clarke: The Solicitor-General has outlined the role of guardians ad litem in respect of local authorities. He said that it might be necessary for them to have access to local authority records at times so that they could feel free to proceed with their duties. The House will follow the thinking behind the Solicitor-General's remarks. However, for guardians ad litem adequately to discharge their duties, it may be that information from other public bodies is necessary. Does the Solicitor-General have in mind to consult the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, for example? Clearly, its involvement with many aspects of this legislation becomes important. Will the Solicitor-General consider, as a next step, whether its records should also be available, in specific cases, to the guardians ad litem?

Mr. McCartney: It is late, but the new clause is important. Many of the problems that arise in relation to child care orders and in courts determining the long-term future of children placed in care relate to judgments of information received and disseminated, whether that judgment is a value or subjective judgment and whether the sources of information have been dubious in the first instance.
When I and other hon. Members have dealt with cases in which there has been a serious miscarriage of justice about parental rights when a child has been taken into care, either in the initial stages or later in a magistrates court, much of the discussion thereafter has been about the ability of independent sources to consider and disseminate the information being prepared by the local authority in determination of the case.
Some months ago, just before the summer recess, we had a debate in the House late in the evening about access to information on social services' files and this debate follows on from that. I am one of those who are concerned that on occasions information on those files is misused, or


that information cannot be used adequately to protect the child or to give adequate information to the court to determine the long-term relationship between the child and the family, whether the parents only or the wider family.
I welcome the opportunity provided by the new clause to discuss the general question of access to information. My hon. Friend the Member for Monklands, West (Mr. Clarke) rightly raised the question of access to information other than that controlled by the local authority. We should also consider access between local authority departments. The development of information between local authority departments is not always clear and local authorities sometimes prevent significant information passing between departments. There are cases where a local authority has parental care over a child, but where the child's education is provided in a special establishment outside the direct control of that local authority. I know of instances in which information gathered between the two authorities has not been of a quality to make possible adequate decisions about the long-term care of a child.
I want to outline a case with which I was involved a few years ago. In that case the information was unreliable and no independent source was able to check it in the subsequent court proceedings and a disastrous chain of events unfolded.
11 pm
I will not identify the real names of the individuals concerned and will refer instead to the girl whom I will call Carol and her baby Louise. As a result of the inability of an independent source to check the quality of information provided by the social services to the courts or to have access to information during the proceedings, a chain of events occurred which caused the family to be separated. However, at the end of the day they were reunited.
Carol was visited by a health visitor and confided in the woman that she had a new boyfriend called Nicky. Unknown to Carol, the health visitor already knew Nicky who had suffered from a mental illness. The health visitor reported her concerns to a male social worker. Within 24 hours he called on Carol and asked her to sever the relationship with Nicky. At that stage Carol did not know what had been said between the health visitor and the social worker. She told the social worker that, at that stage, she was unwilling to sever the relationship, but she would consider it in view of what the social worker had said to her. She was revisited 24 hours later and decided to maintain her previous decision not to sever the relationship at that stage.
The following day, without consultation with Carol, her child was removed from the local authority nursery. The local authority report concluded:
There is no evidence at this stage of any form of abuse either in the home or the nursery.
Carol was immediately refused access to Louise and the magistrates confirmed the order at a subsequent court hearing.
Three months later Louise was put out for long-term foster and subsequently Christmas cards and presents for the baby were returned. A notice was sent to Carol stating that she would not be able to send birthday cards or correspond with the child in any way. At this stage, the mother was distraught at the circumstances and, despite

my efforts and subsequently those of solicitors, we could not find any independent sources of information to determine the way in which the decision was taken. Six months later the local authority applied to allow the long-term foster parents to retain baby Louise on the grounds that her relationship with her mother had completely broken down and no bonding existed.
The bonding had broken down precisely because the social services department had acted to effectively break off the relationship between mother and child. At no stage was any independent review taken of how the local authority had made its decision. No one could challenge the decision or ask for a review to determine what other information—if any—the local authority had gathered to reach its original conclusion.
Eventually, the foster parents applied to the authority to adopt. Subsequently the foster mother became pregnant and the foster arrangement broke down. Louise was placed in a children's home and then sent out to short-term fostering. After two years of negotiations between the local authority and the solicitors—instigated at my intervention —the baby was eventually returned to her mother. During that time the mother's relationship with Nicky proved to be stable—she married him and a baby sister was born to the family. At no stage during that traumatic two-year period could anyone intervene effectively to prevent that miscarriage of justice.
I welcome the new clause. If such a clause had existed in the interim, the independent guardian ad litem would have been able to intervene to assess the information provided by the local authority and the actions that were taken based on that information, and then properly represent the child.
I have met representatives of several self-help organisations throughout the United Kingdom. The case that I mentioned is not isolated. All too often decisions are taken by social workers not because they wish to act aggressively to families but because of pressure on them to try to protect children. They operate on the basis that they should act now rather than be sorry if an event takes place later. In many instances social workers work under pressure because of lack of resourcing for care teams in certain areas or because of general departmental underfunding. When protecting a child from any possible abuse we must determine whether abuse is likely to take place and not abuse that child's right to remain with its parents at that stage.
The new clause gives an opportunity also to protect children from abuses of authority when there are no grounds for children to be taken from their parents. There could be effective intervention by examining local authority records and determining whether there was sufficient reason to take certain action.
I hope that the case that I have outlined will be a matter of the past. Luckily, the family whom I mentioned have been brought together. There are many instances in which families are broken up and never brought together, with tragic consequences for mothers and children.

The Solicitor-General: I am grateful to the hon. Member for Makerfield (Mr. McCartney). His wide experience and the instances that he has mentioned help to illustrate the great variety of cases in which the Bill and this new clause might become relevant.
I shall answer the personal question raised by the hon. Member for Monklands, West (Mr. Clarke) about


circumstances in which the records of not a local authority but of some other responsible body—for example, the NSPCC—might need to be sought. When we adopted new clause 23 we gave an opportunity to give power for rules on access to documents to be furnished. The NSPCC, as an authorised person within the meaning of clause 28(9), could be required to provide access to such documents as the hon. Gentleman had in mind. I hope that is of assistance. I commend the new clause to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 24

ATTENDANCE OF CHILD AT HEARING UNDER PART IV OR V

' .—(1) In any proceedings in which a court is hearing an application for an order under Part IV or V, or is considering whether to make any such order, the court may order the child concerned to attend such stage or stages of the proceedings as may be specified in the order.

(2) The power conferred by subsection (1) shall be exercised in accordance with rules of court.

(3) subsections (4) to (6) apply where—

(a) an order under subsection (1) has not been complied with; or
(b) the order has reasonable cause to believe that it will not be complied with.

(4) The court may make a order authorising a constable, or such person as may be specified in the order—

(a) to take charge of the child and to bring him to the court; and
(b) to enter and search any premises specified in the order if he has reasonable cause to believe that the child may be found on the premises.

(5) The court may order any person who is in a position to do so to bring the child to the court.

(6) Where the court has reason to believe that a person has information about the whereabouts of the child it may order him to disclose it to the court.'.—[The Solicitor-General.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The effect of this new clause is to enable a court hearing an application for an order under part IV or part V of the Bill, which relate to care and supervision orders, or education supervision orders and other orders of that kind, to order that the child attend part or all of the proceedings. Such powers must be exercised in accordance with rules of court.
Subsections (4) to (6) give the court enforcement powers in the event of non-compliance. That is another addition to the Bill in the series on procedure and practice in family proceedings in the courts having concurrent jurisdiction. The purpose is to reproduce—in a decriminalised form, I hasten to say—the provisions of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969. At present, care proceedings are brought in juvenile courts by bringing the child before the court. In future, care will be sought by an application to the court by the local authority or authorised person.
The Bill's principal reforms on representation of the child and court procedure and practice should make it unnecessary for the child to attend the hearing in many cases. I hope that this will be much welcomed and that this point illustrates the points that I made in our longer debate earlier. The presumption that there will be a guardian ad litem for the child reporting to the court and his right of access to local authority records, which we have just dealt

with, and the requirements on advanced disclosure of the case, disclosure of documents and preliminary hearings which it is intended to make in rules of court should make it unnecessary for the child to attend. I know that all these new and welcome provisions will be much welcomed by the hon. Member for Ynys Môn (Mr. Jones) who dealt with this informality.
However, the child's attendance will be necessary in some cases. The circumstances of the case may be such that the court would be helped by hearing from the child directly, at first hand, for a number of reasons. There ma .y be contradictions in the arguments that have been put forward either by the legal representatives or by the guardian ad litem which may need to be sorted out. The new clause gives the court a discretionary power to call the child when hearing such applications.
There is also a decriminalising reform of the present model for enforcement. At present, under the 1969 Act, a child can be arrested and detained for up to 72 hours. That is not the kind of thing that we want to repeat, but there is a power that a child should be brought to the court for this purpose should it be necessary. One hopes that it would happen only in rare cases. I commend the new clause to the House.

Mr. Hardy: I take the view that, if a child's future is being determined by the court, there may well be a risk that the court will be excessively reluctant to bring the child to the court, but the child may be passionately keen to know what the court is saying.
I am reminded of a case that I know well in which a boy of 11 was attending a case conference where they were telling him about the family that he was to join on the following day. He decided that night that he did not want to wait until he was taken there by the social worker and he went to case the joint himself. He was concerned about the place to which he was to go. I think that he wanted to inspect the two motor cars on the drive. He could not wait. He was concerned about his position and his future. A, child might be in a children's home or some other establishment while a court is determining his or her future and discussing it, as it would under parts IV and V. There may be a risk that the court will be excessively protective.
Therefore, I was concerned to see the word "may" appear twice in subsection (1). I am sure that the Solicitor-General will have noted it. I am worried in case the double "may" in one sentence is evidence that the court will be excessively protective. I am not saying that it should be an invariable practice, but in the case of a relatively mature, tough or worldly wise boy or girl of 10, 11, 12 or 13, the court could be over-sensitive or over-protective if it sought to leave the child in an establishment a few miles away while his or her future was being disposed of by the court.
I am strongly in favour of the right being created but I want the right to be exercised in such a way that, especially if the child wishes, he or she may be involved.

The Solicitor-General: What the hon. Member for Wentworth (Mr. Hardy) says carries much force. The new clause not only gives the court the discretion and the right to exercise the power to require the child to come to court, but there is no reason why the court should not intimate to the child that it would like it to come and that it is open to the child to come. The child, as a party, is entitled to


attend, and that entitlement alone might be brought to its attention. I take the hon. Gentleman's point. I commend the new clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 25

ORDERS PENDING APPEALS IN CASES ABOUT CARE OR SUPERVISION ORDERS

' .—(1) Where—

(a) a court dismisses an application for a care order; and
(b) at the time when the court dismisses the application, the child concerned is the subject of an interim care order,

the court may make a care order with respect to the child to have effect subject to such directions (if any) as the court may see fit to include in the order.

(2) Where—

(a) a court dismisses an application for a care order, or an application for a supervision order; and
(b) at the time when the court dismisses the application, the child concerned is the subject of an interim supervision order,

the court may make a supervision order with respect to the child to have effect subject to such directions (if any) as the court may see fit to include in the order.

(3) Where a court grants an application to discharge a care order or supervision order, it may order that—

(a) its decision is not to have effect; or
(b) the care order, or supervision order, is to continue to have effect but subject to such directions as the court sees fit to include in the order.

(4) An order made under this section shall only have effect for such period, not exceeding the appeal period, as may be specified in the order.

(5) Where—

(a) an appeal is made against any decision of a court under this section; or
(b) any application is made to the appellate court in connection with a proposed appeal against that decision,

the appellate court may extend the period for which the order in question is to have effect, but not so as to extend it beyond the end of the appeal period.

(6) In this section "the appeal period" means—

(a) where an appeal is made against the decision in question, the period between the making of that decision and the determination of the appeal; and
(b) otherwise, the period during which an appeal may be made against the decision.'.—[The Solicitor-General.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Harold Walker): With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment No.
320.

The Solicitor-General: The new clause deals with orders pending appeal and will give the courts power to order that a child remain in care, or place him under supervision, pending an appeal when dismissing an application for a care order.
In a similar way, the courts will be able to order that a child stay under supervision pending appeal, when a supervision order is refused. Such powers will be available only when the child is already subject to an interim order.
Courts will also be empowered to order that the child remain in care pending appeal when discharging a care or supervision order. Further, under amendment No. 320, the power to stay the effect of orders will also be extended to those which approve arrangements for children in local authority care to live abroad.
The powers are necessary to avoid needless disruption to the child where there is a good chance that an appellate court will reverse a first instance decision to refuse an order.
The new clause balances the need to consider the child's best interests, by protecting him from unnecessary disruption, against the basic premise that the child should not be kept away from his parents where the local authority has failed to obtain an order. The restrictions placed upon the availability and duration of the orders strike that balance in the best way possible.
Amendment No. 320 completes the picture concerning orders pending appeal. The amendment relates to the situation where the court is asked to approve arrangements for a child in local authority care to live abroad. There must be power to stay this approval pending an appeal as rights of appeal would be useless if the child could be removed from the jurisdiction before an appeal is heard.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 26

TESTS TO ESTABLISH PATERNITY

' . In section 20 of the Family Law Reform Act 1969 (power of court to require use of tests to determine paternity), the following subsections shall be inserted after subsection (1)—

"(1A) Where—

(a) an application is made for a direction under this section; and
(b) the person whose paternity is in issue is under the age of eighteen when the application is made,

the application shall specify who is to carry out the tests.

(1B) In the case of a direction made on an application to which subsection (1A) applies the court shall—

(a) specify, as the person who is to carry out the tests, the person specified in the application; or
(b) where the court considers that it would be inappropriate to specify that person (whether because to specify him would be incompatible with any provision made by or under regulations made under section 22 of this Act or for any other reason), decline to give the direction applied for.".'.—[The Solicitor-General.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 28

PRIVACY FOR CHILDREN INVOLVED IN CERTAIN PROCEEDINGS

' .—(1) Rules made under section 144 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 may make provision for a magistrates' court to sit in private in proceedings in which any powers under this Act may be exercised by the court with respect to any child.

(2) No person shall publish any material which is intended, or likely, to identify—

(a) any child as being involved in any proceedings before a magistrates' court in which any power under this Act may be exercised by the court with respect to that or any other child; or
(b) an address or school as being that of a child involved in any such proceedings.

(3) In any proceedings for an offence under this section it shall be a defence for the accused to prove that he did not know, and had no reason to suspect, that the published material was intended, or likely, to identify the child.

(4) The court or the Secretary of State may, if satisfied that the welfare of the child requires it, by order to dispense with the requirements of subsection (2) to such extent as may be specified in the order.

(5) For the purposes of this section—

"publish" includes—

(a) broadcast by radio, television or cable television; or
(b) cause to be published; and

"material" includes any picture or representation.

(6) Any person who contravenes this section shall be guilty of an offence and liable, on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale.

(7) Subsection (1) is without prejudice to—

(a) the generality of the rule making power in section 144 of the Act of 1980; or
(b) any other power of a magistrates' court to sit in private.

(8) Section 71 of the Act of 1980 (newspaper reports of certain proceedings) shall apply in relation to any proceedings to which this section applies subject to the provisions of this section.'.—[The Solicitor General]

Brought up, and read the First time.

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment No. 310.

The Solicitor-General: This new clause is concerned only with cases heard before magistrates and deals with the matter of privacy.
The ability of magistrates courts to sit in private and restrictions on publication of material about children involved in civil cases differ, at present, between courts and according to the type of case being heard. For example, most cases affecting the custody of or access to children which are heard in magistrates courts are heard under the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971 in the domestic court. Rules of court may specify when hearings under this Act can be held in private, and rules currently provide that the court shall hear applications in private where it considers this is expedient in the interests of the minor. But there is no similar power in relation to care cases.
The Bill repeals the 1971 Act and new clause 18, which we have already debated, removes jurisdiction to hear care cases from the juvenile court and transfers it to the domestic court. The net effect of all this, if we do not provide otherwise, is to remove protection already afforded today by the law to children involved in care, custody and access cases. In addition, the current hotch-potch of protection in these matters needs to be replaced by coherent and consistent provisions.
Amendment No. 310 adds another exception, to take account of new clause 28, which deals with privacy for children in certain proceedings. A court or the Secretary of State will have power by order, under subsection (4) of that clause, to lift the restrictions upon identifying a child involved in proceedings under the Bill. This is because it may be in the child's best interests, albeit only in rare cases, for facts to be fully published, rather than have rumour and speculation flourish. Such orders will have to be made quickly. It would be both unwieldy and inappropriate for them to be made under the statutory instrument procedure.
I commend the new clause to the House.

Mr. Michael Stern: I shall not detain the House long, but I wish to explore with my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General what this clause comprises because I think that it may go wider than he has described. He may be aware that I was in correspondence with my hon. and learned Friend the Minister for Health about a related matter some time ago. Would my hon. And learned Friend the Solicitor-General agree that under the proposed clause, with which I heartily agree, it would be possible for magistrates to order privacy when powers under the Bill were being considered when privacy was required not for the child but for another person connected with the case?
I am thinking of a case which occurred in my constituency in which privacy would have been necessary for the protection of the accused adult in the case. Does my hon. and learned Friend agree with me that, under the new clause, should magistrates so decide, there would be powers available to them to protect the adult? I am not necessarily asking my hon. and learned Friend to answer this query straight away, but I should be most grateful if he would write to me if he cannot give me an answer now.

The Solicitor-General: If I do not rise to my feet too rapidly, I may be able to oblige my hon. Friend now.
The position will be dealt with by rules of court which will set out the circumstances under which the court can sit in private. Those rules of court have still to be formulated and my hon. Friend's point will be borne in mind when we draft them.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 29

SELF-INCRIMINATION

' .—(1) In any proceedings in which a court is hearing an application for an order under Part IV or V, no person shall be excused from—

(a) giving evidence on any matter; or
(b) answering any question put to him in the course of his giving evidence, on the ground that doing so might incriminate him or his spouse of an offence.

(2) A statement or admission made in such proceedings shall not be admissible in evidence against the person making it or his spouse in proceedings for an offence other than perjury.'.—[The Solicitor-General.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
This new clause deals with self-incrimination. It is important that courts hearing applications for care or supervision orders, or for emergency protection orders, should have the benefit of all the evidence available to them. Generally, a witness in proceedings enjoys a privilege against self-incrimination. Courts hearing the types of application outlined under parts IV and V of the Bill should not be deprived of potentially useful evidence, even on this ground.
Therefore, the new clause removes that privilege in respect of applications under those parts of the Bill. In its place, it grants such a witness an indemnity so that his evidence in those proceedings cannot be relied upon in proceedings against himself or his spouse for any criminal offence other than perjury.
I commend the new clause to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 31

APPLICATION OF PART X TO SCOTLAND

' . In the application to Scotland of this Part.

(a) "the court" means the sheriff;
(b) "day care" means any form of care or of activity supervised by a responsible person provided for children during the day (whether or not it is provided on a regular basis);
(c) "education authority" has the same meaning as in the Education (Scotland) Act 1980;
(d) "local authority foster parent" means a foster parent with whom a child is placed by a local authority;
(e) for references to a person having parental responsibility for a child there shall be substituted references to a person in whom parental rights and duties relating to the child are vested; and
(f) for references to fostering a child privately there shall be substituted references to maintaining a foster child within the meaning of the Foster Children (Scotland) Act 1984.'.—[Mr. Mellor.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 293 to 298 and Government amendment No. 363.

Mr. Mellor: These are technical amendments designed to allow part X of the Bill to operate in Scotland.

Mr. Tom Clarke: I assure the House that at this late hour I do not propose to initiate a major debate on Scotland, inviting though that is. There are those who

might suggest that so keen am I on promoting the Solicitor-General that there might be a vacancy for the Secretary of State for Scotland in the not-too-distant-future and he might be seen as an applicant.
My hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Garscadden (Mr. Dewar) would expect me to ask a question or two. We appreciate that the new clause applies to part X of the Bill, which deals with child minding and day care. It is rather comprehensive. It includes the sheriff courts, day care, education authorities, local authority foster parents, parental rights and references to fostering a child privately.
In Committee, even on issues such as these, which I accept cannot be argued to have a major impact on how we deal with these matters, voluntary organisations and local authorities had an opportunity to give us their views. I might be mistaken, but I have not had an opportunity to hear the views of any Scottish organisations. I am not aware of the views of the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities.
I am asking the Minister, not to give me an assurance that such views will be sought before tomorrow morning, or even before the Bill reaches another place, but that, before implementation, the Government, particularly the Secretary of State for Scotland, will bear in mind the views of such organisations.

Mr. Mellor: I dinna ken too much about this the noo —but I shall do my best to give the undertaking that the hon. Gentleman wants.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

Further consideration of the Bill adjourned.—[Mr. Kenneth Carlisle.]

Bill, as amended (in the Standing Committee), to be further considered tomorrow.

Dangerous Goods (Transport by Sea)

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Kenneth Carlisle.]

Mr. George Howarth: There is, quite properly, wide public concern about environmental issues, and the subject of this debate is a potentially serious matter that requires Government action.
One case highlights starkly the need for the law relating to the transport of cargoes to be tightened. In September last year, the ship Ardlough sank in the Irish sea, and much of its deadly cargo—a cocktail of dangerous substances and low-level radioactive waste carried in unlabelled containers—landed at various locations on the north-west coast. The authorities and emergency services had great difficulty dealing with the consequences of this incident for one crucial reason—they did not have sufficient information to work from.
As a result, the Association of Metropolitan Authorities conducted a detailed review of the procedures involved and, in August, recommended changes to the legal framework in six key areas. The first concerned blanket cover—the system which allows ships to move from one port to another without notifying the authorities other than at six-monthly intervals. The AMA suggests that cover should be limited to single cargoes such as oil tankers.
Secondly, the requirement for transport operators to give only 24 hours' notice of their intention to bring dangerous goods into ports should possibly be increased, but most certainly the time that applies at the moment should be properly enforced, because port authorities are frequently not given that type of notice.
Thirdly, harbour masters should be required by clear regulation to give higher priority to safety rather than, as we often suspect is the case at the moment, to economic factors.
Fourthly, pilots should be required to accompany ships with dangerous cargoes into and out of ports. Such a deficiency, if I may so call it, may have been a factor in the recent Humber tanker collision. That cannot be proved as yet, but one can hope that the facts will be discovered.
Fifthly, all faces of containers that carry this kind of material should be clearly labelled with a durable label that could withstand up to three months in the sea.
Finally, the emergency planning authorities and local authorities should be given enough financial support to enable them to carry out proper planning and to make resources available to deal with such problems as and when they arise. The legislation covering that urgently needs to be reviewed and revised.
I should add in passing that this raises questions about the powers of emergency planning officers, which are too restricted for the demands placed on them. I hope that the Home Secretary—I recognise that this is a transport matter—will build on the comments in his speech of 5 September of this year to the Fire International conference. I am aware that the Department of Transport responded to the AMA's report in a letter dated 12 September 1989, but that response was inadequate and unhelpful. Time prevents me from commenting in too much detail on that response, but having read it I am at a loss to see how, for example, the incident I mentioned

earlier could have been eased by the response envisaged by the Department. Clearly, more needs to be done and a more intelligent response is needed.
The Government's general attitude to environmental matters is worrying. It is instanced by the late signing of the Basle convention on toxic waste—the Government were one of the last Governments to sign it. Our present methods and procedures are wholly inadequate when set against acceptable modern safety standards. The Government's complacency stands in stark contrast with their political posture as the guardians of our green and pleasant land.
If the letter I referred to earlier is indicative, the Government's rhetoric is hollow, their proposals are thin or non-existent and their intentions are nothing more than a tendency to tawdry window-dressing. In many of these issues, particularly that of the transport of these goods by sea, the Government try to lock the stable door after the horse has bolted. Too many disasters are waiting to happen for this approach to be acceptable. More needs to be done. The AMA has good ideas and I hope that the Government will respond to them more positively than they have done do far.

The Minister for Aviation and Shipping (Mr. Patrick McLoughlin): I thank the hon. Member for Knowsley, North (Mr. Howarth) for giving me the opportunity of appearing at the Dispatch Box for the first time before a number of changes take place in the Chamber. I also thank him for giving me the chance to speak about this subject, which has been of some topical interest in recent years but which has not had the attention of the House for some time.
As one with both a background and constituency in Merseyside, the hon. Member is naturally concerned with ports and with the welfare of those that go down to the sea in ships. It is refreshing to be asked to respond on a topic that, while close to the hearts of many of us, stands a better chance of being treated in a dispassionate and non-partisan spirit, and on which, even in the short time afforded by an Adjournment debate, it is possible to get some meeting of minds.
I shall be responding to individual points in a few moments, but first I should like to say a few words about the current framework for dealing with maritime carriage of dangerous goods and associated emergency planning, dealing with the emergency planning aspect first.
Contingency plans exist to deal with a spillage or loss of dangerous goods from a ship at sea. The Department's marine pollution control unit, which was set up in 1979 with specific responsibilities for contingency planning and for taking charge of operations to deal with pollution at sea, has access to expert advice on chemical and radioactive hazards and has under contract both a strike team of personnel experienced in handling dangerous cargoes and cargo transfer equipment.
When an accident happens to a vessel the unit would first try to ascertain the intentions of the owners or the salvors to contain pollution or the threat thereof. If necessary, the Secretary of State would exercise his powers of intervention if it became apparent that the owners or salvors were not taking all reasonable steps to avoid or combat pollution, or if they were not in a position to do so. These powers are statutory ones and derive from the


Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971 supplemented by the Merchant Shipping (Prevention of Pollution) (Intervention) Order 1980, which was passed by this Government. These powers are very wide. Where an accident has happened in or to a ship and pollution will or may be caused on a large scale in the United Kingdom or in United Kingdom territorial waters, the Secretary of State may give directions to owners, masters or salvors of ships requiring them to take, or refrain from taking, any action of any sort whatever. Moreover, if he feels that the powers to give directions are inadequate, the Secretary of State may himself take any action of any kind whatever, which can include taking control of the ship or even destroying it.
In an incident threatening grave or imminent pollution we shall not hesitate to use those powers if need be. This was demonstrated in March of this year when a small Panamanian-registered, Indonesian-owned ship, the Perintis, capsized and sank in international waters in the middle of the English channel, about 35 miles south-east of Brixham. The vessel had a quantity of toxic pesticides on board and the expert advice to the marine pollution control unit was that the chemicals posed a major pollution threat to the marine environment and to United Kingdom fishery interests in particular. The owner of the vessel was not intending to do anything about the chemicals, and accordingly the Secretary of State authorised the MPCU to take direct action to recover the drums of pesticide which were scattered over the sea bed when the vessel capsized. Later, 28 of the 32 drums of toxic chemicals were successfully recovered. Tests showed that they had a much lower rate of solubility in sea water than first feared and scientific advice was that a continued search for the remaining drums was not therefore justified.
The Government's response on that occasion shows that we are conscious of the environmental hazards posed by the loss of dangerous goods being transported by sea, and we are ready to take action where it is practicable to do so.
Turning briefly to the general question of transport of dangerous goods by sea, I am well aware of the increasing concern for the protection of the marine environment, which can be undertaken only with international co-operation. The promotion of safety of life at sea was a major factor in the setting up 30 years ago of the International Maritime Organisation as a United Nations specialised agency based in London, and very soon afterwards work was begun, based on the United Kingdom's own Blue Book, on codifying internationally accepted provisions on classification, packing, marking, labelling, stowage and segregation of packaged dangerous goods—work which took shape in the form of the international maritime dangerous goods code, or the IMDG code as it is more familiarly known. There has been similar activity in dealing with bulk carriage of chemicals, gases and solid bulk materials. In all this, successive United Kingdom Governments have played an active role. The IMO's 30th anniversary year, as it happens, coincides with the issue of a new edition of the IMDG code, which for the first time contains detailed provisions controlling the marking, identification, packing and stowage of cargoes known to be marine pollutants and reporting of incidents involving them. These amended provisions will

enable international adoption of annex III to the marine pollution convention, and the Department is preparing new regulations to implement the changed requirements nationally.
Although our plans for dealing with emergencies are tried and tested, I am keen to deal with potential problems by preventive action rather than by measures to handle the consequences of an accident.

Mr. George Howarth: May I welcome the Minister to the Dispatch Box for the first time? I am familiar with the authority that he has mentioned. Is he aware of the European Commission directive 89/C147/03 of 24 May? It places a requirement on member states to observe articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the directive which covers the ground that I spoke about and about which the Minister has also spoken.

Mr. McLoughlin: I am aware of that directive. There will be a chance to discuss that in the House at a later date and I look forward to that.
As I was saying, there are detailed and complex internationally agreed rules governing the transport of dangerous goods by sea. One way to do that is to ensure that ships carrying dangerous goods meet the international standards applicable to them. Tankers carrying chemicals in bulk and gas carriers are already singled out by surveyors in the port state control inspections.
Ministers meeting next March for the third international conference on the protection of the North sea will be considering how the present arrangements for ship inspection can be extended to cover all equipment and the operational requirements required by current international conventions in respect of pollution prevention and safety. Under these measures, ships carrying certain dangerous goods in packaged form will be given special consideration under port state control procedures.
I hope that the hon. Gentleman will join me in congratulating the marine pollution control unit on its effective and fast response in averting what could have been a nasty and serious environmental accident following the recent collision in the Humber. The quick response of the unit and the Department averted such a disaster. Oil spillage is covered under international liability and international insurance. The quick and effective way in which we responded to the incident in the Humber demonstrated at first hand the way in which the Department and the Government are set up to meet the challenges presented by such accidents.
The hon. Gentleman spoke about emergency planning by local authorities. Of course, that is a matter for my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department. I understand that there is a framework in existence which allows expenditure on civil emergency planning in a variety of ways. Apart from these provisions, my right hon. Friend has announced that he intends to appoint a civil emergencies adviser who will have oversight of civil emergency planning in peacetime.
The regulations about dangerous substances in harbour areas require the harbour authorities to prepare an effective emergency plan for dealing with emergencies that affect or could affect dangerous substances in their areas. In terms of the identification of which goods on board are dangerous and where they are stowed, the master is obliged to prepare a dangerous goods manifest or stowage plan from the information provided on the various


dangerous goods declarations that he is given. That list or plan must indicate the name of each of the dangerous goods carried and show where each is stowed in the ship.
When I was in Southampton a few weeks ago I was able to see the way in which a ship's master carefully monitors and clearly identifies where dangerous or suspect cargo is loaded, as he is required to do by the various regulations. That enables easy access to the goods and such goods are not allowed to be placed in the main hold of the ship. In addition, packages, vehicles and freight containers are required to have hazard labels or placards so that they can easily be picked out by an inspector.
I am sure that we shall return to this topic. I have already spoken about the EC order. I thank the hon. Gentleman for his contribution and for the stimulating and educational debate. The hon. Member has done us all a service by his choice of subject. I know that this is not the last time that we shall hear about maritime safety. This debate has been a useful and constructive start.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at sixteen minutes to Twelve o'clock.